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Abstract
The worst economic and financial crisis since the Great Depression in the
1930s, the Great Recession, followed by the Sovereign Debt Crisis (ESDC) in Euro
area countries have revived interest in fiscal policy, and particularly in various topics
related to its interactions with monetary policy in a monetary union. Despite a
recent surge in theoretical and empirical work in this area, there are still many
important questions that have not been explored and this thesis aims to fill this
gap.
This thesis consists of three essays. Chapter one and chapter two focus on
particular sets of questions that partially address newly emerging problems in the
wake of the ESDC. Their common link is the existence of the Euro area and problems
of national fiscal policies in this monetary union. Chapter three analyses effects of a
government intervention in the form of an unexpected public sector salary increase.
The main focus of chapter one is on fiscal (debt) sustainability and the so-
called fiscal fatigue hypothesis (‘debt legacy’). For that purpose I firstly estimate
a fiscal policy rule for Euro area countries, and test its robustness with various
economic, financial and institutional determinants. Subsequently, the fiscal fatigue
hypothesis is examined by estimating a non-linear specification of the same fiscal
policy rule as suggested in the literature. In addition, I propose a simple linear debt
rule for identifying the risk of fiscal fatigue.
In chapter two I analyse the fiscal policy behaviour of ‘old’ Euro area coun-
tries (EA-12) and three stand-alone EU countries (EU-3), given institutional con-
straints imposed on fiscal policy in the wake of the European integration process. To
capture the changing nature of fiscal behaviour, I estimate a Bayesian time-varying
parameter fiscal rule. Since fiscal harmonization is an important consequence of
fiscal constraint, I also try to capture that effect by looking at the dispersion of
country-specific Euro area fiscal behaviour and compare it with countries facing less
strict fiscal constraints (EU-3).
The last chapter aims to shed some light on a government intervention (a
quasi-natural experiment) represented by an unexpected increase of public employ-
ees’ salary. Given the type of intervention, I can construct a ‘natural’ treated and a
control group (private employees) and link them with data from a household budget
survey. To compare their consumption behaviour, I estimate a regression model
controlling for relevant economic and socio-demographic characteristics.
xi
Chapter 1
Introduction
The Global Recession and the related Sovereign Debt Crisis in the Euro area (ESDC)
have resulted in heightened volatility and uncertainty that have already persisted
for several years, making them the most serious economic and financial disruptions
since the Great Depression of the 1930s. Fiscal policy measures have been imple-
mented in attempts to revive weak aggregate demand (via consumption spending)
and economic growth, and to avoid repeating mistakes from the past. However,
many of these measures have unexpectedly (soon) run out of steam. Conversely,
fiscal policy has showed the other face that is related to its long-term effects (sus-
tainability) as a result of large and increasing public debts across countries around
the world. More recently, a mix of low real GDP growth, and low rates of infla-
tion have compounded the problems. High private and sovereign indebtedness have
placed serious and potentially long-lasting limits on economic activity and changed
the economic and financial environment in many countries.1
Many developed countries, still facing grim economic outlooks have since re-
sponded with various non-standard monetary measures such as quantitative easing.
Coupled with radical changes in financial intermediation, the standard economic
and fiscal landscape that prevailed for several decades has also undergone signif-
icant transformation. Suddenly, bond yields and interest rates have approached
not-for-a-very-long-time or never ever seen lows, and in some cases even entering
negative territory, substantially reducing pressure on severely strained public fi-
nances.2 However, having consumed all of its gunpowder, monetary policy became
‘gridlocked’ in the zero-lower-bound (ZLB) trap and thus gradually became ineffec-
tive. This rather extraordinary environment has led to the revival of a relatively
1 For some early evidence see for example a series of McKinsey reports, such as Dobbs et al.
(2015).
2 Some evidence (mainly for euro area countries) can be found in Jobst and Lin (2016).
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enduring discussion of roles and tasks attributed to monetary policy, and fiscal pol-
icy. In particular, as this discussion evolved over the years, fiscal policy has grown to
again become one of the only available tools in policy-makers’ pockets.3 However,
fiscal policy has now been seriously constrained, haunted by its own shadows.
This situation bares some resemblance to Catch-22, but is even more compli-
cated and complex in the case of countries or member states of a monetary union.
Having given up their monetary policy independence and exchange rate, fiscal pol-
icy and its toolkit is the only remaining domestically controlled tool that is useful
for macroeconomic stabilization. Without any doubts, the role of fiscal policy has
become much more important, and its on-going health deserves increased scrutiny.
This thesis consists of three essays that address some of the current fiscal
issues that are outlined above. The link between Chapter 1 and Chapter 2 is the
existence of a monetary union. Chapter 3 departs slightly to analyse the effects
of a government intervention in a particular setting several years before the Great
Recession, but with many surprising similarities to much later events. Macroeco-
nomic stability, debt (fiscal policy) sustainability and the alignment of fiscal policy
measures among member states are of key importance, both for the single monetary
authority, and for the very existence of a monetary union. This has been repeat-
edly emphasised across a wide range of theoretical, empirical and policy-oriented
publications by a range of well-known economists and institutions, including the
European Commission, the ECB, the IMF or OECD. This introductory chapter will
briefly review all three chapters and their main findings and contributions. I then
conclude this introduction by summarising the main findings of all three chapters in
greater detail. The last chapter of this thesis reviews main findings across all three
chapters and offers some suggestions regarding possible extensions.
Chapter 1, titled, ‘Fiscal Reaction Function and Fiscal Fatigue in the Euro
Area’,4 investigates fiscal (debt) sustainability and debt related problems (fiscal
fatigue) of Euro area member states. This is explored by estimating a fiscal policy
rule (inspired by the Bohn, 1998’s strand of literature), and examining its stability
and robustness for these countries. The fiscal rule is a simple but powerful approach
3 Either in the form proposed by classical public finance theory or in a more recent role aimed
at macroeconomic stabilization in the (new) Keynesian public finances literature. The latter has
particularly been subject to disputes since there seems to be a trade-off between short-run demand
management and the (long-run) implications for sustainability of public finances, for an overview
see Burger (2005).
See also regular publications of international organisations or numerous articles and books published
recently by research institutions such as CEPR or NBER; further references can be found in Afonso
and Toffano (2013) or Baldwin and Giavazzi (2016).
4 This chapter was written jointly with Cristina Checherita-Westphal during my PhD traineeship
at the ECB in 2014.
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for assessing the fiscal sustainability of a country since it is not dependent on detailed
microeconomic time series that may not be available, or estimates (educated guesses)
of structural parameters that are often subject to criticisms.
As a second step, the chapter also explores the so-called fiscal fatigue hy-
pothesis for this group for EA countries.5 Apart from the estimation of a non-linear
model of debt a` la Ghosh et al. (2013) for the EA sample, we propose a way of test-
ing fiscal fatigue with a simple linear rule. Such a model can easily be implemented
both in countries with limited availability of economic time series. This model can
also be used as an early warning system in distressed countries, given the robustness
of fiscal rule estimates across countries at different stages of economic development.
As the title ‘Do Institutional Changes Affect Fiscal Policy Behaviour? Time-
Varying Evidence from Europe’ illustrates, Chapter 2 analyses changes in fiscal pol-
icy behaviour triggered by institutional rules and regulations (‘fiscal institutions’)
among twelve Euro Area (EA) members in comparison with three stand-alone EU
members. These changes importantly include the most recent EU macro-fiscal reg-
ulations that were implemented in response to the ESDC. Fiscal policy is approx-
imated with changes in primary balance, modelled within two types of fiscal rules:
one that follows model-based sustainability literature (Leeper, 1991 or Bohn, 1998),
the other resembling a monetary policy Taylor rule with microeconomic founda-
tions (Kirsanova et al., 2005). This chapter then combines a time-varying parameter
model estimation with Bayesian techniques (following the work of Kim and Nelson,
1999), and uses a novel quarterly dataset of fiscal and economic determinants over
the period 1980q1–2015q4.
For the empirical analysis, individual countries are grouped by their debt
levels (below 50% of GDP, between 50% and 80% and above), allowing for different
levels of effort expected to be carried out so that debt development is kept under
control (that is sustainable). Further, this chapter also investigates the (indirect)
effect of fiscal institutional change on the harmonization of fiscal behaviour in the
Euro area, and compares it with changes in the case of the stand-alone EU countries.
Chapter 3’s title ‘Consumption Responses to an Unexpectedly Large Shock in
Public Salaries – Evidence From a Government Intervention in Hungary’ is at first
sight somewhat distinct compared with the previous two Chapters, but is equally
pertinent to fiscal policy. In this chapter I explore a government intervention that
took place in Hungary in 2002 – a large unanticipated increase of public employ-
ees’ salaries – (a quasi-natural experiment, in the notion of Fuchs-Schu¨ndeln and
5 Since there are many definitions of fiscal fatigue, I follow Ghosh et al. (2013)’s definition that
relates fiscal fatigue to the impossibility of adjusting primary balance such that it would stabilise
the existing level of outstanding public debt.
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Schu¨ndeln, 2015) and its effects on households consumption. Therefore, this anal-
ysis offers some very timely implications, since the majority of recent experiments
have included changes in taxation, both randomized and pre-announced. Given the
fact that only one side of the labour market is affected, it provides a natural classi-
fication of individuals subject to the intervention (treated group). In this chapter I
am able to analyse the effects of the base salary increase on consumption responses
among households by combining information obtained from employment surveys
with budget surveys. The specific setting of a transition country trying to join the
EU, combined with unexpected and rather large government intervention (salary
increase), is a mix that is usually not observed. It complements the only existing
study that uses this intervention to analyse wage spillovers between the private and
public sector (see Telegdy, 2017). The findings, implications and conclusions of this
chapter are particularly attractive for policy-makers deciding on various changes
within the public sector or across sectors in an economy such as a reform of welfare
or pension system.
1.1 Overview of Chapter 1
After the global economic and financial crisis, and euro area sovereign debt crisis,
questions about fiscal sustainability in advanced economies have featured promi-
nently in academic and policy debates. The large debt burden of most sovereigns
has weighed on their economic outlook, further complicating the sustainability of
public finances in the face of rising age-related payments, and the expected down-
ward trend in potential GDP growth.
This chapter deals with the topic of fiscal sustainability by employing a
so-called ‘fiscal reaction function’ (FRF) to euro area economies (EA-18) for the
period 1970–2013. In this framework, we empirically test whether euro area govern-
ments abide, on average, by (weak) sustainability constraints, that is, whether they
tend to ensure higher budget surpluses when their debt ratio increases (so-called
model-based sustainability, see D’Erasmo et al., 2015). Our dataset is adjusted for
government support to the financial sector, which has been sizeable in some cases at
the height of the euro area sovereign crisis. This allows us to avoid peaks in primary
deficits that would otherwise unduly reflect fiscal loosening and induce high data
volatility. We also propose a novel concept to investigate fiscal fatigue for the euro
area sovereigns. This is based on the estimated coefficient (associated with debt) of
the fiscal reaction function that is often used to benchmark the realism of primary
balance projections in the context of debt sustainability simulations.
4
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Using various dynamic panel techniques, we find evidence that euro area
sovereigns abide, on average, by (weak) sustainability constraints. The primary
balance improves by about 0.03–0.05 for every 1 percentage point increase in the
debt-to-GDP ratio after controlling for other relevant factors. We show that the
FRF estimates are rather robust across various specifications, time periods and
the exclusion of individual countries. We also conduct a series of country-specific
robustness checks and find that responses do not extensively differ. With regards to
other determinants of stronger fiscal positions (higher primary surpluses), we also
find evidence for political factors (non-election years), improved external positions
(support for the twin deficits hypothesis), and lower interest payment burden, inter
alia. After controlling for the economic cycle (size of output gap), the positive
reaction of primary surpluses to higher debt strengthened over the crisis, and seemed
to have acted as a disciplining device, as compared to the preceding period. We do
not find strong evidence for a stable cyclical behaviour (stabilisation) function of
fiscal policy across the euro area countries.
The second contribution of the chapter proposes a novel approach to mea-
suring fiscal fatigue. This simple measure allows the classification of countries based
on their actual fiscal behaviour with few assumptions. Hence, one can measure the
extent of fiscal fatigue for individual euro area countries by comparing the simu-
lated primary balance paths in the context of debt sustainability analyses with each
country’s track-record, adjusted for the change in debt ratios by the estimated FRF
coefficient. If the projected fiscal path, say as an average for a period of 5 or 10
years, is better than the country’s performance in the past, adjusted for the change
in the debt level, then the sovereign may be signalled as being at risk of fiscal fa-
tigue. Such risk would need to be further investigated to determine more concrete
country-specific risks. We provide illustrative examples for the application of this
approach to the euro area countries in our sample. We also investigate an alterna-
tive estimation of the fiscal fatigue hypothesis using a non-linear FRF as proposed
in Ghosh et al. (2013), but do not find sufficiently robust support for the euro area
sample.
5
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1.2 Overview of Chapter 2
While the first chapter explicitly considers problems of debt sustainability, this
chapter emphasises the importance of fiscal policy in a single monetary policy envi-
ronment, as a means of responding to country-specific shocks coming primarily from
differences in business cycles across member countries (asymmetric shocks). This
emphasis on fiscal policy is contrary to commonly used monetary policy approaches
that deal with common (symmetric) shocks such as currency fluctuations. In this
case, (fiscal, debt) sustainability is important because of two reasons: firstly, to guar-
antee macroeconomic stability (providing the government with necessary room to
cope with asymmetric shocks, and for coordination with monetary policy), secondly,
in the finance-fiscal sense, where sustainable (sound) fiscal policy is a key condition
for the stability of domestic financial institutions (see Be´nassy-Que´re´, 2016).6 These
reasons call for the existence of rules or ‘fiscal institutions’ that can help to main-
tain sustainable (sound) fiscal policy, and prevent member states from free-riding in
a single currency environment. However, such (fixed) rules would require efficient
mechanisms (tools) to enhance their credibility and mitigate moral hazard problems
since there is often a temptation to avoid them under limited enforceability (moral
hazard).
In this chapter I analyse the effects of institutional changes on fiscal policy
in Europe (‘rules of fiscal game’), focusing on the ‘old’ members of the Euro area
(EA-12) and three stand-alone EU countries (EU-3).7 Recent changes in the regu-
latory framework have made it substantially faster and easier to impose (pecuniary)
sanctions on EA members if they do not comply with various forms of regulation
of fiscal matters. However, non-EA members subject to the same regulation may
‘only’ (non-binding) face recommendations without de facto sanctions.8 This may of
course affect the effort that individual countries devote to meeting such a regulatory
framework, and how they respond to its modification. Therefore, I firstly investi-
6 The literature has suggested that a loop exists here: a worsening of fiscal policy behaviour
is reflected in the prices of sovereigns’ debt instruments, with negative effects on banks’ balance
sheets, profitability and potential need to provide state guarantees. However, such a scenario would
consequently put an additional layer of pressure on already distressed public finances (the so-called
‘Diabolic loop’, see Acharya et al., 2014; Brunnermeier et al., 2016).
7 This group of countries includes: Austria, Belgium, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Lux-
embourg, Ireland, Italy, the Netherlands, Portugal, and Spain. Greece became an EU member
in 1981, Spain and Portugal in 1986, Austria and Finland in 1995. The EU-3 group of countries
consists of: Denmark, Sweden, and the United Kingdom. These countries did not belong to the
original group of six member states (‘founders’) either: Denmark and the United Kingdom became
EU members in 1973, and Sweden in 1995.
8 The most ‘serious’ sanction would be related to the temporary suspension of the use of various
EU funds, such as those for structural adjustment.
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gate whether changes in the EU-wide institutional environment had any effects on
fiscal behaviour during the decades long European integration process. Apart from
examining the effects of the pre-Euro integration (Maastricht Treaty) and the first
years of the Euro (Stability and Growth Pact), focus is paid to an original analysis of
the effects of crisis-related institutional changes on fiscal regulation (coordination)
in the post-2010 period, the Fiscal Treaty in particular.
The second question looks at the accompanying effect of institutional changes
in the EU, and specifically analyses how individual regulatory changes affecting the
institutional environment have shaped the harmonization (increased similarity) of
national policy-making and fiscal policy behaviour. In particular, one can think that
the very last series of institutional changes (the so-called Fiscal Compact within the
Fiscal Treaty) will most likely see national fiscal policies behave in a similar way,
increasing the risk of negative (undesirable) demand spillovers across EA members,
in line with the arguments of Holland and Portes (2012) and other studies.
In order to answer both research questions, I create a novel quarterly dataset
covering the period (1980q1–2015q4), comprising of fiscal variables for the aforemen-
tioned groups of EA-12 and EU-3 countries.9 For this purpose, I use an approach
that combines both the Kalman filter and Bayesian methods (see Ban`bura et al.,
2015; Giannone et al., 2015). The dataset covers all the main stages in the integra-
tion process, starting with those in the late 1980s up until the most recent changes
in the wake of the ESDC.10 This dataset is an important first contribution since
it complements a dataset available for Spain (see De Castro et al., 2014) and the
Euro area (see Paredes et al., 2014), and consequently extends the possibilities for
researchers to analyse fiscal policy at a higher frequency.
Given the fact that governments can unexpectedly modify their behaviour as
a consequence of varying internal and external incentives and/or shocks can result
even in abrupt changes of policy variables. Budgetary balance is a key variable
for policy-makers (mainly government) since institutional settings may change fis-
cal measures, and in turn affect budgetary outcomes. This dynamic calls for an
approach that appropriately considers both aspects. Therefore, I draw upon a mod-
elling strategy that is similarly used to explore monetary policy – a proxy for fiscal
policy behaviour is a fiscal rule providing a link between the key fiscal variable (pri-
9 It complements available quarterly fiscal series from Eurostat that for most of the countries
start either in 1999q1 or 2002q1 for flow variables (balances), or in 2000q1 for stock variables (debt).
10 Mainly these: the Delorse Report, the pre-EMU period (Maastricht period), the creation of
the Stability and Growth Pact (1996), the Euro launch (1999), fiscal sustainability problems of
EMU countries and a modification of fiscal rules (2005), and the EU Sovereign Debt Crisis and
institutional response (2011–2012).
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mary balance) and a set of its fiscal policy determinants (primarily public debt).11
Two rules are considered since there is no single universal fiscal rule: one in line
with Leeper (1991) and Bohn (1998) (‘macro-fiscal rule’, macro debt sustainability),
and the other resembling a Taylor rule proposed by Kirsanova et al. (2005) (micro-
based ‘optimal rule’). I accordingly estimate both fiscal rules using a time-varying
parameter (TVP) model combined with Bayesian techniques.
That allows me to see the observed values of primary balance that result
from ‘behavioural changes’, in the estimated coefficients of its key determinants
such as government debt and business cycle. Moreover, I am able to trace these
outcomes without explicitly specifying an impact period, while also minimizing some
other problematic aspects related to the standard estimation of fiscal rules (such as
structural breaks).
I show that the effects of institutional changes on national fiscal policies were
rather heterogeneous over the entire sample period, corresponding to differences in
debt levels across EA countries. I do find only weak effects related to the Maastricht
Treaty, and in contrast to the literature emphasising the effect of Maastricht rules,
my findings provide only limited support to the usual explanation (a significant
change in behaviour). However, the implementation of the Pact and the race to
adopt the single currency amongst the frontrunners corresponded with a high share
of countries responding to the Pact’s limits (nine out of twelve). Similar to the
literature, I do find some support for its modification in 2005 (for most of the
medium and high debt countries). Since the dataset covers the outset of the ESDC
and a series of more recent reforms (the Fiscal Treaty in particular), my exploration
of these changes reveals that less than half of the countries responded to the most
recent changes.12 In the ‘control’ group of three stand-alone EU countries, few show
some response to the Maastricht Treaty, while in the case of the most recent changes,
their responses are ambiguous.13
In the case of harmonization of national fiscal policies, my results for EA-12
confirm a reduction of dispersion, approximated with the standard deviation of time-
varying fiscal (debt) responses over the entire period. However, this conclusion hides
11 Primary balance does not only represent the results of the current action, or past active or
passive behaviour reflected in public debt, but also represents economic conditions (business cycles),
trade flows and various other determinants.
Primary balance is a tool that comprises of all governmental actions that affect both revenues and
expenditures less interest payments over a period of time (usually one year).
12 The Fiscal Pact was formally enforced from January 2013, but granted signatories a period
of one year to implement the necessary amendments at the national level. For EA participating
countries, it therefore only became binding for the first time from January 2014.
13 As expected since they have not signed some or all (the UK) of the newly introduced institu-
tional amendments.
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a rather heterogeneous transition since the 1980s. First, dispersion was increasingly
larger before the Maastricht period, and was followed by a decline, and another
increase during the early years of the Euro area. Subsequently, around the onset
of the ESDC, there was an increase in the harmonization of fiscal policies, which
continued almost until the end of our sample period. The dispersion in the case
of stand-alone countries was lower in absolute terms, compared with EA-12, but
similar to that of EA-10. Nevertheless, there are some similar patterns visible,
with only a negligible increase during the Euro period (1999–2009), followed by
an increase and rather small reduction of dispersion. I conclude the text with a
discussion of the consequences of harmonized fiscal responses. In particular, there
seems to be a strong need for further changes in intra-EA fiscal policy arrangements,
either as modifications to the existing mechanisms or as an additional level of fiscal
coordination at the supranational level. That would alleviate pressures on members
facing idiosyncratic shocks.
1.3 Overview of Chapter 3
There is a natural interest to analyse individuals or households and their consump-
tion behaviour, particularly in the case where the flow of individuals’ (households’)
primary (labour) and/or secondary (non-labour) income is subject to expected or
unexpected changes. This information is particularly important for policy making
decisions with regards to modifications or reforms of direct or indirect taxation,
welfare systems, and pension systems (see Jappelli and Pistaferri, 2010 or Fuchs-
Schu¨ndeln and Schu¨ndeln, 2015). This is further reflected in the recent surge in
studies providing empirical evidence on expected changes in income and their cor-
responding effects on consumption. For instance, a number of studies explored the
effects of government interventions in the aftermath of post-2000 events such as
‘September 11’, and an even greater number explored the effects of the Financial
crisis and the Great Recession. Nevertheless, many empirical studies have been un-
able to document the effects of (a) unexpected (unanticipated) income changes and
(b) large (unanticipated) permanent income shocks.
In this last chapter I try to fill in this gap investigating how a government
intervention, represented by an exogenous shock to households lifetime resources,
impacted on consumption in a quasi-natural experiment setting (in terms of Fuchs-
Schu¨ndeln and Schu¨ndeln, 2015’s terminology). The government intervention was
an unanticipated and unexpectedly large increase in the basic salary pay (50%)
across employees in the Hungarian public sector in 2002, and reached as many
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as 90 percent of workers in the public sector.14 Because of the features of this
intervention, an approach similar to Jappelli and Padula (2014) can be followed in
order to study the effects at the household level, instead of analysing individuals
and their incomes. This allows me to compare household heads that are directly
exposed to the government intervention, with those that are not, assuming that a
variation in consumption responses is driven by a realization of the income shock.15
Since this government intervention targeted only public employees, I will consider
households of public employees as the treated group, and contrast this to a control
group of households of private employees and other types of public workers.
I then use a novel approach to identify treated households by calculating
probabilities of working in the public sector over an exhaustive set of occupational
categories from a novel individual dataset based on the repeated cross-section Hun-
garian household budget survey. This approach allows me to then use a regression
framework to identify the consumption responses – (1) for levels of consumption
and (2) average propensity to consume (APC) – of households driven by the ex-
ogenous change in their income, when controlling for relevant economic and socio-
demographic characteristics. In this way, this chapter complements the only other
study (Telegdy, 2017) that uses the same salary intervention to study public-private
sector wage spillovers.
Given the structure of public sector employees’ remuneration, a change in
employees’ base salary can be viewed as a change in the permanent component of
their total (disposable) income. Standard consumption theory postulates that effects
in the case of such an unexpected increase in income are associated with changes
of consumption expenditures at the household level. Although I do find significant
responses for subcomponents (durable and non-durable) of total consumption ex-
penditure, I did not find significant changes in the case of total consumption (only
for the other variable, APC). This may have been the result of a consumption
boom on the heels of a change in a system of housing loan subsidies (and a par-
tial re-direction of these funds to finance other non-housing related consumption
expenditures).16 As a result, many households in the early 2000s were left with
14 Some employees were excluded such as workers in state-owned firms or employees in the judi-
ciary.
15 Although a ‘natural’ choice would seem to be the individual level, I followed this modelling
approach because controls for some household characteristics are only observed at the household
level in budget surveys.
16 This strongly resembles Mian and Sufi (2015) story of the mid 2000 US credit crunch (mortgage-
bubble) unfolding into the most severe economic crisis since the Great Depression, or Kumhof et al.
(2015)’s alternative explanation that places more emphasis on income inequality and indebtedness.
However, (i) Hungarian households could not re-mortgage their mortgages, (ii) it was not possible
to obtain loans above the property valuation (not much above 60%, see MNB, 2002), and (iii)
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higher actual levels of consumption expenditures as compared to their disposable
incomes, and declining savings (assets). In my explanation, the potential for increas-
ing household consumption was dampened, because households ‘living above their
means’ used the additional income to consolidate their ‘weak’ balance sheets. This
seems to be supported by some evidence showing a catching-up effect in consumption
in subsequent years (2004 and 2005). Looking back in time, I argue that this unex-
pected income change, together with regulatory restrictions on housing loans may
have unintentionally prevented the loan-driven-consumption bonanza that returned
more severely in 2007.
there was not a general trend of rising housing prices in the country (apart from the capital and
few other regions) before EU accession.
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Chapter 2
Fiscal Reaction Function and
Fiscal Fatigue in the Euro Area
2.1 Introduction†
white white white white white white white
white white white
Sustainability is basically about
good housekeeping. [...]a good indica-
tor of sustainability is one which sends
clear and easily interpretable signals
when current policy appears to be lead-
ing to a rapidly growing debt to GNP
ratio.
[Blanchard et al., 1990, p. 8]
The global economic and financial crisis, and the Euro area Sovereign Debt
Crisis (ESDC, henceforth) has brought heightened volatility and uncertainty in re-
cent years. Questions about fiscal sustainability in advanced economies have fea-
tured prominently in academic and policy debates. In particular, the issue of early
identification of the fiscal fatigue that may be associated with sizeable efforts to
restore fiscal sustainability has gained prominence. The large debt burden of most
sovereigns, coupled in many cases with high private indebtedness, has weighed on
their economic outlook. This mix further complicates the sustainability of public
finances in the face of high and rising ageing costs and related pressures on potential
growth.
In the empirical literature, a concept inherently related to the operationaliza-
tion of fiscal sustainability is the fiscal reaction function (FRF, henceforth), coined
in the seminal paper of Bohn (1998). Applied to the US economy, the paper shows
that a sufficient condition for sustainability is that the government reacts systemat-
† This chapter represents a slightly modified version of the ECB Working paper written jointly
with Cristina Checherita-Westphal during my PhD traineeship in the DG Economics in the ECB.
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ically to increases in government debt by adjusting the primary balance (reducing
the deficit or increasing the surplus net of interest payments). However, as pointed
out in Ghosh et al. (2013), this condition can be thought of as a weak sustain-
ability criterion that does not, for example, rule out a permanently increasing
debt-to-GDP ratio. In this way, the criterion does not take into account the initial
debt level (which may be regarded by markets as dangerously high) or the likely
bounds to primary surpluses that a country may sustain due to (uncontrolled) insti-
tutional or political factors. Nor does it say much on the forward-looking policy that
governments may implement to address (or not) sustainability concerns1. However,
it remains informative on the type of fiscal policy reaction governments did have in
the past, and is helpful in providing signals for potential problems linked to future
policies.2 Generally, studies employing large panels of advanced economies find ev-
idence that governments tend, on average, to meet (such weak) fiscal sustainability
constraints.
This chapter seeks to estimate a fiscal reaction function for the euro area
countries and to derive a simple measure of fiscal fatigue. Our dataset is an (un-
balanced) panel of 18 euro area countries over the period 1970–2013, but we also
conduct various robustness checks for country and time period sub-samples. Fiscal
balance data is adjusted for government support to the financial sector (a specific
type of ‘one-off items’), which allows us to avoid peaks in primary deficits that
would unduly reflect fiscal loosening and induce high data volatility. In this way,
we enhance the robustness of our results by addressing the issue of extreme out-
liers that emerged in recent years. A simple FRF is estimated in the first stage to
assess whether fiscal policy in the Euro area behaved in an overall (weakly) sustain-
able way. Using various dynamic panel techniques, we find evidence that euro area
sovereigns abide, on average, by such sustainability constraints. We show that the
FRF estimates are rather robust across various specifications, time periods and the
exclusion of individual countries.
In the second stage, we importantly propose a novel approach to investigate
fiscal fatigue for the euro area sovereigns, which gauges a country’s capacity to
maintain primary surpluses based on its past efforts and the estimated fiscal reaction
function. The FRF empirical framework allows the quantification of the strength
of the feedback from debt to primary balance. The resulting coefficient can in turn
1 For a comprehensive debt sustainability analysis framework for the euro area (EA, henceforth)
sovereigns, see Bouabdallah et al. (2017).
2 This reaction can not only be tested with respect to the sustainability objective (the relation
between primary balance and debt), but also to the stabilisation function of fiscal policies (for
example the relation between primary balance and output gap).
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be used to benchmark the realism of primary balance projections, which represent
key inputs to debt sustainability analysis (DSA, henceforth). Finally, the chapter
also investigates the risk of fiscal fatigue in the Euro area resulting from non-linear
FRF estimation in the spirit proposed by Ghosh et al. (2013).
The chapter is structured as follows. Section 2 reviews the literature and
methodology. Section 3 presents the data and model. Section 4 discusses the re-
sults of the fiscal reaction function, including extensive robustness checks. Section
5 outlines our novel measure to investigate the fiscal fatigue hypothesis, and sec-
tion 6 concludes. The Appendix includes a comparative summary of literature, a
description of data sources and further robustness checks.
2.2 Review of literature and methodology
Complementing the theoretical approach of Blanchard et al. (1990) and other more
complex sustainability frameworks, Bohn (1998) proposes a simple empirical test
of sustainable fiscal policy (model-based sustainability, see D’Erasmo et al., 2015).
This relates the primary balance to the level of debt, with or without conditioning
on further controls (such as business cycle). It can be written as follows:
(2.1) pbt = κ · dt + ξt,
where pbt is the primary balance in terms of GDP, dt is the government debt-to-
GDP ratio, κ is the responsiveness of the primary balance to the debt ratio and ξt
contains effects of various other determinants of primary balance (such as economic,
institutional, etc.) and the error term.
Bohn (2008) shows formally that for an economy to satisfy its intertemporal
budget constraint and the so-called no-Ponzi condition, the coefficient κ > 0 is
sufficient, provided that the present value of GDP is finite, and ξt <∞ is a fraction
of GDP as well. However, as shown in some studies (see, inter alia, Ghosh et al.,
2013 or Daniel and Shiamptanis, 2012), a positive coefficient κ cannot be viewed
as sufficient to achieve fiscal sustainability if there is a limit for positive values of
primary balances. Instances of such limits can occur at very high debt levels3 or if
the reaction of financial markets is explicitly considered (for example the increase
3 An upper limit on the amount of debt that can be repaid creates additional restriction for
government policy. An extension of Bohn’s approach for a country restricted by fiscal limits using
a non-linear fiscal rule is in Shiamptanis (2015). Ghosh et al. (2013) and Fourier and Fall (2015)
consider the reaction of financial markets in conjunction with fiscal limits.
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in the primary balance is not large enough to account for the exploding interest
rate-growth differential). In this respect, Ghosh et al. (2013) call Bohn’s condition
a ‘weak sustainability condition’.
Further issues have been raised in the literature regarding country-specific
and cross-country estimation, mainly in panel data studies, that is, time and country
stability of estimated coefficients. Some more recent empirical studies have employed
both approaches subject to data availability (see EC, 2016). In general, most panel
FRF studies tend to find evidence of fiscal sustainability for advanced economies
(κ̂ > 0). The intensity of the reaction (that is, the size of κ̂) varies between 0.01
and 0.10 (country, time, method and estimator-dependent). See table A.1 in the
Appendix for a literature review summary (primarily covering European/OECD
countries).
Analyses of individual countries find more mixed results, though evidence
of ‘weak’ sustainability condition tend to be more prevalent. See, for instance, results
for the US in Bohn’s studies, for four EA countries in Legrenzi and Milas (2013),
or for the majority (9 out of 17) OECD countries in Wyplosz (2015). Lukkezen
and Rojas-Romagoza (2012) find sustainability concerns for three out of a sample
of seven OECD countries using a combination of FRF estimation on very long time
series and stochastic debt simulations. When relaxing the assumption of time-
invariance on debt-related responses, Cuerpo (2014) find evidence of sustainability
for Spain, though with regime variation during the period of investigation (1986–
2012). On the other hand, Gal´ı and Perotti (2003) find a positive and statistically
significant coefficient on lagged debt in only five out of eleven EA countries, in a
model that uses cyclically adjusted primary balance (CAPB, henceforth) as a way to
model the discretionary reaction of fiscal policy.4 In our study for 18 EA countries,
we do find that fiscal responses are compatible with weak sustainability constraints,
with moderate cross-country variation for our time sample (when excluding one
country at a time).
Few studies have explored effects related to the European integration pro-
cess, such as the Maastricht Treaty, for example Weichenrieder and Zimmer (2014),
or first effects of the European Sovereign Debt Crisis such as Baldi and Staehr
4 FRF models using CAPB instead of the primary balance generally find similar evidence of
sustainability. For instance, Golinelli and Momigliano (2006) estimate FRF in a panel of 19 OECD
countries based on ex-post and real-time data on CAPB for 1988–2005(2006). Their results confirm
sustainability (in addition to stabilization behaviour) of fiscal policy and a positive effect of fiscal
rules. Similarly, Ayuso-i-Casals et al. (2007) use CAPB (and primary expenditures) in a panel
of 25 EU countries over the period 1990–2005. They find evidence for fiscal sustainability and
stabilisation function (in addition to the main finding that the design and coverage of fiscal rules
matter).
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(2016) for quarterly fiscal series. In this regard, we find an increased debt response
coefficient for both the post-Maastricht period (including the Euro period) across
specifications, and for effects associated with the ESDC, which could only be par-
tially and indirectly explored because of our time sample.
The FRF literature has more recently focused on the investigation of non-
linear fiscal behaviour conditional on the level of debt. Specifically, the hypothesis
of fiscal fatigue has been tested5 by including polynomial (quadratic or cubic) func-
tional forms in the reaction of the primary balance to the debt ratio. In this respect,
some studies point to the possibility of fiscal fatigue, meaning that, at very high debt
ratios, the fiscal effort must be so large that it becomes untenable. For instance,
Ghosh et al. (2013) report evidence of fiscal fatigue starting at 90 − 100% of GDP
for a group of 23 advanced (but rather heterogeneous) economies over the period
1970–2007 as a whole. That is, although the primary balance response to debt levels
remains positive, it starts declining when the debt ratio reaches around 90− 100%
of GDP. At even higher debt levels (around 150% of GDP); the reaction of primary
balance turns negative (as the coefficient of the cubic debt term indicates). Yet, a
shorter time period (1985–2007) leads to a significant loss of significance for the coef-
ficient on lagged debt. Similar results are reported by Medeiros (2012) for a panel of
EU countries with debt thresholds in the range of 80−90% of GDP. However, these
results seem to depend on the sample composition (inclusion of one or few high-debt
countries) and estimation approach (Fourier and Fall, 2015). This latter study also
finds evidence of fiscal fatigue on a sample of OECD countries (1985–2013) using a
threshold model, starting around a debt ratio of 120% of GDP with a twist around
170% of GDP (without Japan there is no evidence), while two thresholds (at 152%
and 167% of GDP) are identified for the Euro area group (15 countries). These
results seem to be driven by the inclusion of Greece. When Greece is dropped, fiscal
fatigue appears at a debt ratio around 120% of GDP. Our estimates of Ghosh’s
specifications do not reveal any similar debt threshold, even when the crisis period
is excluded.
Our findings seem to be supported by Legrenzi and Milas (2013) estimates of
individual non-linear FRFs over the period 1960/70–2012, for four EA countries that
have been most affected by the sovereign debt crisis (Greece, Ireland, Portugal and
Spain) and do not show evidence of fiscal fatigue. The reaction of primary balance is
made conditional on the size of debt, state of the economy, and a measure of financial
pressure. The chapter concludes that all countries adjust fiscal imbalances only in
5 The notion of fiscal fatigue can be stated as the existence of mean reversion properties in the
primary balance, especially for high levels of public debt; see Ghosh et al. (2013).
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the higher debt regime (estimated to start at thresholds of 69% of GDP for Greece,
49% for Ireland, 47% for Portugal and 43% for Spain), and that financial market
pressure leads all countries to lower the thresholds. Similarly, EC (2011) tests in a
panel of EU countries show the presence of non-linear debt effects (level above 60%
of GDP, quadratic and cubic terms) for the behaviour of CAPB, and do not find
significant supporting evidence. The paper also verifies fiscal solvency for the panel
of EU countries over the period 1975/1980–2010 and confirms a positive relationship
between debt and primary balance. Therefore, in this chapter we propose a linear
rule that allows us to analyse fiscal fatigue for sovereigns without putting emphasis
on non-linearity. Our rule combines estimated debt response coefficients (in the first
part of this chapter), and information about a country’s past fiscal performance that
can be easily obtained from reports of national or international organisations. Our
results indicate that several euro area members are potentially endangered by the
fiscal fatigue (with data up to 2013), and as such, another economic recession could
result in difficulties when dealing with it. By repeating the same exercise with series
up to 2008, our measure indicates a high risk of fiscal fatigue in Greece, Portugal and
some other countries, but does not however signal any problems for three remaining
members of the GIIPS group.
2.3 Model and data
2.3.1 Panel model specification
Our empirical model is an extension of the relationship given by equation (2.1):
(2.2) pbi, t = α+ ϕpbi, t−1 + κ · di, t−1 +
k∑
j=1
βjXj, i, t + δi [+ γt] + i, t,
where pbi, t is the primary balance as a share of GDP and pbi, t−1 is its one year-
lagged value, di, t−1 is the one year-lagged debt-to-GDP ratio, Xj, i, t is a set of j
various (macro)economic, institutional and political determinants of the primary
balance, δi are country fixed effects (complemented in some specifications by time
fixed effects, γt); measurement errors and random shocks are captured by the error
term i, t. The coefficient κ of interest measures the response of the primary balance
to changes in the debt ratio.
The basic model is estimated for a panel of 18 euro area countries6 over the
6 All members of the Euro area as of 2013, that is, Austria, Belgium, Cyprus, Estonia, Finland,
France, Germany, Greece, Ireland, Italy, Latvia, Luxembourg, Malta, the Netherlands, Portugal,
Spain, Slovakia, and Slovenia. The current 19th member, Lithuania, is not included because of its
17
CHAPTER 2. FRF AND FISCAL FATIGUE IN THE EURO AREA
period 1970–2013 (with various robustness checks for country and time period sub-
samples). Naturally, a FRF estimated for one country for a relatively recent period
of time would provide an ideal tool for assessing country-specific responses to fiscal
policy in the face of changing debt levels and economic environments. However,
the number of meaningful observations for only one country (especially for the new
member states) is relatively limited. Second, for the purpose of investigating fiscal
policy responses, annual data capturing budgetary years are more appropriate than
higher frequency data. Third, in our view, it is more meaningful for the purpose
of this research to capture common policy responses for the relatively recent past,
rather than country-specific ones for very long dated periods, which are characterised
by very different historical conditions. In this regard, and given data availability
constraints for most euro area countries, we prefer using a panel approach.
2.3.2 Choice of variables
Two main policy variables – the primary balance (PB, henceforth) or the cyclically-
adjusted primary balance – have been employed in the FRF literature as the de-
pendent variable. Such a choice obviously highlights the primary focus of a study:
models with PB are connected with the output gap and show the total ‘fiscal im-
pulse’,7 while models with CAPB estimate the ‘fiscal effort’ directly.8 Given that
the primary balance is the ‘observable’ fiscal policy variable and is less prone to
ex-post revisions (because of frequent revisions of output gap series and/or uncer-
tainty about budgetary elasticities’), we follow the majority of studies in using the
PB as our dependent variable for both the estimation of a FRF model and a FF
(non-linear) model for euro area countries. The other commonly employed variable,
the CAPB, is used for robustness checks.
There is a large number of possible determinants of the fiscal position,
which can be divided into three broad groups as shown in Abiad and Baig (2005):
(1) those related to a government behaving as an optimizing agent (a` la Barro,
1979), which has been subject to scrutiny since Bohn (1998)’s findings of a link
between debt and deficits; (2) broad economic environment such as business cycle
controls or external relations; and (3) political economy considerations and broadly
later entry (in 2015).
7 See van Riet (2010) for an exposition of the various concepts related to fiscal balance decompo-
sition. As pointed out in Golinelli and Momigliano (2008), there is basically no difference whether
one chooses the dependent variable (CAPB/PB) in first differences or in levels, only the coefficient
on the lagged term is different.
8 There are other possible choices: the total balance or the structural balance. However, they
are exposed to criticisms because of a similar construction to the CAPB (the latter) and issues of
actual coverage (the former), and therefore, neither is commonly utilized in the literature.
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defined institutional factors that shape the use of fiscal measures and the policy
environment.
Our estimated models encompass variables covering all three groups since
each of them determines the willingness and ability of a government to meet sus-
tainability constraints. The core (‘Base’) FRF model includes the lagged public
debt-to-GDP ratio (main variable of interest), the lagged primary balance (to ac-
count for persistence in fiscal policy), output gap (a proxy for cyclical conditions),
current account balance (to control for cross-country spillovers and the twin-deficit
hypothesis), and a political risk variable (dummy for election year).9 Country fixed
effects are included to capture all remaining time-invariant country-specific factors
that are not explicitly controlled for. Finally, a dummy variable for the effects of
the Great Recession (from 2008 onwards), and a time trend to capture common
cross-country factors varying over time are also added to the basic model. There
are other variables that are included in the base FRF model (extended specifica-
tions), when analysing institutional or political effects. A detailed description of
these variables can be found in the appendix. Similarly, variables utilized in the FF
non-linear model follow the Ghosh et al. (2013) model’s specification and include
further determinants, such as a proxy for age dependency or oil and non-oil price
indices.
The main data source for our analysis is the AMECO database (economic
series), and specialised databases such as the IMF (2015) fiscal rules database. Our
panel is unbalanced because of missing observations at the beginning of our sample
and the inclusion of new EU member states, whose time series are generally shorter
(usually available from the early 1990s).10 As a robustness check, the AMECO
primary balance and debt series for the old EU member states are extrapolated to the
1970s using a historical database prepared by Mauro et al. (2013), and complemented
with the other data sources (for details see the Appendix).
2.3.3 Estimation techniques
Several estimators have been employed in the FRF literature. A particular choice
reflects key problems one has to deal with in dynamic panel data setting, especially
when a set of potentially endogenous variables has to be treated appropriately. In
this chapter, our focus is to tackle estimation issues such as endogeneity and cross-
9 Evidence of political cycles in a panel of EU countries is also shown in Golinelli and Momigliano
(2006).
10 Since many countries did not exist in the current form before 1990, we do not attempt to use
any proxy or artificially constructed series.
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sectional correlation.11
Even though our panel is dynamic and includes country fixed effects (γi),
we start with the fixed effects estimator to allow for the presence of potentially
endogenous variables (IV estimation). Being aware of criticisms of its use (the
Nickell’s bias), we argue that our panel is medium to large in the time dimension
compared to the cross-section dimension and the potential bias should be limited
(‘rule of thumb’ based on Bond (2002) who states that for cases when T is larger
than 20, the potential bias of the FE estimator should be negligible12). It has been
shown that GMM estimators would not alleviate the problem (see Judson and Owen,
1999).13 Their asymptotic properties are negatively affected by the dimensions of
our panel and they are left for robustness checks. The bias corrected least-square
dummy variable (LSDVC) estimator (Bruno, 2005) offers some efficiency for large
(time series) panels spanning over 30 years of data and, therefore, it is also used in
the robustness section. Haque et al. (1999) do not recommend first-differencing in
IV cases with time dimensions above 20 since it may result in less efficient estimates.
Another problem is the presence of cross-sectional or ‘spatial’ dependence
that may severely affect estimation efficiency, and render some estimators inconsis-
tent (standard difference and system GMM estimators for dynamic panels) unless
the unobserved factors are not correlated with the explanatory variables (see Phillips
and Sul, 2003). Similarly, standard errors should be treated accordingly to adjust
for overoptimistic t−statistic and confidence intervals (see Petersen, 2008).14
11 There is also a potential problem of non-stationarity of some series (primary balance and debt,
both in levels and as GDP ratios). This is, however, less acute in a panel setting and can be dealt
with based on theoretical grounds (see Bohn (1998, 2007); Favero and Marcellino (2015) who state
that the intertemporal budget constraint is not violated provided the x−th differencing renders the
series stationary). In addition, as Daniel and Shiamptanis (2013) point out, a scaling of both series
by GDP also mitigates (or even eliminates) problems with non-stationarity. Alternatively, one may
use panel unit root tests allowing for endogenously generated structural breaks, as in Im et al.
(2005) and Carrion-i-Silvestre (2005). Yet, one problem is the relatively high persistence of fiscal
series (as pointed out in Bohn, 1998), which make it rather difficult to arrive at an unambiguous
conclusion.
12 This condition is met for both our large sample (1970–2013) and the shortened sample (1991–
2013). Nevertheless, it is conditional on the actual panel setting and therefore, various estimators
are used in the robustness section to show stability and (unbiasedness) of our results.
13 In this context, Celasun and Kang (2006) propose a simple rule based on the main interest
of the study. GMM estimators are recommended for testing cyclical sensitivity of fiscal policy
variables, FE estimators (LSDV) when tests of intertemporal solvency are performed.
14 One further possibility would be an estimator with AR(1) correction for serial correlation
(applied for example by Ghosh et al., 2013) such as FGLS, which also allows for spatial dependence.
Such an estimator works fine for small (balanced) panels. However, Beck and Katz (1995) show that
standard errors computed with this method are rather small (overoptimistic estimates). Another
possibility is an OLS/Prais-Winstein estimator with the panel-corrected standard errors (PCSEs);
however, it assumes strictly exogenous independent variables, and for small ratios of T⁄N, it produces
rather imprecise estimates. In the best scenario for our panel, this ratio is around 2.4, which is
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Overall, in the main regressions, we prefer using an IV, FE estimator to
avoid endogeneity problems and robust standard errors to deal with heteroskedas-
ticity, serial correlation and cross-sectional dependence. In the robustness section,
further estimators are included (inter alia, to provide results comparable with the
literature). Since in the case of weak instruments the LIML (limited information
maximum likelihood) estimator shows better properties in comparison with GMM
estimators, it is also used alongside the differenced GMM (Arellano-Bond) estimator
(without/with forward orthogonal deviations that are more suitable for unbalanced
panels). In addition, more FE estimators are utilized to allow comparison with other
studies (for example Ghosh et al., 2013; Plo¨dt and Reicher, 2015): one allowing for
the error term to follow an AR(1) process, and the other FE estimator explicitly
allowing for cross-sectional dependence in our panel (TPCSE). In addition, as an
alternative to mitigate cross-sectional correlation problems,15 the Driscoll-Kraay es-
timator is also used. Since our results do not differ substantially, we consider them
to have passed the robustness tests (see section 2.4.2).
2.4 Empirical results
2.4.1 Baseline specification and extended models
In the first step we apply the Base specification to the whole EA-18 group and the
entire time span (1970–2013), employing our original (non-extrapolated) dataset.
The literature suggests several instruments to deal with the issue of several vari-
ables, primarily the output gap (both determined and affected by fiscal policy),
being affected by endogeneity (and reverse causation). Some studies simply work
with lagged values; others rely on additional variables or even the GMM approach.16
Our study uses IV (and GMM estimators as a robustness check) for the output gap,
lagged dependent variable (primary balance) and current account (or its alterna-
tive). Our instrument set17 includes second and third lag of the dependent variable;
not far on the way to a large T panel to guarantee its consistency. In addition, its superiority
with respect to the FGLS estimator on the basis of efficiency has been questioned mainly for the
T > N case; see Reed and Webb (2010). Therefore, we prefer to use an IV, FE estimator and
robust standard errors.
15 A test for the presence of cross-sectional dependence (see Hoyos and Sarafidis, 2006) confirms
its presence for our specifications (longer/shorter time periods).
16 Some country studies such as Weichenrieder and Zimmer (2014) or D’Erasmo et al. (2015) do
not report the use of any adjustment, which may cast doubts on their results.
17 Ayuso-i-Casals et al. (2007) use a proxy for international influences (export-weighted output
gap of three major export markets of each country). EC (2011) works with trend output gap
and adds the contemporaneous US output lag, while Plo¨dt and Reicher (2015) use output gap
instrumented with lagged output gap and potential GDP growth corrected for real GDP growth as
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lagged output gap and second and third lag of a proxy for output gap (
Y Pt−1
Y Pt
− Yt−1
Y Pt
,
following Plo¨dt and Reicher, 2015), as well as the first and second lag of the current
account, unless specified differently. This Base model performs well in various ro-
bustness tests such as the Kleibergen-Paap test (a test for weak instruments18) or
Sargan/Hansen test (overidentifying restrictions). Moreover, the explanatory power
of the Base model (and of its derivations) is very good (above 0.70 as measured by
adjusted R2 within groups). In this model (see Table 2.1, first result column), the
estimated FRF coefficient of interest (the response to the debt ratio) amounts to
0.034. The model Base A shows results for the base specification with time fixed
effects, while in the model Base B the output gap was replaced with the real GDP
growth rate (instrumented with its second and third lag following Baldi and Staehr,
2016). The FRF coefficient is slightly lower in these two specifications and remains
highly statistically significant.
Turning to the other variables included in our base specification, the re-
sponses of the primary balance are overall, highly statistically significant and have
the expected sign. Somewhat surprising, while the output gap coefficient is gener-
ally positive, it is not found to be statistically significant (only in robustness checks
for shorter time periods). This result is similar to other recent studies, such as
Berti et al. (2016). On the other hand, the real GDP growth is positive and highly
statistically significant. Election years have, on average, a negative effect on fis-
cal positions. The positive coefficient of the current account balance underpins the
twin-deficit hypothesis. Particularly high and positive values of the lagged depen-
dent variables indicate persistence in fiscal policy. The dummy for the effects of
the crisis is negative and highly statistically significant, pointing to deteriorating
fiscal positions compared to earlier periods. Finally, since the estimated value of the
constant term is negative and significant, the implication from these models is that
the euro area debt-to-GDP ratio is going to stabilise at a positive value in the long
run.19
instruments (trend GDP as robustness) and lagged debt. Neither combination was possible in our
case since the Hansen/Sargan test and the first stage results showed violation of assumptions for
these combinations of instruments. Because of problems with output gap calculations, Berti et al.
(2016) use the second and third lag of primary balance and debt. Baldi and Staehr (2016) work
with GDP growth rates only.
18 Our models are also tested using Anderson-Rubin Wald test and Stock-Wright LM S statistic
for weak-instrument-robust inference (not reported due to space considerations).
19 An estimated value can be calculated based on an estimate of the real interest rate and real
economic growth. In addition, since our estimate of the government response in table 2.1 is the
short-run response (κ̂), the long-run value (κ̂LR) can be calculated as shown in Caruso et al. (2015):
κ̂LR =
κ̂
1−ϕ̂ , where ϕ̂ is the estimate of the lagged dependent variable for the model Base A; the
long-run response is equal to 0.0783.
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The remaining columns of Table 2.1 present a first set of robustness checks of
our base specification by adding one variable at a time, as often used in the literature.
Such a variable set includes: a proxy for openness (sum of exports and imports),
inflation, consumption smoothing (in the spirit of Barro, 1979), political stability
and fiscal rules (additional institutional factors), and financial markets (represented
by various specifications of interest payments). Columns mf and mf1 show results
for models with all these variables, with and without time fixed effects. Finally, we
also investigate the effects on the debt response of the financial crisis (model m7 )
and of other important events over the period of monetary integration (model m8
includes a Euro dummy, being one for all years after euro introduction in individual
countries, and its interaction with debt; in a similar model, not shown in Table 2.1,
the euro dummy is replaced with a dummy equalling one for the EMU period, that
is, as of 1999 onwards for all countries).
In all specifications, including the full models, the lagged debt ratio remains
statistically significant, with a coefficient ranging between 0.031 and 0.041 when
interest payments are included. There are no substantial changes in sign or sig-
nificance level for the estimated effects of the other baseline determinants either.
Regarding added explanatory variables, higher interest payments – as a ratio of
lagged debt, current GDP or total revenues (the first one only shown in model m6
of Table 2.1) – seem to have a (residual) negative impact on the capacity of gov-
ernments to maintain higher primary surpluses (after controlling for the debt level).
This is in line with findings in Debrun and Kinda (2013) on the ‘squeezing feeling’ of
the interest burden. Similarly, the cyclical component of government consumption,
used in several FRF studies to capture stabilising effects of fiscal policy, is found to
limit primary surpluses.20 At the same time, stronger government stability21 or the
existence of a fiscal rule,22 though leading to better fiscal positions, are not found
to be significant at standard levels. In the combined models (mf–mf1 ), the debt
response remains broadly unchanged (somewhat lower in the model without time
fixed effects).
Regarding the events over the monetary union period, we find evidence for
a significant, positive effect of the crisis on the response of fiscal policy to debt.
20 See Bohn (1998) or Mendoza and Ostry (2008) for further details.
21 We also use other variables for political factors such as total risk rating or political risk rating
(from the PRSG database) and find similar conclusions.
22 As measured by a dummy based on the IMF fiscal rule database. Results for an alternative
index – the fiscal rules index (FRI) – from the European Commission (see EC, 2016a) are less robust
(FRI is statistically significant only in certain models, a result that can be due to the relatively
short time span of the index). In general, effects of variables capturing fiscal rules are rather mixed
in the literature (subject to period and country composition, see for example Debrun et al., 2008;
Escolano e al., 2012; EC, 2011).
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The FRF coefficient almost doubles over the crisis (the estimated coefficient of the
interaction term between the crisis dummy and the debt ratio is 0.022, while the
coefficient of the debt variable, denoting how the response before the crisis, declines
to 0.029). The evidence with respect to the effect of the EMU creation or the euro
introduction is more mixed. While the interaction terms between the respective
dummies and the debt ratio are also found to be statistically significant and have a
positive sign for the whole sample, these results may mask the crisis effects. When
the sample is restrained to the period before the crisis (1970–2007), the interaction
terms generally lose significance.
The appendix includes a robustness check for the Base model specification
(Table A.2) with respect to (a) the choice of the dependent variable (CAPB instead
of PB) and (b) the length of fiscal series (based on the use of extrapolated series,
especially for the ‘old’ member states, as opposed to original, shorter series). The
response coefficient of the lagged debt is similar with that using extrapolated series
(0.027 for the Base model, am0 ), while when CAPB is employed the coefficient is
lower in the base model (0.006), but increases in other models (for example to 0.027
when real growth is used instead of output gap).
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Table 2.1: Basic model and extended specifications, EA-18, 1970–2013
Base Base A Base B m1 m2 m3 m4 m5 m6 mf mf1 m7 m8
Lagged primary balance 0.566*** 0.716*** 0.608*** 0.626*** 0.566*** 0.502*** 0.567*** 0.510*** 0.589*** 0.521*** 0.640*** 0.581*** 0.558***
[0.059] [0.046] [0.042] [0.057] [0.059] [0.068] [0.059] [0.064] [0.056] [0.074] [0.059] [0.056] [0.058]
Lagged debt 0.034*** 0.029*** 0.030*** 0.038*** 0.037*** 0.038*** 0.031*** 0.037*** 0.041*** 0.036*** 0.029*** 0.029*** 0.030***
[0.006] [0.006] [0.006] [0.007] [0.007] [0.008] [0.006] [0.007] [0.006] [0.008] [0.007] [0.006] [0.006]
Output gap 0.072 0.076 -0.072 0.072 0.138* 0.061 0.107 0.058 0.085 0.040 0.095 0.100
[0.071] [0.070] [0.058] [0.073] [0.082] [0.069] [0.080] [0.064] [0.074] [0.079] [0.069] [0.074]
Current account 0.157*** 0.156*** 0.101*** 0.152*** 0.180*** 0.128** 0.166*** 0.150*** 0.141*** 0.146*** 0.173*** 0.175***
[0.054] [0.042] [0.036] [0.055] [0.056] [0.055] [0.058] [0.047] [0.052] [0.044] [0.056] [0.058]
Election dummy -0.448*** -0.546*** -0.489*** -0.447*** -0.451*** -0.398** -0.404*** -0.437*** -0.511*** -0.406*** -0.472*** -0.445*** -0.435***
[0.155] [0.142] [0.134] [0.157] [0.156] [0.161] [0.155] [0.160] [0.142] [0.152] [0.146] [0.154] [0.154]
Crisis dummy (2008+) -1.884*** -1.951*** -0.368 -2.250*** -1.942*** -1.976*** -1.710*** -1.912*** -1.199*** -0.977*** -3.064*** -1.867***
[0.364] [0.582] [0.420] [0.379] [0.364] [0.419] [0.349] [0.406] [0.286] [0.331] [0.570] [0.365]
GDP growth 0.350***
[0.087]
Openness 0.013**
[0.006]
Lagged GDP deflator 0.035 0.025 0.025
growth [0.040] [0.037] [0.039]
Lagged IMF fiscal rule 0.432 0.453 0.418
[0.445] [0.416] [0.433]
Government consumption -0.078*** -0.062** -0.032
expenditures [0.027] [0.028] [0.026]
Government stability 0.078 0.014 0.025
[0.051] [0.051] [0.063]
Interest payments -0.156*** -0.152*** -0.085***
[0.021] [0.027] [0.027]
Crisis#debt 0.022***
[0.007]
Euro dummy -0.672
[0.449]
Euro*debt 0.014**
[0.006]
Continued on next page
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Table 2.1 – Continued from previous page
Base Base A Base B m1 m2 m3 m4 m5 m6 mf mf1 m7 m8
Year -0.005 -0.005 -0.005 0.004 -0.005 -0.004 0.002 -0.020 -0.037 -0.012 -0.017
[0.015] [0.012] [0.016] [0.018] [0.029] [0.015] [0.019] [0.013] [0.026] [0.014] [0.020]
Constant -1.125** -0.307 -1.939*** -2.440*** -1.605** -1.803** -1.027** -2.225*** -1.042** -0.870 -2.767*** -0.705 -0.700
[0.490] [0.559] [0.470] [0.549] [0.786] [0.832] [0.478] [0.771] [0.453] [0.976] [0.989] [0.484] [0.548]
Observations 431 431 455 431 431 378 431 392 429 378 378 431 431
R-squared 0.720 0.807 0.758 0.711 0.722 0.727 0.731 0.722 0.766 0.774 0.820 0.731 0.726
Country FE yes yes yes yes yes yes Yes yes yes yes yes yes yes
Time FE no yes no no no no No no no no yes no no
Kleibergen-Paap LM stat. 35.110 36.260 24.540 30.030 33.970 28.670 34.720 31.550 38.610 32.900 28.050 36.260 36.150
Kleibergen-Paap p-val 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
Hansen test 7.264 4.353 3.184 6.430 7.437 7.940 6.621 6.484 6.565 7.026 4.045 7.841 7.881
Hansen p-val 0.123 0.360 0.364 0.169 0.115 0.094 0.157 0.166 0.161 0.135 0.400 0.098 0.096
Notes: P-value: *** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, * p < 0.1: variable is statistically significant at the 1%, 5% and 10%, respectively. Country fixed effects and time fixed effects are not
reported, robust standard errors. The null of Kleinbergen-Paap LM test is that instruments are weak. Source: own calculations.
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2.4.2 Further robustness tests
Period effects
In the following series of robustness checks, we first focus on a period effect since
the literature shows a varying impact of some variables over time. Further to the
interaction models discussed in the previous section, we test for a change in fiscal
policy responses by breaking the sample into several sub-periods, with and without
the years of financial crisis (from 1970, 1985 or from 1991, just before the signature
of the Maastricht treaty).23 In general, the primary balance response to debt for
the periods that include the crisis years is larger than for periods excluding the
crisis. See Table A.3 in the Appendix. The reaction coefficient of the base model
remains broadly unchanged, with an increase for the period after the Maastricht
treaty (from 0.034 to 0.046). Yet, this increase seems to be mainly determined
by the crisis period since the change in the FRF coefficient is much lower when
the crisis is excluded (from 0.025 to 0.027). These results should be interpreted
with some caution because of the shorter data timespan (also indicated by the IV
tests, especially in models m22 and m33 ). The output gap becomes (marginally)
significant (and remains positive) for models without the crisis. In addition, it turns
significant for the entire period in model m2 (1985–2013).
Country effects
Next, we analyse the country dimension of fiscal responses for subgroups of EA18
members. In our case, three subgroups are considered: (i) consisting of the 12 ‘old’
EA members (EA12) or (ii) when Greece (the country with the highest average
debt ratio) or/and (iii) Luxembourg (lowest debt ratio) are excluded. In all three
specifications, estimated FRF (debt) responses are only marginally smaller (around
0.03), for both the entire period (1970–2013) and for the periods without the finan-
cial crisis years. Similar results are found when the Maastricht period (1991–2013)
is considered. See Table A.4 in the Appendix. Regarding other variables, the output
gap turns again significant in the smaller samples. Otherwise, there are no major
changes in the significance or signs of individual variables.
Subsequently, we examine the issue of panel heterogeneity and control more
extensively for potential outliers by running the base specification while omitting
one country at a time. Albeit there is some variability in the FRF coefficient,
23 Because of the relatively short period since the launch of the Euro, we do not show estimates
for a model covering only the post-EMU period (1999 onwards, that is, only 15 years) since results
may be subject to severe bias.
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the differences are rather small. The statistical significance of the debt coefficients
remains unaffected by country exclusions and the size hovers between 0.03 and
0.04.24 See Figure A.2) in the Appendix.
Further tests for country and period effects
To check the robustness of our average estimates of FRF, two further checks are
carried out. They take the form of a simple decomposition based on the ‘random
coefficients model’ over both panel dimensions (cross-section and time). For that
purpose, an individual country dummy or a time dummy is interacted with the
debt variable, and our model described in equation (2.2) is estimated with all these
additional terms.25 That allows us to evaluate country and time effects, while
keeping both the model specification and our sample size unchanged. Nevertheless,
there is one alternation; in order to gain some robustness (for the early years of our
sample), the whole exercise is carried out on the extended data set.
We focus on the narrow group of ‘old’ EA members, with comparable series
(same length for all countries, that is, the EA-12 group without Luxembourg; results
for the EA-18 group can be found in appendix). Based on this exercise there seems
to be some evidence for a link between average response and debt ratios (low in-
debted countries with low responses vs. highly indebted ones with larger responses
despite not being significant for some members). With the exception of the Nether-
lands, the other countries show positive FRF responses. Finland, Austria, Ireland
(not significant for Germany, France, Spain, and Belgium) have estimated responses
below or close to the EA-11 average response, while Portugal and especially Italy
and Greece show larger response coefficients compared to the EA average (see figure
2.1 below).
24 We also carried out a test of homogeneity of the FRF coefficients based on a modification of
the equation (2.2):
pbi, t = α+ ϕ pbi, t−1 + κ · di, t−1 + κi · di, t−1 + controlvari, t + δi + ϑi, t,
where κi is the dummy for a country i, κ and κi are to-be-estimated panel (EA average) and
country-specific slope coefficients, the remaining variables have the same interpretation as those in
the equation (2.2). After having estimated this equation by country, a test of similarity of both
coefficients was carried out (the null: (κ̂− κ̂i) = 0). Since there are no observations for all countries
and all debt-to-GDP ratios, following Ghosh et al. (2013), we estimate this equation for the debt
ratios between 30% and 100% of GDP (without Estonia, Latvia, Luxembourg, and Slovenia). The
null was rejected at 5% level for three countries: France, Ireland and the Netherlands, but for none
belonging to the narrower group of ‘programme countries’. Detailed results available upon request.
25 The model specified in equation (2.3) then includes a set of additional terms (‘interactions’)
with the debt variable for all EA countries [panel a)] and/or years [panel b)] and one country/one
period is selected as the reference country/year [r]: δi · di, t−1∀i, i 6=r or γt · di, t−1∀t, t 6=r. This model
is then similar to the random coefficient model in case of the IV FE estimator, for further details
see appendix A.1.
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Figure 2.1: Fiscal responses by country and by year, EA-18 countries,
1970–2013
Country variation, EA-11
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Note: country ordering based on the 2013 debt level values. Blue line stands for EA-11 average response
with a linear time trend, red dashed line for average response with time fixed effects (all EA11 countries
and for all years). The black dotted line indicates the null response. Whiskers around point estimates
(diamonds) represent the 95% confidence intervals. Source: own calculation.
When considering the other dimension (time), there seems to be a great deal
of variation in the 1970s and early 1980s, and then, a rather mitigated level just
before the onset of the Great Recession (illustrating tensions during first years of
the monetary union and problems with the original Pact). A closer inspection of
the figure (and estimates) reveals some ‘turning points’ that indicate few changes
in government responses over our sample period. However, many ‘time’ effects are
not significant at standard levels.26
Overall, these country-specific results should be taken with caution, because
of the medium time dimension of our panel and the caveats of the method (simple lin-
ear interactions with respect to a base country/year) in case of country-specific and
time responses. Mainly for the latter, this method lacks flexibility that is associated
with Bayesian style time-varying parameter estimations (full model specification),
such as in Cuerpo (2014) for Spanish public finances.
26 Some of these turning points are found significant in the non-parametric time-varying estima-
tion, which gives us more confidence and provides a robustness check of our findings.
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Choice of estimators
As already introduced in section 2.3.3, we also test the robustness of our results by
employing a battery of estimators to gauge any potential biases in our estimated
coefficients compared to the base estimator (FE IV). See Table A.5 in the Appendix.
Regarding our variable of interest, the debt ratio remains highly statistically signif-
icant across estimators (except for the simple Arellano-Bond GMM estimator). In
terms of economic significance, the FRF coefficient estimated with pooled OLS is
viewed as a (quasi)-lower bound (0.010 in our case). Leaving aside the pooled OLS
results, relatively low FRF coefficients are found with the corrected least-squares
dummy variable estimator (LSDVC) and LIML and two-step GMM estimator with
time effects (0.031 and 0.033 respectively). On the other hand, an upper bound
0.064 is given by the Arellano-Bond (difference) GMM estimator, when orthogo-
nal deviations are used. Such an estimate seems to lie near the upper interval for
EU/EA countries (see the literature survey in the Appendix or a short summary
in Berti et al., 2016). The other explanatory variables largely keep their levels of
significance and signs.
Other robustness checks
Two further robustness checks are carried out and shown in appendix. First, we in-
vestigate the effect of introducing a constraint on fiscal policy behaviour in the form
of a fiscal rule (table A.6 in appendix). The inclusion of a proxy for fiscal institutions
in a broad sense is associated with a reduced sample size since most of them are not
available before 1990 (or 1985). While the impact on the FRF coefficient is rather
small, the effects of the fiscal rules themselves are not found statistically significant.
For example, the EC fiscal rule index (FRI, see EC, 2016a), perhaps owning to its
limited availability before 1990 or its specific construction) leads only to a significant
response of the output gap, while the variable itself remains insignificant. Similarly,
the overall IMF fiscal rule dummy and its four subcomponents are not found to
have a statistically significant effect on the primary balance. These results seem to
confirm previous findings in more recent literature (see Ayuso-i-Casals et al., 2007;
Cordes et al., 2015).
Second, we investigate the effects of broadly defined political institutions
(such as government stability or political risk rating prepared by the Political Risk
Services Group (PRSG), and alternatively from the IADB database of political
institutions; see description in Table A.8 in the Appendix). These variables are not
found statistically significant for our group of countries with the exceptions of the
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election dummy and total risk rating variable. One reason can be due to rather
highly developed political systems having differences that are hardly detectable by
this type of soft-data comparable across a world sample.
Finally, a simple test for the presence of non-linear responses is conducted
by using a debt dummy variable. A large number of studies report estimates of
nonlinearities found around the debt-to-GDP ratio of 50 percent, such as Mendoza
and Ostry (2008). Since we are agnostic about a location of such effect (perhaps in
the neighbourhood of 60 percent if the Pact was binding), we estimated our base
model specification with a simple dummy variable (one at a time), taking the value
one for a particular debt ratio lying between 5 and 135 percent and zero otherwise.
Our results show (see figure A.3 in appendix) that there are several intervals of
levels of indebtedness where the coefficient on a debt dummy becomes significant,
one of them around 40 percent, others for rather low levels of indebtedness (below
20 percent), and then for higher levels (around 70 percent, including the 60 percent
ceiling). There are even two visible (significant) points of discontinuity (measured
in term of the estimated coefficients), one around 35 percent, and the other around
56 percent. Similar but rather noisier results are obtained when our non-extended
sample is utilized. These finding would point towards the need to explore possible
non-linearities in debt responses. This is done in the next section.
2.5 Fiscal fatigue
In this section, we first propose a novel approach to measure fiscal fatigue (FF)
building on the linear FRF. In turn, we investigate the fiscal fatigue hypothesis
across euro area countries using a non-linear approach. So far, the concept of fiscal
fatigue based on a FRF has been mainly investigated in the literature using a non-
linear (cubic) function in line with Ghosh et al. (2013). In related fields, the empirical
evidence on the capacity of sovereigns to maintain high primary surpluses is rich
(see Eichengreen and Panizza, 2014, for a recent study).
2.5.1 Detecting fiscal fatigue – the linear case
In the linear FRF literature, a sufficient condition for sustainability is that the
primary balance ratio improves when the government debt ratio increases. However,
large increases in primary surpluses and, especially maintenance of such surpluses
over long periods of time, are constrained by a multitude of economic, institutional
and political factors denoting fiscal fatigue. The linear FRF literature provides the
size of the estimated coefficient for the reaction of the primary balance to debt. This
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can be used to calculate upper limits for the primary surpluses that a country can
maintain, and thus provides a useful input for debt sustainability analyses (DSA).27
For instance, a central question in DSA exercises is the size of the needed primary
balance to stabilise the debt ratio or bring it below a certain threshold by the end
of the simulation horizon. The resulting primary balance can be evaluated against
the risk of fiscal fatigue by comparing it with the country’s historical track-record.
If the simulated primary surplus is above the average or, even worse, above some
maximum primary balance maintained in the past (call it ‘Benchmark’, B), then
the government may be at risk of fiscal fatigue. However, governments may have
maintained a relatively low fiscal surplus in the past given a low debt level. An
increase in the debt level (due, for instance, to a crisis) would improve the fiscal
effort if the respective government obeys sustainability constraints. To calculate
such an upper limit for the fiscal fatigue, an estimated linear FRF coefficient k can
be used. For instance, taking a prudent coefficient of 0.04 based on our analysis of
the euro area FRF, any 10 percentage point increase in the debt ratio (∆D) would
add 0.4 percentage point to the primary balance. The ‘adjusted primary balance
Benchmark’ (Badj) would then be derived as follows:
(2.3) Badj = B + k × (∆D).
One could assign for instance a risk score (and a heat map) for fiscal fatigue
as follows:
1. Low risk (L) if the simulated primary balance (say average over 5 or 10 years
during the DSA horizon) is lower than the benchmark B of the recent past;
2. Medium risk (M) if the simulated primary balance is above the past bench-
mark, but below the benchmark adjusted with the FRF coefficient for the
increase in the debt level (Badj);
3. High risk (H) if the simulated primary balance is above the debt-adjusted
benchmark (Badj).
An example for the application of the linear FRF-based fiscal fatigue crite-
rion to the euro area countries (EA-18), based on the DSA data from the latest
IMF documents (mostly Art. IV reports), is shown in Table 2.2 below. Column 8
27 DSA has been gaining popularity as a tool that allows us to assess the behaviour of public
finances in the short and medium-term horizon under uncertainty. A country-specific example (for
Spain) can be found in Cuerpo (2014).
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shows the risk of fiscal fatigue when we take the benchmark as the average fiscal
performance over the monetary union period (the average primary balance net of
support to the financial sector for the period 1999–2013), and employ an adjust-
ment FRF coefficient of 0.04. According to this measure, from the perspective of
their past track-record and an average fiscal reaction function, more than half of
our EA-18 sample (10 countries) would be signalled in DSA simulations at high risk
of fiscal fatigue. Results would remain unchanged if the FRF coefficient of our base
model, 0.034 or the lower and upper bounds of its 95% confidence interval (0.022
and, respectively, 0.046) would be used instead. See columns 8.1 − 8.3. Results
would change (to lower risks) for only three countries (highlighted in column 8.4) if
the upper estimator bound (0.064 with the difference AB estimator) were used.
Alternative (less stringent) applications of the fiscal fatigue criterion refer
to the chosen benchmark for the primary balance track-record (see Table 2.3). If
the crisis years are broadly excluded from the benchmark (that is, only the average
primary balance over a 10 year-period, 1999–2008, is considered) and the FRF
coefficient from model m7, table 2.1 (0.029) is used for the adjustment, then the
upper adjusted PB benchmark increases and the risk assessment improves in several
countries (7 countries, highlighted in column 8, Table 2.3). This less stringent
assessment would be justified by the normalisation of the economic conditions and
a low probability of a crisis revival. This setup is likely more suitable for a DSA
baseline, while the one in Table 2.2 may be considered for DSA risk scenarios.
Though less accurate estimates, the use of country-specific FRF coefficients
(as per Figure A.2)28 instead of the common panel coefficient would not significantly
change the risk assessment. See second panel of Table 2.3. The risk of fiscal fatigue
would change for only two countries, Austria and Greece (higher for Austria and
lower for Greece). For countries with large increases in the debt ratio, such as
Greece, the size of the FRF coefficient plays a more sizeable role. According to
this model, the upper limit of the primary balance benchmark for DSA simulations
(Badj) would be around 0.6% of GDP, at an average (common) FRF of 0.04. This
would however increase to 3.5% of GDP if a country-specific FRF coefficient of
about 0.075 were to be used.
28 For the EA-11 countries; for the remaining EA-18 countries, the common FRF coefficient (0.04)
is used instead.
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Table 2.2: An application of the linear FRF-based fiscal fatigue criterion: 1999–2013 benchmark
Average Average 5 year Risk of fiscal fatigue: Adjustments Risks of fiscal
Country 1999–2013 DSA simulations with FRF coefficient of 0.04 fatigue – alternative
(latest IMF DSA) FRF coefficients:
Risk:
PB Debt PB Debt Change Adj. in Max PB Comparison 0.034 0.022 0.046 0.064
(B) in debt PB (Badj) with DSA sim
1 2 3 4 (5 = 4− 2) (6 = 5 ∗ 0.04) (7 = 1 + 6) 8 (3 vs. 1 & 7) 8.1. 8.2. 8.3. 8.4.
AT 0.82 71.4 1.40 74.5 3.1 0.12 0.94 H H H H H
BE 2.96 100.6 0.74 104.1 3.5 0.14 3.10 L L L L L
CY -0.35 62.3 2.24 116.5 54.2 2.17 1.82 H H H H M
DE 0.83 67.6 1.92 66.0 -1.6 -0.06 0.77 H H H H H
EE 0.48 5.9 0.50 6.9 1.0 0.04 0.52 M M M M M
ES -0.70 55.6 -0.32 97.5 41.9 1.68 0.98 M M M M M
FI 3.57 42.9 -0.90 60.9 18.0 0.72 4.29 L L L L L
FR -0.95 70.6 0.16 93.0 22.4 0.90 -0.05 H H H H M
GR -2.08 121.9 2.60 168.1 46.2 1.85 -0.24 H H H H H
IE -0.51 54.8 2.08 103.2 48.5 1.94 1.43 H H H H M
IT 1.88 108.4 2.30 130.0 21.7 0.87 2.74 M M M M M
LU 2.12 12.0 0.00 38.5 26.5 1.06 3.18 L L L L L
LV -1.54 22.4 0.10 36.4 14.0 0.56 -0.98 H H H H H
MT -0.78 66.3 1.40 67.2 0.9 0.04 -0.74 H H H H H
NL 0.63 53.8 -0.68 68.4 14.6 0.58 1.21 L L L L L
PT -2.01 77.0 1.70 123.4 46.5 1.86 -0.15 H H H H H
SI -1.36 33.2 -0.34 84.3 51.1 2.04 0.68 M M M M M
SK -2.86 41.5 0.64 51.8 10.3 0.41 -2.45 H H H H H
Notes: PB denotes primary balance (adjusted for the government support to the financial sector, GAFS); both PB and debt
as % of GDP. Max PB (Badj) denotes the debt-adjusted primary balance benchmark (see eq. (2.3) above). DSA simulated PB
and debt are taken from IMF Article IV reports and similar materials, as available online, up to August 2015. In column 8,
the FF risk categories (L, M , H – low, medium, high risks) are described in the text (see eq. (2.3) above).
Source: own calculations.
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Table 2.3: Alternative applications of the linear FRF-based fiscal fatigue criterion
10-year Risk of fiscal fatigue: Adjustments Risk of fiscal fatigue: Adjustments
Country average with FRF coefficient for with country-specific
1999–2008 period before crisis (0.029) FRF coefficient (whole period)
Risks: Risks:
PB Debt Change Adj. in Max PB Comparison Adj. in Max PB Comparison
(B) in debt PB (Badj) with DSA sim PB (Badj) with DSA sim
1′ 2′ (5′ = 4′ − 2′) (6′ = 5′ ∗ 0.029) (7′ = 1′ + 6′) 8′ (3 vs. 1′ & 7′) (6′′ = 5′ ∗ k) (7′′ = 1′ + 6′′) 8′′ (3 vs. 1′ & 7′′)
AT 1.19 66.4 8.1 0.23 1.42 M 0.16 1.35 H
BE 4.68 99.8 4.2 0.12 4.80 L 0.17 4.85 L
CY 0.88 57.7 58.8 1.71 2.59 M 2.35 3.24 M
DE 0.78 62.5 3.5 0.10 0.88 H 0.04 0.81 H
EE 0.78 5.0 1.9 0.06 0.84 L 0.08 0.86 L
ES 2.02 47.3 50.2 1.46 3.47 L 0.90 2.92 L
FI 5.77 39.8 21.1 0.61 6.39 L -0.53 5.24 L
FR 0.15 63.1 29.9 0.87 1.01 M 0.45 0.59 M
GR -1.26 104.6 63.5 1.84 0.58 H 4.76 3.50 M
IE 2.12 32.4 70.9 2.05 4.18 L 1.77 3.89 L
IT 2.37 102.9 27.2 0.79 3.16 L 2.17 4.55 L
LU 2.95 8.0 30.5 0.89 3.83 L 1.22 4.17 L
LV -1.26 12.8 23.5 0.68 -0.58 H 0.94 -0.32 H
MT -1.19 65.3 1.9 0.06 -1.13 H 0.08 -1.11 H
NL 2.09 49.6 18.8 0.55 2.64 L 0.57 2.66 L
PT -1.39 60.8 62.6 1.82 0.42 H 1.57 0.17 H
SI -0.36 25.3 59.0 1.71 1.35 M 2.36 2.00 M
SK -2.44 39.4 12.4 0.36 -2.08 H 0.50 -1.94 H
Notes: See Table 2. Columns 3 and 4 as per Table 2. Highlighted cells show differences in risk assessment compared to column 8 Table 2.2.
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The debt-adjusted benchmark based on the linear FRF can be complemented
with the upper sustainable limits suggested in other empirical literature strands, for
instance, the primary surplus threshold of 4% of GDP in Eichengreen and Panizza
(2014). Overall, the results of such analysis (here for illustrative purposes), can serve
as a basis for further investigation of the fiscal fatigue hypothesis in the context of
debt sustainability analyses.
2.5.2 Non-linear estimation of FRF
Turning to the non-linear FRF, this section aims to investigate the existence of a
non-linear link between primary balance and debt ratios. First, our focus is to test
the fiscal fatigue hypothesis in line with Ghosh et al. (2013), using our euro area
dataset. In this case, the model to estimate extends the specification in eq. (2.2)
simply by adding lagged polynomial terms of public debt. The cubic specification
below is only one particular form to capture a non-linear behaviour and we also
explore a modification that includes only squared lagged debt term:
(2.4) pbi, t = ϕpbi, t−1 +β0di, t−1 +β′0d
2
i, t−1 +β
′′
0d
3
i, t−1 +
k∑
j=1
βjXi, j, t+δi [+ γt]+ωi, t,
where the variable definitions are as per equation (2.3) (measurement errors and
random shocks are captured by the error term ωi, t).
The results for the entire period 1970–2013 (using the original, not-extended
dataset) are presented in Table A.7 in the appendix. These models are divided into
two groups: one labelled base, which presents results for our specification and the
Ghosh’s base specification estimated with our data, and the other, extended, that
does the same for Ghosh’s extended specification. Both groups are an extension of
the Base specification with non-linear debt terms (quadratic and cubic debt terms),
as follows: IV FE ff0a includes not only both nonlinear terms but also the lagged
dependent variable while IV FE ff1 does not. Neither of Ghosh’s models includes
the lagged dependent variable. All models are estimated with IV estimators – FE IV
as in previous text and two-stage PCSE estimator correcting for serial correlation
and cross-sectional dependence with panel specific AR(1) type error term.29 Our
base results do not indicate any presence of the fiscal fatigue (significance and/or
signs), neither for our Base specification nor for Ghosh’s models. The signs and
levels of significance are very similar to previous results, in case of Ghosh’s model to
29 Results based on the FE estimator are sensitive to period of data utilized in estimation and the
way endogenous variables are treated (output gap). Results for both estimators are not sensitive
to alternations in oil prices and/or non-oil price indices (IMF or WB definition, see appendix).
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their results. The only exception is the output gap that turns significant in models
without the lagged dependent variable. The other half of table A.7 shows results
for our base model with nonlinear debt terms, with the lagged dependent variable,
and with output gap and current account variables not instrumented, but replaced
by their first lags estimated with FE estimator. Only in one model – FE ff3a –
all debt variables become significant and with correct signs. Output gap in these
specifications remains significant with a positive sign (not for model FE ff2a), and
the election dummy loses its significance in some models. The last two columns of
the table presents results of Ghosh’s extended model for our data. However, debt
variables remain insignificant and with incorrect signs as in the previous case.
To check the robustness of our findings, our ‘fiscal fatigue’ models (IV FE
ff0a and IV FE ff1 ) were also estimated on a sample where one country was dropped
at a time. While there were no significant differences across estimated models, after
dropping a county, some estimates had the correct signs but lacked significance for
higher order debt terms. In addition, we also explore the effect of excluding the
crisis years (after 2008 in line with our definition of the crisis period).
While in the Ghosh et al. regressions, the results remained mostly insignifi-
cant, in our specifications, mainly FE ff3a, we find statistically significant estimates
with correct signs for the nonlinear fiscal fatigue pattern. Possible debt turning
points were calculated, but were found to be very high (approaching 200% of GDP).
Overall, in this type of fiscal fatigue specification, it appears that the significance
of findings is lost when instrumental variables are employed and/or when the years
after 2007 are included in the sample.30 Apart from the sample composition, an-
other explanation for the difference in results compared to Ghosh et al. (2013) can
be associated with the underlying debt series: for instance, Fourier and Fall (2015)
find evidence of fiscal fatigue for OECD public debt series but not for debt series
calculated according to the EDP rules.
To summarize our findings, there does not seem to be clear evidence for
non-linear fiscal fatigue in line with Ghosh et al. (2013), even though some (high
debt) countries may have been exposed to such problems in the more recent past.
This conclusion is not surprising given the relatively low number of observations
with very high debt ratios in our sample. In addition, some studies have shown
sensitivity of fiscal fatigue estimates on some variables, particularly interest rates
30 Even though the onset of the Sovereign Debt Crisis can be traced back to late 2009 or 2010,
samples including 2008 or 2009 show a lack of significance in debt coefficients.
Using an extended country sample (EU-28 or OECD countries) does not lead to significantly differ-
ent results, but coefficients turn positive and with the correct signs in the case of OECD countries,
where some of them have experienced high levels of indebtedness (Japan or as a result of a crisis
such as Bulgaria in early 1990s). Results available upon request from the authors.
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(see Daniel and Shiamptanis, 2015).
2.6 Conclusions
This chapter addressed two main research questions that result in two contributions
of this text. First, we estimated a ‘stylised’ fiscal reaction function for 18 euro area
countries employing longer and more recent time series. Second, we explored the
issue of fiscal fatigue in greater depth.
Having used various dynamic panel techniques and a battery of robustness
checks, we found evidence that euro area sovereigns abide, on average, by weak sus-
tainability constraints. The primary balance improves by about 0.03–0.05 for every
1 percentage point increase in the debt-to-GDP ratio after controlling for other rele-
vant factors. The positive reaction of primary surpluses to higher debt strengthened
over the crisis (2008 onwards), which seemed to have acted as a disciplining device
compared to the preceding period. Similar evidence with respect to the behaviour
over the monetary union period (after 1999 and in individual country after the euro
adoption) is less strong (the higher FRF coefficient seemingly determined by the cri-
sis period). Overall, we find that the FRF estimates are rather robust across various
specifications, time periods and exclusion of individual countries. Moreover, the fis-
cal reaction is not substantially different for our base model specification across EA
countries. Though country-specific results should be regarded with caution, we find
that the FRF coefficient deviated somewhat more substantially from the average
one in a few countries, especially as a reaction to the crisis, .
Regarding other determinants of fiscal positions (higher primary surpluses),
we find evidence for persistence in fiscal policy; political factors (election years only,
with a negative impact), for the twin deficit hypothesis (improved external posi-
tions and more openness) and the squeezing effect of interest payments. We do
not find strong evidence for a stable cyclical behaviour (stabilisation) function of
fiscal policy across the euro area countries. When the whole period (crisis years
included) is considered, the output gap does not seem to have a statistically signif-
icant impact in the setting of the cyclically-adjusted primary balance (a proxy for
the discretionary fiscal policy) and, more surprisingly, of the primary balance. A
statistically significant and positive impact, which may be taken as weak evidence
of counter-cyclical effects of fiscal policy, is found only when the GDP growth rate
is used, or, in the case of the output gap, only for the periods excluding the crisis
years. However, neither the output gap or the real growth rate is found to have a
statistically significant impact on driving the CAPB (discretionary fiscal policy). In
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this sense, we do not find strong evidence for either a continuously pro-cyclical or
counter-cyclical fiscal policy for the euro area countries, on average.
The second contribution of the chapter consists in proposing a novel mea-
sure of fiscal fatigue that allows us to classify countries based on their actual fiscal
behaviour with few assumptions. Considering a prudent coefficient for the fiscal
policy reaction function, we can measure the extent of fiscal fatigue by comparing
simulated primary balance paths in the context of debt sustainability analyses with
countries’ track-record, adjusted for the estimated fiscal reaction coefficient. Sup-
port for the fiscal fatigue hypothesis using a non-linear FRF as proposed in Ghosh
et al. (2013) is weak and not sufficiently robust in the euro area sample.
Our study is subject to caveats associated with a panel approach when in-
vestigating the fiscal fatigue hypothesis. A natural response seems to be more
data-demanding country-specific models that can be estimated with a battery of
econometric techniques allowing for various types of non-linearities. This would
come, though, at the cost of reduced comparability and applicability to more recent
economic, institutional and political conditions. Because of limited availability or
comparability of time series (at the same or a higher (quarterly) frequency that is
available for most EA countries as late as 2000) for our set of countries, we leave this
extension for further research. As such, further investigations could focus in more
detail on the fiscal fatigue hypothesis in a larger sample of countries such as EU-28
or OECD, or attempt to endogenise it to see effects of its main determinants such as
economic growth or real interest rate. In a similar vein, one could try to link it with
the literature on fiscal limits (see Davig et al., 2011). Another extension could relax
the assumption of time-invariant responses over the sample period in an attempt
to explore effects of steps in the monetary integration and/or effects related to the
debt crisis. For that purpose, higher frequency series and/or Bayesian techniques
for the EA as a whole or at a country level could be a starting point.
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A.1 Fiscal responses – country and time specific effects
To evaluate country specific responses in our panel, we present one test that drops
a country at a time in the main text. Since this is an indirect way of capturing
possible effects on debt responses associated with one country in our group, another
model is estimated. Since we are interested in country specific and/or time specific
responses, we estimate a model that resembles the random coefficients model:
(A.1) pbi, t = α+ ϕpbi, t−1 + κ · di, t−1 +
∑
i, i 6=r
λi · di,t−1 +
k∑
j=1
βjXj, i, t + δi + υi,t,
where λi represents a set of i−1 country specific debt responses and the other items
have the same interpretation as in the main text.
Coefficients shown in the main text and also in figure A.1 below, show the
total response for individual countries (sum of the estimated coefficients κ + λi)
with a country r chosen as the base country. Similarly, for time specific responses,
when there is a sum of time specific debt responses for all years over our sample
period without two (model with a constant term and a full set of country FE).
When the extended dataset is utilized, all EA-12 countries have the same number
of observations. However, since our panel is unbalanced, EA-18 results presented
below are not directly comparable because of different coverage for new EA member
states. Nevertheless, time specific responses are rather similar for both groups of
countries, and similarly for country specific responses.
When looking at the panel a) of the figure A.1, one can see generally larger
(positive) responses by new EA members that can be related to their sample period
(and ordered by their 2013 debt levels). The relative position of old EA members
is almost unaffected (two changes in positions), and response coefficients are quite
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Figure A.1: Fiscal responses by country and by year, EA-18 countries,
1970–2013
Country variation, EA-18
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Time variation, EA-18
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Note: country ordering based on the 2013 debt level values. Blue line stands for EA-18 average response
with a linear time trend, red dashed line for average response with time fixed effects (all EA18 countries and
for all years). The black dotted line indicates the null response. Whiskers around point estimates (diamonds)
represent the 95% confidence intervals, CIs for Estonia are [-0.587; +0.817]. Source: own calculation.
similar to those shown for the reduced model for EA-11 countries in the main text.
Relatively stronger responses in case of new EA member states partially reflect
shorter time coverage and on average more sound fiscal policy behaviour since most
of their public debts were wiped out during first years of their transformation pro-
cesses in the 1990s. Significance of individual response coefficients can be judged
from the size of confidence intervals shown around the point estimates (‘whiskers’).
Our reading of these results is that they can be considered a test of fiscal fatigue sui
generis (see further details in the main text) for this group of countries. When coun-
tries are ordered by their average debt values, there is some reshuﬄing of positions
but there is no significantly improved picture of fiscal fatigue.i
When considering the other dimension, time variation, and visible patterns
(panel b) of figure A.1), there seems to be a great deal of variation in the 1970s and
early 1980s. The extension of the country dimension is reflected in smaller disper-
sions of debt responses in the 1990s (almost cyclical patterns), but mainly over the
i The same is true even for similar exercises taking into account values before the start of the
debt crisis, that is, until 2007/2008; for example for 2007 the ordering of countries is quite similar
(both ends of the distribution) and the responses of countries with higher debts are close to that
EA-11 average – larger responses showed only Germany, and surprisingly Portugal and Greece.
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most recent period (Great Recession and Sovereign Debt Crisis). A closer inspec-
tion of the figure (and estimates) reveals few ‘turning points’ that indicate changes
in government responses over our sample period. However, they are not significant
at the 95% level.ii Some of them can be associated with events in the process of
European integration, preparations for the monetary union or the sovereign debt
crisis (the last three years). Nevertheless, these results should be taken with cau-
tion, because of different lengths of series for our set of countries (only the EA-11
group is broadly comparable), and the interaction method employed.
ii Some of these turning points are found significant in the non-parametric time-varying estima-
tion, which gives us more confidence and provides a robustness check of our findings, see below.
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A.2 Figures and tables
Figure A.2: FRF coefficients: EA-18 panel excluding one country at a time,
1970–2013
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Note: Country excluded shown on the OX-axis. Horizontal line shows the FRF coefficient for the whole
panel (EA-18), base model. Source: own calculation.
Figure A.3: Coefficient on a debt dummy, EA-18, 1970–2013
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Note: debt-to-GDP ratios are shown on the OX-axis. Horizontal line shows the coefficient on a particular
debt dummy for the whole panel (EA-18), base model, and extended dataset. Source: own calculation.
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Table A.1: Summary of FRF literature
Study Model specification Coefficient on lagged debt Further notes
Country specific estimation
Bohn (1998) PBAL 0.054 OLS with Newey-West S.E., GVAR and YVAR fiscal variables;
Period: 1916–1995, US extensions: fiscal fatigue (second and third polynomial terms, break at 34%);
various sub-samples,
Bohn (2008) PBAL 0.094–0.121 OLS with robust S.E., with time trend;
Period: 1792–2003, US extensions: debt squared, AR(1) process for outlays, public debt is not lagged.
Legrenzi and Milas (2013) PBAL 0.087–0.177 OLS and 2STLS (IV) estimation;
Period: 1960(1970)–2012, extensions: non-linear (logistic) model with state-varying thresholds,
models for GRC, IRL, PTL and ESP a measure of financial pressures.
Cuerpo (2014) PBAL -0.032 – 0.018 Bayesian time-varying coefficients technique (TVC)
Period 1986q1–2012q4
(quarterly data), ESP
D’Erasmo et al. (2015) PBAL, 0.0767–0.105 OLS with HAC S.E. and military expenditures;
1972–2014, US extensions: time trend, squared debt, asymmetrical response, with AR(1) term,
Eurozone, EU, OECD with/without recession
Debrun and Wyplosz (1999) PBAL (with 1 lag) 0.01–0.03 FE OLS, GLS and 3SLS estimators, no institutional or political variables included
Panel: 11 European countries,
some specifications with
country FE, period: 1982–1997
Gal´ı and Perotti (2003) CAPB and general government
PBAL divided by potential output, -0.06 FE and IV FE estimator with country FE;
EU-11+OECD-5 (individual, -0.07 (only EU-11) extensions: debt as a fraction of potential GDP, expected output gap,
pooled estimation), period: 1980–2002 -0.02 (only OECD5) pre- vs. post-Maastricht period; monetary policy rule; government investment,
spending, and revenues to potential output;
IMF (2004) General government CAPB (with 1 lag) 0.00–0.08 2SLS IV estimator, model with monetary gaps; country specific FRF
Panel (unbalanced): EA-12
(without Luxembourg), period 1971–2003
Annett (2006) CAPB (with 1 lag) 0.01–0.03 (EU-14) Pooled and 2SLS estimator with and without country FE;
Panel: EU-14 (without Luxembourg), 0.01–0.02 (EU-11) extensions: dummy for election year, commitment/mixed forms of fiscal governance,
period: 1980–2004 and delegation relative economic size in EU-15/EA-12, a 10-year real growth volatility;
pre- and post-Maastricht period and pre- and post-SGP period estimation
Continued on next page
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Table A.1 – Continued from previous page
Study Model specification Coefficient on lagged debt Further notes
Golinelli and Momigliano (2006) Change of CAPB, lagged PBAL included 0.008–0.024 Real-time data, various estimators (OLS, FE, GMM), country and fixed effects;
Panel: 19 OECD, 11 Euro area, (only EA countries) extensions: dummy variables for stages of European monetary integration, phases
three periods covering 1988–2006 of business cycle and election cycle, a Maastricht variable (number of years for elimination
of excessive deficits and expected interest payments);
Ayuso-i-Casals et al. (2007) CAPB (with 1 lag) testing symmetry of fiscal responses
and primary expenditures (with 1 lag) 0.00–0.03 FE estimator and TSLS (IV) estimator with country FE;
Panel: 22 EU, period: 1990–2005 -0.18– -0.02 extensions: analysis for various types of fiscal rules and fiscal institutions, cyclical stance
(for primary expenditures)
Debrun et al. (2008) General government and
CAB (with 1 lag), 0.02–0.04 OLS, LSDVC, FE and FE IV estimator with country FE;
Panel: EU-25, period: 1990–2005 0.02 (only EU-15) extensions: subgroups estimations, focus on fiscal rules
Golinelli and Momigliano (2008) Change in CAPB (one 1 added) 0.008–0.080 Pooled OLS, Within group, difference and system (one-step) GMM estimators;
Change in CAPB (lagged PBAL) 0.009–0.011 extensions: real-time and ex post data, symmetry of responses, political and institutional
Change in PBAL (1 lag added) 0.009–0.014 variables, the Maastricht variable, real ex ante interest rate; rolling regression
Panel: 11 EA, period: 1978–2006 (15-year-long windows)
Afonso and Jalles (2011) PBAL (with 1 lag) 0.01–0.15 Pooled OLS and FE IV estimators, system GMM estimator, narrow specification (debt
Panel: 18 OECD countries, -0.05–0.17 and/or output gap only); extensions: panel time series estimation (MG, AMG, CCEMG)
period: 1970–2010 (time series estimators) and Driscoll-Kraay estimator
EC (2011) PBAL 0.027–0.031 FE IV estimator with country FE;
Panel: EU-27, period: 1975/1980–2010 0.033–0.038 (extensions) ; extensions: with the FRI variable for the period 1990–2008
Eller and Urvova´ (2012) General government PBAL 0.026–0.060 Pooled OLS, FE, system GMM estimators with FE and time effects;
(with 1 or 2 lags) extensions: debt spline (at 40%), output gap analysis, various election variables and price
Panel: 8 new EU member states, indices, fiscal institutions (FRI, WB governance)
period: 1995–2011
Escolano et al. (2012) General government and CAB 0.0367 LSDVC and FE estimator with country FE;
(with 1 lag) 0.0455–0.0563 (for CAPB) extensions: focus on fiscal rules; subgroups
Panel: EU-27, period: 1990–2008 0.0415 (only EU-15)
Medeiros (2012) General government PBAL 0.054–0.078 FD and FE IV estimator with country FE allowing for AR(1) errors;
Panel: EU-27/-21, period 1976–2011 extensions: estimation of fiscal fatigue via FD IV estimation (with output gap only)
Theofilakou and Stournaras (2012) CAPB (with lag) 0.0240–0.0426; One-step BB estimator with forward orthogonal deviations; specification similar
Panel: 10 EA (unbalanced), to Bohn (1998) with bond yields included; non-linear specification with quadratic term
time dummies for selected years, 0.064 (not significant)
Continued on next page
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Study Model specification Coefficient on lagged debt Further notes
1988–2009 (NL model with a squared term)
0.022 (2 subgroups
based on the 60% threshold)
Betty and Shiamptanis (2013) PBAL 0.0727 Panel cointegration estimators (DOLS) allowing for heterogeneity,
Panel: 11 EA, 1970–2011,
pre-EMU (1970–1998) and
post-EMU (1999–2011)
Schoder (2014) PBAL 0.041 (1980–1996) MG and PMG estimators;
OECD 15, period: 1981–2010 0.011 (1997–2010) extensions: various sub-periods and subgroups
(quarterly observations)
Weichenrieder and Zimmer (2014) general government PBAL 0.043–0.059 FE estimator with time and country FE;
Panel: EA, 1970–2011 extensions: focus on changes over time – three periods (dummy shifter) and no crisis period
Baldi and Staehr (2016) Quarterly PBAL (with t− 4 lag) 0.026 (before, EA-12) 2SLS estimation with robust S.E., country FE and quarterly dummies with GDP
Quarterly panel, EU-27, growth only; variables are not seasonally adjusted; extensions: various subgroups
period: 2001Q1–2008Q2 (before the crisis) of countries (EA12, CEE10, old and new EU countries grouped by ‘seriousness’ of their
(before the crisis) and fiscal problems)
2009Q1–2014Q1 (during the crisis) 0.087 (during, EA-12)
Developing and developed countries
IMF (2003) General government PBAL (with 1 lag) 0.039–0.047 GLS estimator, country FE;
Panel: 54 emerging and industrial 0.057–0.060 extensions: spline regression (threshold at 50%);
countries, period: 1990–2002; (only for industrial economies) subsample of 20 industrial economies and spline regression (threshold at 80%)
Abiad and Baig (2005) PBAL 0.034 FE OLS estimator core model (macroeconomic variables only); debt spline at 50%;
Panel: 34 emerging market countries, 0.055–0.086 extensions: model with political or institutional variables; model with both variables
country FE, period: 1990–2002 0.063–0.089
(with debt spline)
(ext. model with debt spline)
0.048–0.072
(all variables and debt spline)
Abiad and Ostry (2005) PBAL 0.05–0.10 FGLS estimator, debt spline at 50%;
Panel: 31 emerging market 0.04–0.06 (extended model) extensions: alternative fiscal institution measures
countries, country FE,
period: 1990–2002
Celasun et al. (2006) General government PBAL 0.030–0.046 Difference LIML, GMM estimators with country FE;
Continued on next page
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Study Model specification Coefficient on lagged debt Further notes
Panel: 34 emerging economies, extensions: spline regression (threshold at 50%) and positive and negative output gap
period: 1990–2004
Ghosh et al. (2011) General government PBAL -0.2080 (long) FE estimator with robust S.E. and with AR(1) error term process;
Panel: 23 developed countries, -0.0805 (short) extensions: fiscal fatigue explored (coefficients of the second and third polynomial),
period 1970/1985–2007 government expenditure gap
Debrun and Kinda (2013) PBAL 0.035–0.040 (FE) FE and LSDVC estimator;
Panel: advanced (28) and emerging 0.032–0.037 (LSDVC) extensions: interest payments, and interest payments thresholds (linear)
(26) countries, period: 1980–2010
Mendoza and Ostry (2008) PBAL 0.033–0.072 FE estimator with country FE, robust S.E. with country AR(1) coefficients;
Panel: 22 industrial and 34 0.020–0.038 extensions: subsamples (high/low debt countries);
emerging countries, (only industrial countries) spline regression (threshold at 48%); shorter periods for most emerging countries;
period: 1980/1990–2005 YVAR and GVAR government expenditure variables
Ghosh et al. (2013) General government PBAL -0.208– -0.225 (long) FE country-fixed effect estimator with robust S.E. and with AR(1) error term process;
panel: 23 developed countries -0.081– -0.086 (short) extensions: OLS, PCSE estimators, fiscal fatigue explored (second and third polynomial
(EU-14), period 1970/1985–2007 terms included in both specifications); government expenditure gap; age dependency,
IMF arrangement, fiscal rules, oil price, non-fuel commodity price, trade openness
Debrun and Kinda (2014) PBAL 0.015–0.023 LSDVC estimator;
Panel: advanced (28) and emerging extensions: exploring fiscal rules and fiscal councils;
(26) countries, period: 1990–2011
Cevik and Teksos (2014) CAPB -0.01–0.01 (reduced form) GLS (reduced form only), one and two-step system GMM estimator (with/without
Panel: 49 developed and developing 0.003–0.025 collapse option), output gap and country FE (reduced form); extensions: macro-finance
countries, period: 1990–2012 variables (real exchange rate, domestic credit, market capitalization, residential property
prices, and natural resource rents), institutional and demographic
variables; estimation also for standard deviation of CAPB.
Cordes et al. (2015) PBAL (with 1 lag) 0.013 LSDVC estimator, expenditure rule index/dummy;
Panel: 57 advanced and developing extensions: model specified for primary expenditures
economies, period: 1985–2012
D’Erasmo et al. (2015) PBAL -0.001–0.692 FE with White cross-section corrected S.E. with output gap and government expenditures;
Panel: 25 advanced and 33 emerging extensions: government expenditure or consumption gap (HP filter), country AR(1) error.
economies, period: 1951–2013
Note: PBAL – primary balance, CAPB – cyclically adjusted PBAL, CAB – cyclically adjusted balance, NL – non-linear, standard errors – S.E., FE – fixed effects.
Source: studies listed in the table.
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Table A.2: Robustness checks – main specification (PBAL with extrapolated series) and CAPB (not extrapolated
sample), EA-18, 1970–2013
am0 am1 am2 am3 am0’ am1’ am2’ am3’
Lagged primary balance 0.645*** 0.754*** 0.642*** 0.653*** Lagged CAPB 0.653*** 0.690*** 0.619*** 0.644***
[0.049] [0.039] [0.038] [0.046] [0.059] [0.056] [0.065] [0.065]
Lagged debt 0.027*** 0.024*** 0.027*** 0.029*** Lagged debt 0.006*** 0.015*** 0.029*** 0.027***
[0.005] [0.006] [0.005] [0.006] [0.002] [0.004] [0.006] [0.006]
Output gap -0.034 0.049 -0.096* Output gap 0.001 0.080 -0.057
[0.065] [0.063] [0.052] [0.057] [0.068] [0.054]
GDP growth 0.325*** GDP growth 0.153
[0.081] [0.100]
Current account 0.097** 0.105*** 0.079** Current account 0.101*** 0.103*** 0.099***
[0.045] [0.035] [0.033] [0.037] [0.035] [0.032]
Openness 0.016** Openness 0.008
[0.006] [0.006]
Election dummy -0.516*** -0.576*** -0.499*** -0.509*** Election dummy -0.602*** -0.569*** -0.556*** -0.539***
[0.154] [0.151] [0.130] [0.154] [0.143] [0.143] [0.142] [0.148]
Crisis dummy -1.973*** -1.630*** -0.327 -2.245*** Crisis dummy -0.515*** -0.536*** -0.534*** -0.501***
[0.360] [0.552] [0.370] [0.373] [0.145] [0.154] [0.143] [0.143]
Year 0.006 -0.007 -0.004 Year -0.971*** 0.188 -0.342 -1.188***
[0.015] [0.011] [0.016] [0.319] [0.588] [0.425] [0.340]
Constant -1.005*** -0.102 -1.679*** -2.146*** Constant -0.020* -0.020* -0.020
[0.313] [0.552] [0.366] [0.500] [0.012] [0.011] [0.014]
Observations 533 533 566 533 Observations 442 442 450 442
R-squared 0.690 0.785 0.731 0.696 R-squared 0.708 0.744 0.700 0.710
Country FE yes yes yes yes Country FE yes yes yes yes
Time FE no yes no no Time FE no yes no no
Kleibergen-Paap LM statistic 38.220 41.820 27.490 40.020 Kleibergen-Paap LM statistic 36.370 46.030 22.480 34.470
Kleibergen-Paap p-val 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 Kleibergen-Paap p-val 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
Hansen test 5.883 2.793 2.295 3.913 Hansen test 4.908 2.721 2.907 2.039
Hansen p-val 0.208 0.593 0.514 0.418 Hansen p-val 0.297 0.606 0.406 0.729
Note: Model am0 is the base model. Model am1 includes country and time fixed effects (IV). Model am2 is the base model, which uses GDP growth rates
instead of output gap. Model am3 is the base model that includes export and import instead of current account. CAPB specifications are the same as
PBAL models. CAPB denotes the cyclically adjusted primary balance. Robust standard errors used in all specifications. The null of Kleinbergen-Paap LM
test is that instruments are weak. x – exactly identified model. P-value: *** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, * p < 0.1: variable is statistically significant at the 1%,
5% and 10%, respectively. Source: own calculation.
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Table A.3: Main specification for various periods, EA-18
m1 m11 m1a m11a m2 m22 m3 m33
1970–2013 1970–2007 1970–2013 1970–2007 1985–2013 1985–2007 1991–2013 1991–2007
Lagged primary balance 0.566*** 0.627*** 0.645*** 0.721*** 0.492*** 0.497*** 0.493*** 0.469***
[0.059] [0.064] [0.049] [0.046] [0.064] [0.086] [0.081] [0.137]
Lagged debt 0.034*** 0.025*** 0.027*** 0.019*** 0.040*** 0.026*** 0.046*** 0.027**
[0.006] [0.005] [0.005] [0.005] [0.008] [0.007] [0.010] [0.011]
Output gap 0.072 0.138** -0.034 0.025 0.159* 0.260*** 0.140 0.260*
[0.071] [0.069] [0.065] [0.059] [0.084] [0.093] [0.096] [0.135]
Current account 0.157*** 0.102 0.097** 0.052 0.188*** 0.145* 0.182** 0.120
[0.054] [0.070] [0.045] [0.046] [0.060] [0.080] [0.075] [0.126]
Election dummy -0.448*** -0.659*** -0.516*** -0.693*** -0.401** -0.624*** -0.371** -0.665***
[0.155] [0.171] [0.154] [0.172] [0.166] [0.196] [0.180] [0.234]
Crisis dummy -1.884*** -1.973*** -2.093*** -2.523***
[0.364] [0.360] [0.409] [0.481]
Year -0.005 -0.012 0.006 0.006 0.018 -0.007 0.060* -0.023
[0.015] [0.013] [0.015] [0.014] [0.023] [0.018] [0.033] [0.034]
Constant -1.125** -0.591 -1.005*** -0.738** -2.324** -0.815 -4.128*** -0.394
[0.490] [0.521] [0.313] [0.298] [0.911] [0.861] [1.194] [1.568]
Observations 431 327 533 429 364 260 312 208
R-squared 0.720 0.733 0.690 0.712 0.729 0.721 0.731 0.720
Country FE Yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes
Time FE No no no no no no no No
Kleibergen-Paap LM stat. 35.110 25.860 38.220 32.480 28.210 19.610 25.070 15.610
Kleibergen-Paap p-val 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.001 0.000 0.008
Hansen test 7.264 5.679 5.883 1.125 7.812 8.677 7.936 10.170
Hansen p-val 0.123 0.224 0.208 0.890 0.099 0.070 0.094 0.038
Note: models m1a and m11a are estimated on linked series for most of the euro area countries. Robust standard errors,
country FE used in all specifications. The null of Kleinbergen-Paap LM test is that instruments are weak. P-value:
*** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, * p < 0.1: variable is statistically significant at the 1%, 5% and 10%, respectively.
Source: own calculation.
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Table A.4: Main specification by groups of countries, various periods
1970–2013 1991–2013
m1 m2 m3 m4 m5 m1a m2a m3a m4a m5a
EA18 EA12 EA11a EA11b EA10 EA18 EA12 EA11a EA11b EA10
Lagged primary balance 0.566*** 0.581*** 0.569*** 0.587*** 0.571*** 0.493*** 0.456*** 0.407*** 0.443*** 0.358***
[0.059] [0.061] [0.068] [0.065] [0.074] [0.081] [0.079] [0.093] [0.092] [0.109]
Lagged debt 0.034*** 0.029*** 0.029*** 0.030*** 0.030*** 0.046*** 0.033*** 0.037*** 0.035*** 0.040***
[0.006] [0.006] [0.006] [0.006] [0.006] [0.010] [0.010] [0.011] [0.010] [0.011]
Output gap 0.072 0.095 0.140 0.107 0.163 0.140 0.218* 0.352** 0.265* 0.485***
[0.071] [0.079] [0.092] [0.086] [0.101] [0.096] [0.124] [0.157] [0.153] [0.185]
Current account 0.157*** 0.218*** 0.214*** 0.216*** 0.213*** 0.182** 0.316*** 0.300*** 0.325*** 0.316***
[0.054] [0.046] [0.055] [0.047] [0.058] [0.075] [0.060] [0.069] [0.063] [0.070]
Election dummy -0.448*** -0.424*** -0.452*** -0.411** -0.440*** -0.371** -0.279 -0.316* -0.270 -0.322*
[0.155] [0.158] [0.158] [0.161] [0.160] [0.180] [0.187] [0.175] [0.190] [0.175]
Crisis dummy -1.884*** -1.515*** -1.437*** -1.609*** -1.535*** -2.523*** -1.948*** -1.676*** -2.130*** -1.760***
[0.364] [0.439] [0.443] [0.452] [0.450] [0.481] [0.605] [0.635] [0.612] [0.601]
Year -0.005 -0.018 -0.019 -0.017 -0.019 0.060* 0.029 0.013 0.034 0.011
[0.015] [0.015] [0.015] [0.014] [0.015] [0.033] [0.038] [0.040] [0.040] [0.040]
Constant -1.125** -0.559 -0.493 -0.588 -0.520 -4.128*** -2.449* -2.150 -2.696** -2.301
[0.490] [0.455] [0.505] [0.452] [0.501] [1.194] [1.337] [1.443] [1.357] [1.400]
Observations 431 351 332 330 311 312 232 216 212 196
R-squared 0.720 0.756 0.764 0.761 0.771 0.731 0.771 0.792 0.784 0.812
Country FE yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes
Time FE no no no no no no no no no no
Kleibergen-Paap LM stat. 35.110 29.280 28.370 24.970 23.980 25.070 16.950 21.600 14.170 19.000
Kleibergen-Paap p-val 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.005 0.001 0.015 0.002
Hansen test 7.264 9.079 8.895 9.514 9.285 7.936 5.604 5.346 5.093 4.640
Hansen p-val 0.123 0.059 0.064 0.050 0.054 0.094 0.231 0.254 0.278 0.326
Note: robust standard errors, country FE used in all specifications. The labels: EA12 represents a group of countries without
new EU member states (i.e., AT, BE, DE, ES, FI, FR, GR, IE, IT, LU, NL, PT). EA11a and EA11b represent the EA-12 group
without GR, and respectively, LU; EA-10 is EA12 without both countries GR and LU. The null of Kleinbergen-Paap LM test
is that instruments are weak. P-value: *** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, * p < 0.1: variable is statistically significant at
the 1%, 5% and 10%, respectively. Source: own calculation.
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Table A.5: Main specification: robustness check with various estimators, EA-18, 1970–2013
Pooled OLS IV FE (Base) IV FE + TE LIML LSDVC IV GMM 2S DK PCSE AB GMM ABo GMM
Lagged primary balance 0.607*** 0.566*** 0.716*** 0.570*** 0.706*** 0.576*** 0.498*** 0.204*** 0.635*** 0.655***
[0.047] [0.059] [0.046] [0.064] [0.034] [0.059] [0.079] [0.077] [0.099] [0.067]
Lagged debt 0.010*** 0.034*** 0.029*** 0.033*** 0.031*** 0.031*** 0.051*** 0.056*** 0.049 0.064**
[0.003] [0.006] [0.006] [0.006] [0.006] [0.006] [0.008] [0.008] [0.030] [0.029]
Output gap -0.101 0.072 0.076 0.056 -0.025 0.076 0.096 0.216*** 0.062 0.113
[0.067] [0.071] [0.070] [0.071] [0.047] [0.069] [0.095] [0.074] [0.104] [0.088]
Current account 0.086*** 0.157*** 0.156*** 0.159** 0.148*** 0.158*** 0.167*** 0.171*** -0.091 -0.023
[0.023] [0.054] [0.042] [0.063] [0.032] [0.052] [0.061] [0.040] [0.054] [0.064]
Election dummy -0.415** -0.448*** -0.546*** -0.450*** -0.484*** -0.468*** -0.361* -0.414*** -0.514*** -0.444***
[0.195] [0.155] [0.142] [0.116] [0.168] [0.154] [0.210] [0.153] [0.166] [0.131]
Crisis dummy -1.987*** -1.884*** -1.935*** -1.591*** -1.637*** -1.506* -1.669***
[0.372] [0.364] [0.439] [0.297] [0.345] [0.756] [0.574]
Year 0.042*** -0.005 -0.003 -0.009 -0.009 -0.024 -0.018
[0.012] [0.015] [0.021] [0.014] [0.014] [0.022] [0.024]
Constant -0.909** -1.125** -2.257*** -1.113 -0.901* -1.341*** -1.917**
[0.379] [0.490] [0.558] [0.684] [0.480] [0.490] [0.814]
Observations 431 431 431 431 431 431 431 431 462 463
R-squared 0.521 0.720 0.807 0.716 0.720 0.479 0.412
Country FE No yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes
Time FE No no yes no no no no no yes yes
Kleibergen-Paap LM statistic 35.110 36.260 12.530 35.110
Kleibergen-Paap LM p-val 0.000 0.000 0.028 0.000
Hansen test 7.264 4.353 7.264 19.770 20.240
Hansen p-val 0.123 0.360 0.072 0.063
AR(1) p-val 0.000 0.001 0.003
AR(2) p-val 0.188 0.502 0.484
Note: All results for the original (not-extended) sample. Robust standard errors or clustered standard errors for DK; bootstrapped S.E. for pooled OLS and LSDVC
estimators (500). AB GMM (xtabond2, collapsed), ABo GMM (xtabond2, orthogonal, collapsed); DK – Driscoll-Kraay estimator assuming heteroskedasticity, cross-
sectional and temporal dependence with country FE; PCSE model: with a common AR(1) error term (= 0.401). Hansen test’s null hypothesis is that instruments
(orthogonality conditions) are valid. The null of Kleinbergen-Paap LM test is that instruments are weak. x – exactly identified model. Specification of instruments
between estimators may change. For estimators without explicit IV option, we estimated the first stage for both endogenous variables on the same set of instrument
as for models with IV option, including lagged dependent variable. Fitted values for these variables were then utilized for estimation of our base model. .. – not
available/not calculable. P-value: *** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, * p < 0.1: variable is statistically significant at the 1%, 5% and 10%, respectively. Source: own calculation.
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APPENDIX A.
Table A.6: Robustness checks – effects of fiscal rules in detail, EA-18
afr1 afr2 afr3 afr4 afr5 afr6 afr7 afr8
Lagged primary balance 0.473*** 0.459*** 0.513*** 0.502*** 0.516*** 0.518*** 0.510*** 0.510***
[0.065] [0.066] [0.064] [0.068] [0.063] [0.062] [0.063] [0.063]
Lagged debt 0.045*** 0.045*** 0.037*** 0.038*** 0.038*** 0.038*** 0.037*** 0.037***
[0.008] [0.008] [0.007] [0.008] [0.007] [0.007] [0.007] [0.007]
Output gap 0.193** 0.196** 0.121 0.138* 0.122 0.119 0.118 0.116
[0.081] [0.080] [0.079] [0.082] [0.080] [0.079] [0.080] [0.081]
Current account 0.205*** 0.207*** 0.176*** 0.180*** 0.181*** 0.177*** 0.174*** 0.174***
[0.060] [0.061] [0.058] [0.056] [0.059] [0.059] [0.059] [0.060]
Election dummy -0.367** -0.353** -0.417*** -0.398** -0.421*** -0.417*** -0.422*** -0.418***
[0.165] [0.165] [0.159] [0.161] [0.159] [0.159] [0.159] [0.158]
Crisis dummy -2.275*** -2.289*** -2.015*** -1.976*** -2.091*** -2.064*** -1.998*** -2.007***
[0.410] [0.429] [0.415] [0.419] [0.403] [0.400] [0.424] [0.418]
FRI fiscal rule -0.093
[0.132]
Lagged FRI fiscal rule 0.149
[0.167]
IMF fiscal rule 0.170
[0.506]
Lagged IMF fiscal rule 0.432
[0.445]
Expenditure rule -0.393
[0.296]
Revenue rule -0.250
[0.291]
Balanced budget rule 0.257
[0.440]
Debt rule 0.255
[0.447]
Year 0.045* 0.033 0.004 -0.005 0.018 0.013 -0.001 -0.001
[0.025] [0.027] [0.028] [0.029] [0.021] [0.021] [0.028] [0.028]
Constant -3.510*** -3.085*** -1.801** -1.803** -2.166*** -1.986** -1.688** -1.692**
[0.932] [0.963] [0.776] [0.832] [0.784] [0.817] [0.815] [0.811]
Observations 348 340 385 378 385 385 385 385
R-squared 0.737 0.735 0.724 0.727 0.724 0.724 0.724 0.723
Country FE yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes
Time FE no no no no no no no no
Kleibergen-Paap LM stat. 27.800 28.100 30.620 28.670 31.440 31.170 30.870 31.330
Kleibergen-Paap p-val 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
Hansen test 8.717 8.490 6.964 7.940 6.897 6.803 6.947 6.878
Hansen p-val 0.069 0.075 0.138 0.094 0.141 0.147 0.139 0.142
Note: EC FRI – period: 1990–2013, IMF fiscal rule and sub-rules – period: 1985–2013. Robust standard
errors, country FE used in all specifications. Hansen test’s null hypothesis is that instruments (orthogo-
nality conditions) are valid. The null of Kleinbergen-Paap LM test is that instruments are weak. P-value:
*** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, * p < 0.1: variable is statistically significant at the 1%, 5% and 10%,
respectively. Source: own calculation.
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Table A.7: Extended benchmark model and fiscal fatigue, EA-18, 1970–2013
base extended
IV FE ff0 IV FE ff0a IV FE ff1 Ghosh – Ghosh – IV FE ff2 FE ff2a FE ff3 FE ff3a FE ff4a Ghosh – Ghosh –
IV FE IV PCSE ext. FE ext. PCSE
Lagged primary balance 0.566*** 0.516*** 0.594*** 0.717***
[0.059] [0.064] [0.066] [0.040]
Lagged debt 0.034*** -0.030 -0.134* 0.001 0.016 -0.009 -0.016 -0.097 -0.140** -0.107* 0.005 0.020
[0.006] [0.043] [0.078] [0.101] [0.098] [0.035] [0.026] [0.063] [0.057] [0.059] [0.078] [0.053]
Lagged debt2 0.001 0.002 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.001* 0.001* 0.002*** 0.001 0.000 0.000
[0.001] [0.001] [0.001] [0.001] [0.000] [0.000] [0.001] [0.001] [0.001] [0.001] [0.001]
Lagged debt3 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 -0.000** 0.000 0.000 0.000
[0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000]
Output gap (y/n IV) 0.072 0.109 0.484*** 0.368*** 0.345*** 0.139* 0.528*** 0.457*** 0.420*** 0.381***
[0.071] [0.076] [0.087] [0.114] [0.083] [0.073] [0.062] [0.081] [0.074] [0.035]
Lagged output gap -0.027 0.330***
[0.034] [0.063]
Current account (y/n IV) 0.157*** 0.187*** 0.323*** 0.188*** 0.206*** 0.352***
[0.054] [0.063] [0.084] [0.056] [0.060] [0.078]
Current account 0.106*** 0.260***
[0.035] [0.069]
Election dummy -0.448*** -0.424*** -0.286* -0.232 -0.300 -0.450*** -0.471*** -0.311* -0.285 -0.392**
[0.155] [0.155] [0.168] [0.176] [0.213] [0.158] [0.153] [0.161] [0.179] [0.181]
Dummy crisis (2008+) -1.884*** -1.930*** -2.089*** -1.658***
[0.364] [0.363] [0.501] [0.451]
Lagged growth of GDP 0.134** 0.088 0.158*** 0.128***
deflator [0.068] [0.071] [0.056] [0.040]
IMF fiscal rule 1.401*** -0.089 1.381*** 0.794**
[0.473] [0.511] [0.481] [0.318]
Cyclical component of -0.141*** -0.183*** -0.148*** -0.179***
government consumption [0.038] [0.040] [0.032] [0.023]
Government stability 0.165** 0.160** 0.099 0.058
[0.083] [0.081] [0.074] [0.046]
Continued on next page
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Table A.7 – Continued from previous page
base extended
IV FE ff0 IV FE ff0a IV FE ff1 Ghosh – Ghosh – IV FE ff2 FE ff2a FE ff3 FE ff3a FE ff4a Ghosh – Ghosh –
IV FE IV PCSE ext. FE ext. PCSE
Oil prices / non-oil -0.030*** -0.014 -0.026*** -0.007
commodity price index [0.007] [0.009] [0.009] [0.006]
Dependency ratio 0.134* -0.086
[0.081] [0.138]
Openness 0.014* 0.043*** 0.015* 0.022***
[0.008] [0.016] [0.008] [0.008]
Age dependency 0.046 -0.054
[0.070] [0.072]
Future age dependency 0.001 -0.084**
[0.061] [0.042]
IMF arrangement -1.249 -0.033
[0.870] [0.502]
Year -0.005 0.001 0.007 -0.059*** -0.044*** -0.051** -0.057** -0.012
[0.015] [0.014] [0.021] [0.012] [0.011] [0.021] [0.022] [0.020]
Constant -1.125** 0.650 3.491* -7.614* -0.219 1.227 0.884 3.118** 4.166*** 3.448** -4.398 3.323
[0.490] [1.180] [1.824] [4.380] [6.364] [0.941] [0.698] [1.519] [1.380] [1.430] [3.985] [3.450]
Observations 431 431 461 381 366 431 477 493 487 431 422 422
R-squared 0.720 0.724 0.578 0.637 0.448 0.700 0.704 0.543 0.450 0.563 0.627 0.480
Country FE yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes
Time FE no no no no no no no no no no no no
ILS (+ corrected S.E.) yes yes yes yes yes no no yes no yes no no
Kleibergen-Paap LM statistic 35.110 39.210 37.760 .. .. 38.410 .. .. .. .. .. ..
Kleibergen-Paap LM p-val 0.000 0.000 0.000 .. .. 0.000 .. .. .. .. .. ..
Hansen test 7.264 7.812 6.957 .. .. 8.261 .. .. .. .. .. ..
Hansen p-val 0.123 0.099 0.073 .. .. 0.083 .. .. .. .. .. ..
Note: robust standard errors. Output gap and current account are instrumented if ‘IV’ shown. Oil prices/non-oil commodity price index – average oil price for oil exporters,
non-oil commodity price index for all other countries (in our case); for definition see appendix. Dependency ratio is defined as non-active population over active population
(15–64 years old). Lagged debt2 (lagged debt3) represent the quadratic and cubic term of public debt variable. ILS – indirect (two stage) IV estimation. PCSE model (col. 6
and 13) assumes panel-specific disturbances to be heteroskedastic and contemporaneously correlated (an AR(1) error structure; estimated average value: 0.416 for IV PCSE
model; 0.485 for extended PCSE model). Hansen test’s null hypothesis is that instruments (orthogonality conditions) are valid. The null of Kleinbergen-Paap LM test is
that instruments are weak – only for IV FE ff0 model: 24.51 and p-val = 0.000. x – exactly identified model. P-value: *** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, * p < 0.1: variable
is statistically significant at the 1%, 5% and 10%, respectively. Source: own calculation.
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Table A.8: Description of main variables and their sources
Variable Definition Period Transformation(s) Main source
Primary balance General government primary balance (ESA 2010, EDP); 1970–2013 Series extended using series of pre- AMECO, ECB, OECD
vious methodological concepts –
growth rates from OECD database,
complemented with EC Statistical
Annexes [FR, GR, IE, LU, and PT].
Values after 2007 adjusted for
GAFS in percent of nominal GDP.
Debt ratio General government debt (EDP, ESA 2010); 1970–2013 Series extended using growth rates AMECO
of non-EDP series ESA79 or
ESA2010 (IMF WEO, OECD) or
Mauro et al. (2013) [DE, FR, NL,
PT]; in percent of nominal GDP.
Price index GDP deflator (ESA 2010); HICP; 1970–2013 – AMECO, ECB [HICP]
Output gap GDP minus potential GDP over potential GDP 1970–2013 AMECO definition AMECO
HP filtered GDP series (λ = 6.25), Own calculations based
CF filtered GDP series. on AMECO series
Current account balance Current account balance in % of GDP 1970–2013 – AMECO
Current account Approximated current account balance in % of GDP 1970–2013 Export minus import of goods AMECO
and services, in % of nominal
GDP (in current prices, national
accounts definition) or current
account balance in percent
of GDP.
Election dummy Binary variable (1 = election); 1970–2013 Own corrections of mistake Electionresources.org
for new Euro area member states.
FRI Fiscal rules index (de jure definition, five sub-indices, random weights) 1990–2013 – EC (FRI database)
IMF fiscal Binary variable (1 = any fiscal rule is applicable); 1985–2013 Own calculation from IMF IMF’s Fiscal
rules index database – if any fiscal rule is Rules database
applied then dummy variable is
equal to = 1.
Government stability A measure of both of the government’s ability to carry out its declared program(s), 1984–2013 – PRSG
and its ability to stay in office. The risk rating assigned is the sum of three subcomponents:
Government Unity, Legislative Strength, and Popular Support;
Total risk Composite Political, Financial, Economic Risk Rating for a country (CPFER) = 0.5 1984–2013 – PRSG
rating score (Political Risk + Financial Risk + Economic Risk) Ranging from Very High Risk (00.0− 49.5)
to Very Low Risk (80.0− 100). The higher the points, the lower the risk
Political risk A means of assessing the political stability of a country on a comparable basis with other countries 1984–2013 – PRSG
rating score by assessing risk points for each of the component factors of government stability, socio-economic
conditions, investment profile, internal conflict, external conflict, corruption, military in politics,
religious tensions, law and order, ethnic tensions, democratic accountability, and bureaucracy quality.
Risk ratings range from a high of 100 (least risk) to a low of 0 (highest risk), though lowest de
Continued on next page
5
5
Table A.8 – Continued from previous page
Variable Definition Period Transformation(s) Main source
facto ratings generally range in the 30’s and 40’s.
Bureaucratic quality Institutional strength and quality of the bureaucracy is a shock absorber that tends to 1984–2013 – PRSG
minimize revisions of policy when governments change. In low-risk countries, the bureaucracy
is somewhat autonomous from political pressure. (Refer to ICRG Methodology for maximum points
for this variable, as well as for related formulas for calculating risk.)
System of checks Checks – countries where legislatures are not competitively elected are considered countries 1984–2013 – PRSG
where only the executive yields a check.
Government system Parliamentary (2), Assembly-elected President (1), Presidential (0); 1975–2013 Only non-missing observations. IADB DPI2015
Rule of majority This is the fraction of seats held by the government. It is calculated by dividing the number 1975–2013 Only non-missing observations. IADB DPI2015
of government seats by total (government + opposition + non-aligned) seats.
Index of The probability that two deputies picked at random from among the government parties 1975–2012 Only non-missing observations. IADB DPI2015
fractionalization will be of different parties. Equals NA if there is no parliament. If there are any government parties
where seats are unknown (cell is blank), GOVFRAC is also blank. No parties in the legislature
results in NA.
Index of polarization Maximum polarization between the executive party and the four principle parties of the legislature 1975–2013 Only non-missing observations. IADB DPI2015
Economic policy Party orientation with respect to economic policy, coded based on the description of the party 1975–2012 Only non-missing observations. IADB DPI2015
in the sources, using the following criteria: Right (1); Left (3); Center (2); No information (0);
No executive (NA)
Interest payments Absolute volume of interest payments (ESA 2010); 1970–2013 Relative (as % of GDP, lagged AMECO database
debt or total revenues)
Cyclical component
of government final Final government consumption expenditures, ESA 2010; 1970–2013 HP filtered cyclical component AMECO database
consumption expend. (λ = 100)
Trade openness Ratio of exports and imports to nominal GDP 1970–2013 Own calculation AMECO database
Age dependency Ratio of population < 15 and > 64 to population between 15− 64 1970–2013 Own calculation PF WG EC
Future age dep. The same definition, but projection for 20 year ahead (medium variant) 1970–2013 Own calculation PF WG EC
Oil-price Simple average of three spot prices (Dated Brent, Texas Intermediate and the Dubai Fateh) 1970–2013 Own calculation IMF commodity price
database, WB
commodities database
Non-oil price Non-fuel price index, 2005 = 100 (Food and Beverages and Industrial Inputs Price Indices) 1992–2013 – IMF commodity
price database
Non-energy Commodities, 2010=100 (including Food and Beverages, Agricultural and Other Raw
materials, Metals and Minerals and Fertilizers), annual prices, nominal USD 1970–2013 – WB commodities
database
Note: AMECO – Macroeconomic Database (EC, 2016); IADB DPI2015 (Cruz et al., 2016) – The Database of Political Institutions 2015; FRI – EU fiscal rule index (FRI,
EC, 2016a); PRSG – Political Risk Services Group (PRSG, 2015); GAFS – Government Assistance to Financial Institutions (see ECB, 2016). World Bank Commodities Price
Data (The Pink Sheet) – WB (2015), IMF Primary Commodity Prices – IMF (2015a). Period indicate the earliest year of data available in our sample. Source: own calculation.
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APPENDIX A.
Table A.9: Summary statistics
Debt (% of GDP) Primary balance (% of GDP)
min mean max st. dev. min mean max st. dev.
AT 16.7 52.9 82.4 20.0 -2.4 0.5 3.2 1.4
BE 54.4 98.5 134.4 25.4 -7.7 1.3 6.7 3.5
CY 45.1 60.0 102.5 12.8 -3.7 -0.4 6.0 2.5
DE 16.2 46.1 81.0 19.6 -6.0 0.7 9.0 3.2
EE 3.7 6.2 9.9 1.7 -2.9 1.2 9.5 2.6
ES 11.5 40.6 93.7 21.1 -9.3 -0.8 3.8 2.9
FI 6.3 29.0 56.2 17.8 -3.8 3.3 9.6 3.4
FR 20.1 45.9 92.3 21.9 -4.8 -0.2 4.2 1.8
GR 15.4 73.4 177.7 45.5 -5.8 -1.1 2.8 1.9
IE 23.6 67.7 120.1 28.3 -9.6 -0.1 6.8 4.1
IT 35.8 87.0 129.0 26.8 -7.0 -0.4 6.2 3.3
LU 4.2 10.9 23.3 5.2 -1.1 2.4 6.3 2.1
LV 8.4 19.7 47.5 13.2 -6.6 -0.2 6.9 2.8
MT 22.4 54.4 72.0 16.9 -6.4 -1.6 1.2 2.4
NL 38.0 56.4 75.5 12.6 -3.4 1.1 5.2 2.0
PT 13.2 53.0 129.0 26.4 -7.0 -1.4 2.2 2.2
SI 18.3 29.7 71.0 12.9 -6.1 -1.4 1.2 2.0
SK 21.7 37.5 55.0 9.7 -8.0 -3.0 -0.2 2.4
Note: extended series (according to the ESA2010 methodology
extended using Mauro et al., 2013). St. dev. – standard deviation.
Source: own calculations.
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Chapter 3
Do Institutional Changes Affect
Fiscal Policy Behaviour?
Time-Varying Evidence from
Europe
3.1 Introduction
white white white white white white white
white white white
A policy reaction function is likely
to be a fragile creature. Over time, ...
the importance attached to conflicting
objectives [of the policy] may change,
[policy makers’] views on the structure
of the economy may change.
[McNees, 1986, p. 7]
The conduct of national fiscal policy is crucial for the existence of a single
monetary policy and a single currency for all members in a monetary union. While
monetary policy helps to deal with common symmetric shocks such as currency fluc-
tuations or changes in consumers’ preferences abroad, fiscal policy plays a vital role
in responding to country-specific shocks coming from differences in business cycles
across member countries (asymmetric shocks). Accordingly, a sound (sustainable)
fiscal policy that is able to account for public debt level and its long-run sustainabil-
ity, enables the single monetary policy to focus on its objectives of low and stable
inflation (see Fata´s and Mihov, 2010). Therefore, coordination (integration) among
national fiscal policies would provide assistance when national resources were not
enough to deal with national cyclical fluctuations.1
1 Such coordination can take the form of: (i) increased coordination among member states
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Fiscal sustainability is important for monetary unions because of two pri-
mary reasons:2 firstly, in the already described macroeconomic sense of being able
to cope with asymmetric shocks and enable a smooth coordination with monetary
policy. Secondly, in the finance-fiscal sense, where sustainable (sound) fiscal policy
is a key condition for stabilising financial institutions (see Be´nassy-Que´re´, 2016). In
this financial-fiscal sense, fiscal sustainability provides an important loop between
the sovereign, and those financial institutions that hold its domestic financial instru-
ments on their balance sheets. Therefore, a deterioration of fiscal policy towards
unsustainable levels is often reflected in the prices of sovereigns’ debt instruments,
and has negative effects on financial institutions’ balance sheets, profitability, and
potential need to provide state guarantees. This in turn puts additional pressure
on already distressed public finances (so-called ‘Diabolic loop’, see Acharya et al.,
2014; Brunnermeier et al., 2016). This feedback effect is crucial for addressing the
(increasingly) high home bias3 of domestic financial institutions that is visible in
many EU or euro area (EA, henceforth) countries today.4 Unsustainable (debt)
fiscal policy not only puts pressure on the government, but also on the common
currency, and could result in an exit from or even in a break-up of the currency
union. Such fears have frequently emerged in some EA members since the onset of
the Global Recession, and particularly during the Euro area Sovereign Debt Crisis
(ESDC, henceforth).
In this chapter I aim to shed some light on the effects of institutional changes
on fiscal policy in Europe, focusing on the twelve ‘old’ members of the Euro area
(EA-12)5, and three stand-alone EU countries (EU-3)6. The first research question is
without creating explicit ‘federal’ institutions or (ii) an additional level of governance (supranational
institutions) equivalent to the level that European institutions enjoy.
2 The notion of fiscal (debt) sustainability was coined in a seminal paper by Blanchard et al.
(1990), and has been discussed by many authors over time.
3 Home bias represents a situation when financial institutions prefer purchasing and holding
domestically issued debt instruments.
4 Early evidence for selected EA countries is provided in Merler and Pisani-Ferry (2012); more
recent evidence for so-called GIIPS countries (Greece, Ireland, Italy, Portugal and Spain) is provided
in Ongena et al. (2016) and references therein.
5 This group of countries includes: Austria, Belgium, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Lux-
embourg, Ireland, Italy, the Netherlands, Portugal, and Spain. Greece became an EU member in
1981, Spain and Portugal in 1986, Austria and Finland in 1995.
None of the ‘new EU’ member states that have since joined the Euro area is considered in this study,
because of different starting conditions (public debt were mostly erased by high inflation rates in
the first years of the transformation processes in the early 1990s), structural characteristics, and a
general scarcity of data before the 1990(95).
6 This group of countries consists of: Denmark, Sweden and the United Kingdom. Denmark
joined the European Communities (EC, henceforth) in 1973 with an opt-out clause, but has tight
monetary policy linkages; Sweden joined the EU in the 1995 enlargement, rejected participation
in the European monetary union (EMU) in September 2003, and have since followed a quasi-
independent monetary policy, and the United Kingdom, which joined the EC in 1973, is the other
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therefore concerned with whether changes in the EU-wide institutional environment
have affected fiscal behaviour during the decades long European integration process.
The final version of the EC/EU treaties that shaped the third state of the European
monetary integration process (the establishment of the Euro area) only focused on
coordination, and did not attend to fiscal matters in in great detail. It is therefore
not surprising that an early 1990’s pre-EA report (EC, 1990) put a great deal of
emphasis on guaranteeing fiscal (debt) sustainability, and resulted in a series of fiscal
rules. While EA members can face even (pecuniary) sanctions if they do not comply
with various forms of regulation of fiscal matters, non-EA members subject to the
same regulation may face ‘only’ (non-binding) recommendations without de facto
sanctions. This may of course affect the effort that individual countries devote to
meeting such a regulatory framework.
The fact that sovereigns are subject to fixed rules in a common environment,
opens up a Pandora box: in the case of EA countries, those with weaker institutions
have tried to free-ride, while those firmly sticking to the rule(s) have not been
able to prevent such behaviour.7 Despite awareness of such problems, and the
fact that fiscal policy has been subject to increased scrutiny since the first stage
of the integration process in the early 1990s,8 problems first emerged in the early
years of the Euro area – not only high and sustained indebtedness, but also repeated
violations of yearly budgetary limits by many member states. The ‘natural’ response
at that time was: a modification of fixed fiscal rules, but these rules did not help to
remove the fundamental tension. The subsequent revelation of even deeper problems
(including improper statistical evidence in fiscal accounts, see Irwin, 2015) in several
states led to the emergence of the ESDC in the very first decade of the Euro. I
accordingly analyse the institutional changes that had an impact on fiscal policy
from the very beginning of the EC/EU integration process, in order to assess their
effect on country-specific fiscal behaviour across the EU: both for EA members and
selected stand-alone EU countries. I particularly focus on effects of crisis-related
opt-out country, and is potentially a soon-to-be non-EU country. The UK is usually analysed
outside of the EMU but has applied a number of monetary strategies that could potentially affect
its fiscal policy decisions.
I do not include Norway (with a rather specific fiscal policy), Switzerland or other small members
of the European Free Trade Association (European Economic Area, EEA) since their fiscal policy
was not explicitly subject to regulation/supervision by EU institutions.
7 The implementation of any fixed (numerical) rules is faced with credibility problems, and
attempts to avoid them altogether (moral hazard), see for example studies by Buti et al. (2006)
and Irwin (2015), and references therein.
8 For a brief overview see EC (2013); EC (2015) or more recently Masten and Gnip (2016).
There is also a non-negligible aspect associated with strong and weak institutions across EU/EA
countries, for example in case of compliance with rules; for discussion and references see for example
De Grauwe (2016).
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changes in institutions (post-2010 such as the Fiscal Treaty) that have so far not
been empirically assessed.
The second question will explore the accompanying effects of institutional
changes in the EC and later on in the EU, and will specifically investigate how these
changes have shaped the harmonization (increased similarity) of national policy-
making and fiscal policy behaviour. For instance, the last series of institutional
changes, and mainly the so-called Fiscal compact (see below) could most likely
cause national fiscal policies to behave in a similar way (in line with arguments of
Holland and Portes, 2012).
In order to answer both research questions, I create a novel quarterly fiscal
dataset comprising fiscal variables for twelve ‘old’ EA members and three stand-
alone EU countries, for the period 1980q1–2015q4.9 I use a recent approach based
on Bayesian methods (see Ban`bura et al., 2015 or Giannone et al., 2015) to calculate
variables for this dataset. The dataset covers all the main stages in the integration
process, starting with those in the late 1980s up until the most recent changes in
the wake of the ESDC.10 This dataset is my first contribution to the literature since
there are only a few EU countries with quarterly series available before 1999, such
as those reconstructed for Spain or the Euro area as a whole (see De Castro et al.,
2014 and Paredes et al., 2014 respectively).11
Budgetary balance is a key variable for policy-makers since fiscal institutions
may apply new or change current fiscal measures, and in turn affect budgetary
outcomes. This balance does not only depend on past active or passive government’s
behaviour, as reflected in public debt, but it also depends on economic conditions
(business cycles), trade flows and various other determinants. As a proxy for fiscal
policy behaviour, I draw upon a modelling strategy that is similar to that used
for monetary policy – fiscal behaviour is approximated with a fiscal rule, providing
a link between the key fiscal variable (primary balance) and a set of fiscal policy
determinants.12 Here, I consider two fiscal rules, since there is no single universal
concept: one in line with Leeper (1991) and Bohn (1998)’s strand of literature
9 It complements available quarterly fiscal series from Eurostat that for most EU countries, start
either in 1999q1 or 2002q1 for flow variables (balances), or in 2000q1 for stock variables (debt).
10 Mainly the Delorse Report, the pre-EMU period (Maastricht period), the creation of the Sta-
bility and Growth Pact (1996), the Euro launch (1999), fiscal sustainability problems of EMU
countries and a modification of fiscal rules (2005), and the Sovereign Debt Crisis and institutional
responses (2011–2012), such as the Fiscal Treaty.
11 I do not consider ‘simple’ mechanical decompositions of yearly series that is considered by
Schoder (2014). However, the national statistical offices of some countries like France and the UK
do provide official series.
12 Primary balance is viewed as a tool that encompasses all governmental actions that affect both
revenues and expenditures less interest payments over a period of time (usually one year).
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(model based sustainability, ‘macro-fiscal rule’), and the other resembling ‘optimal
monetary rules’ a` la a Taylor rule in line with the model by Kirsanova et al. (2005)
(‘micro-based rule’).
Governments can often unexpectedly modify their behaviour in response to
internal and external incentives and/or shocks. Such modifications are often accom-
panied by changes to policy variables.13 This makes it particularly challenging to
devise a modelling strategy that captures their behaviour, using a standard econo-
metric toolkit. Accordingly, in the empirical part of this chapter, I estimate both
fiscal rules using the time-varying parameter (TVP) model combined with Bayesian
techniques. This estimation approach is my other contribution to the literature.
An overwhelming majority of studies (for EU countries) has utilized time-invariant
estimation in panel models (such as Baldi and Staehr, 2016 and Weichenrieder and
Zimmer, 2014) or country-specific models (such as Berti et al., 2016). Compared
to those, my approach views observed values of primary balance as a result of ‘be-
havioural changes’, in estimated coefficients of its key determinants such as govern-
ment debt and business cycle, without explicitly specifying an impact period, while
also minimizing some other problematic aspects related to the standard estimation
of fiscal rules (such as structural breaks).
To preview, my results addressing the first question on the effects of institu-
tional changes show that national fiscal policies behaved rather heterogeneously over
the entire sample period. This suggests that one of the key determinants of fiscal
behaviour is related to differences in debt levels across EA countries. Specifically,
different pre-existing needs existed when adjusting policies according to the new set
of rules (constraints). Despite delays and variation in the exact implementation of
the required institutional changes, I only find weak effects related to the Maastricht
Treaty. Only one low debt country (debt below 50% of GDP), and one in a group of
high debt countries (above 80% of GDP) modified their fiscal policy, so that a change
in their fiscal responses – coefficients on the lagged public debt variable – could be
identified. In contrast to the recent literature emphasising the effect of Maastricht
rules, my findings provide only limited support to the usual explanation.14 How-
ever, the Pact and the race to adopt the single currency amongst the frontrunners
corresponded with a high share of countries responding to the Pact’s limits (nine
13 Conversely, the behaviour of a monetary policy authority should be as predictable as possible
to create a stable environment.
14 Traditionally, a dummy variable or a dummy interaction term is included in the regression or
a model is estimated for the entire sample period and for a Maastricht sub-sample; for an recent
application using a panel of EA countries see Weichenrieder and Zimmer (2014). Results of these
estimations can suffer from a low number of observations in the latter case, or an assumption of a
linear effect on the coefficient of interest in the former case.
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out of twelve). Similar to the literature, I do also find some support for Pact’s mod-
ification in 2005 (six out of twelve). My exploration of these changes reveal that less
than half of the countries responded to the most recent changes (mainly some of the
medium and high debt countries), particularly since the dataset covers the outset
of the ESDC and a series of more recent reforms (the Fiscal Treaty in particular).
For a comparison, in the ‘control’ group of three stand-alone EU countries, some
responded to the Maastricht Treaty, while in the case of the most recent changes,
their responses were ambiguous.15
My last contribution is associated with the harmonization of national fiscal
policies. Surprisingly, there is only some anecdotal (see van Rompuy et al., 2012),
indirect evidence on the process of harmonization of fiscal policies such as results
of simulations in stylised models (see Holland and Portes, 2012), or some simple
statistics (see Fata´s and Mihov, 2010). My results offer the first empirical evidence
on this process with important implications for the on-going discussion of fiscal
federalization (see Evers, 2015) and risk sharing issues (see Verstegen and Meijdam,
2016) in the EU/EA. Turning to the results, I find reduced dispersion for EA-12,
approximated with the standard deviation of coefficients on the lagged public debt
variable (fiscal responses) for both models of fiscal rules over the sample period.
However, this conclusion hides a rather heterogeneous transition since the 1980s.
The EA dispersion became increasingly larger before the Maastricht period, and
was followed by a decline, and another increase during the early years of the Euro
area (a sort of ‘Olympic effect’). Subsequently, around the onset of the ESDC, there
was an increase in the harmonization of fiscal policies, represented by a decline in
dispersion that continued almost until the end of the sample period. The dispersion
in the case of the stand-alone EU countries was much lower in absolute terms,
compared with EA-12, but comparable with that of EA-10.
Given the existence of rather harmonized fiscal responses, there is a strong
need for further changes in intra-EA fiscal policy arrangements, in order to allevi-
ate pressures on members facing idiosyncratic shocks, and on the single monetary
authority. Increased harmonization, and the resulting possibility of more aligned
co-movements in sovereign debt instruments can also create a challenge in terms of
the finance-fiscal link, the ‘Diabolic loop’. Some suggested solutions will only work
under the assumption of not-perfectly correlated fiscal policies.
The remainder of the chapter is structured as follows. Section 2 reviews the
main theoretical concepts used, and provides links to relevant literature. Section 3
15 As expected since they have not signed some or all (the UK) of the newly introduced institu-
tional amendments.
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presents the time varying parameter model (Bayesian TVP model) and illustrates
the main parts of the estimation methodology for fiscal rules that is used in the
chapter. Section 4 describes the dataset and reviews all steps necessary for the
(re)construction of variables. Section 5 presents results for EA countries and stand-
alone EU countries, and the Euro area as a whole, and discusses the implications of
these findings. Finally, section 6 concludes and offers some suggestions for further
research.
3.2 Review of literature and methodology
3.2.1 A theoretical review: fiscal rules, fiscal regimes and interac-
tions with monetary policy
Knowledge of fiscal policy measures, their effects and related implications have im-
proved substantially over recent years. However, there are still wide gaps and a
general lack of ‘rigorous’ understanding of many aspects, in comparison to its more
well-studied monetary policy counterpart (as a consequence of the Great Moder-
ation), as outlined in Alessina and Givazzi (2013).16 Those ‘problematic’ areas
include: (1) effects of policy interventions (multiplication effects), (2) long-term im-
plications of fiscal policy measures (such as long-term trends bringing about changes
in the workforce), (3) ways of tackling (high levels of) indebtedness and (4) the links
between fiscal policy and political processes (institutions), particularly links around
finding efficient (robust) ways of putting constraints on fiscal policy. This chap-
ter aims to provide some further evidence within area (4), which is predominantly
concerned with fiscal rules and fiscal institutions.
In a similar vein, contrary to monetary policy’s already well-established and
relatively simple policy rules (mainly those of the Taylor’s and/or McCallum’s type),
and its recent theoretical and empirical scrutiny, fiscal policy importantly lacks
clearly formulated rule(s) that would be applicable in analyses of fiscal behaviour.17
Such rules would enable us to structure a way of thinking about key variables and
main relationships, and differentiate between various types of policies (mainly discre-
tionary vs. rule based ones), with ample implications for practical policy-making.18
16 A strong incentive was the Great Recession and/or the ESDC that have led to the use of
unconventional monetary policy instruments alongside or as a substitute for a lack of fiscal measures.
17 Apart from those rules suggested by Taylor (2000) that are similar to a Taylor rule, and/or
rules suggested by Bohn (1998) that focus primarily on providing a testable sustainability condition.
In addition, Yoshino et al. (2015) derive a more comprehensive fiscal rule, modifying the Bohn’s
rule by including both public debt, its change, and a measure of output gap as a combination of
optimal spending and taxation rule. Its use enables both fiscal sustainability and economic growth.
18 There are also some potential pitfalls that are related to simplifications of reality so that it
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Reasons for this substantial gap in fiscal policy are manifold, but mostly revolve
around the differences between the conduct of monetary and fiscal policy inter alia:
ways of setting (selecting) and possible choices of pursued targets, independence
of considerations and/or political influences alongside well-known problems such
as lack of (higher frequency) fiscal series, identification and explanatory problems
(fiscal policy heterogeneity, see Claeys, 2008; Leeper, 2010).
Nevertheless, in the last 30 years there have been many simpler rules (at
least those systematically documented) attached to particular types of fiscal policy
behaviour (‘problematic aspect’). Some limitations put on fiscal policy behaviour
are much older in origin.19 More recently in response Global recession rooted fiscal
problems, a larger number of national (independent) fiscal institutes have been
established alongside the existing ones (that can be traced back to as early as the
mid-1940s, such as the Dutch ‘watchdog’ Central Planbureau, CPB) to strengthen
public scrutiny (mitigate ‘fiscal bias’).20 The existence and importance of some sort
of rules of conduct for fiscal policy is thus not a completely recent phenomenon
compared to monetary policy.21
As briefly outlined above, another important layer for countries in a mon-
etary union is related to the classification of fiscal authorities behaviour according
to the so-called Fiscal theory of the Price level (FTPL, henceforth). FTPL origi-
nates from the seminal work of Sims (1994) and that of Leeper (1991), even though
Buiter (2002) mentions even earlier contributions.22 In the FTPL, both both fiscal
and monetary policy are considered perfect substitutes for price level determina-
tion and government debt stabilization, with the former conventionally belonging to
monetary policy and the latter to fiscal policy. Fiscal policy behaviour can be clas-
sified as active or passive (alternatively Ricardian or non-Ricardian) with respect to
its link between public debt and prices/output.23 Only the latter is, however, com-
can be approximated via a rule, which may turn unfavourable during large business cycles or in the
case of shocks.
19 A document that lists all rules for countries around the world is the IMF’s Fiscal rules database
(see IMF, 2015). There has been similar activity by the EU Commission (numerical rules only and
for its members, see EC, 2016a). Going to ancient times, one could find some institutions even in
Ancient Rome or Greece.
20 In the case of EU-28, there were as many as 47 independent fiscal and other institutions in
2014 (see EC, 2014). A formal test of the effects of fiscal institutions is presented in Beetsma and
Debrun (2016).
21 An example of a monetary rule sui generis is the so-called k−percent rule suggested by Milton
Friedman in the early 1960s. Simple monetary rules were also applied during the so-called Gold
standard in late 19th century or even before.
22 Woodford (1995, 1996) shows that price setting does lead to important differences in this
concept.
23 ‘Passive fiscal policy’ (regime) means that it does respond to debt, and the intertemporal
budget constraint (IBC) is satisfied for all price paths (Ricardian policy). Conversely, ‘active fiscal
65
CHAPTER 3. INSTITUTIONAL CHANGES AND FISCAL POLICY BEHAVIOUR
patible with sustainability since outstanding liabilities are expected to be balanced
by future revenues. In this way fiscal solvency is guaranteed as budget (primary)
balance responds accordingly to debt development.24 In this framework, as pointed
out by Creel and Le Bihan (2006), the existence of a passive fiscal policy (a Ricar-
dian) regime across EA countries is essential to the European Central Bank’s (ECB,
henceforth) activities to control inflation so that price stability (according to their
definition) can be achieved. The existence of a fiscal rule (Pact) itself, however, is
not a unique way of guaranteeing the passive regime (see ibid.).
The (fiscal) Maastricht criteria and/or the Pact are commonplace examples
when analysing fiscal rules in a monetary union. But why has been so much emphasis
on fiscal policy? While the seminal papers of Mundell (1961) and Mundell (1973)
considered ‘fiscal policy’ (predominantly ‘transfers’) to be a rather extraordinary
tool, it has been criticised in the case of non-existing market forces, for not being
able to cope with asymmetric shocks (slightly changed views in later contributions)
in a single monetary authority environment. Authors later treated transfers as an
important part of any monetary union, see for example Kenen (1969).25 Early argu-
ments assumed that independent and flexible national fiscal policy could deal with
any shock(s) on its own and therefore, there was no need to propose any common
framework for national (decentralised) fiscal policies. However, this argument rests
upon two important implications: (a) fiscal policy remains sustainable (increased
indebtedness after a negative shock is reduced in ‘good times’, see below) and/or (b)
policy’ (regime) implies smaller than necessary responses to debt (in fact, it can follow any process
even in contrast with the notion of sustainability). Fiscal policy eventually has the upper hand
over monetary policy for the determination of prices (monetary authority can only deal with the
consequences, i.e. inflation). In terms of the model (3.4) or (3.4) below, α > 0 can be interpreted
as a Ricardian policy, that is, the latter case. The notion of active/passive can reflect changes in
taxation as well. For example, a policy can be passive when taxation responses to debt are large
enough to the real interest rate payments (see Davig and Leeper, 2007). An implication of the active
fiscal regime can be a lower response coefficient in an estimate of a Taylor rule (the so-called Taylor
principle would not be satisfied). The labelling of these policies as ‘Ricardian’ and ‘non-Ricardian’
stems from the work of Aiyagari and Gertler (1985).
However, the results of empirical testing have been rather ambiguous because of the observational
equivalence (for examples see Afonso et al., 2011).
24 However, an instability region is occurs when both fiscal and monetary policy are ‘active’, and
prices would still be affected by fiscal policy measures, for discussion see Creel and Le Bihan (2006).
25 In his view, a system of fiscal transfers was necessary to mitigate effects of adverse shocks in
parts of the monetary union, funded by resources coming from taxation. A recent report prepared
by four top officials in the Euro area (see van Rompuy et al., 2012) has highlighted the need for
an integrated budgetary framework comprising of the issuance of common debt instruments, and
shock-absorbing mechanism (system of transfer payments) for strengthening of EA fiscal capacity.
However, a very similar argument was already made in pre-EMU reports – the MacDougall Report
(see EC, 1977,a) or the Delorse Report (see Delors, 1989).
Interestingly, a recent publication – Deutsche Bundesbank (2015) – considering future paths in
European fiscal policy, operates with country-specific responses to asymmetric shocks.
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the overwhelming majority of shocks occur because of exogenous factors (affecting
more or less all members in a symmetrical manner).26 However, neither implication
is true for euro area countries, since most of the shocks affecting euro area countries
have had their roots in their economies (asymmetrical business cycles, degrees of
openness).27
Beetsma and Giuliodori (2010) or Badinger (2009) outline the need for some
fiscal rules in such an environment: (a1) guaranteeing fiscal sustainability, and (a2)
coordination and harmonization (limiting the size of deficits and potentially un-
sound fiscal policies), (b) helping to achieve economic stability (setting limits to
discretionary policies). More recently, even more emphasis has been put on fiscal
sustainability since it is viewed in terms of (see Be´nassy-Que´re´, 2016): (1) macroe-
conomic stability (achieving stable economic environment by promoting sound eco-
nomic growth) and (2) finance-fiscal stability (emphasising fiscal (debt) sustainabil-
ity as a key condition of the financial sector stability, that is, the fiscal-banking
nexus, see Brunnermeier et al., 2016). Such rule(s) when implemented, complement
the fiscal policy role as outlined in many classical. For instance Mundell (1961,
1973) highlight the need for fiscal transfers in the case of market rigidities and/or
limited mobility of factors, and work by Kenen (1969) highlight the need of some
form of a fiscal union.28
A brief review of links to the literature
Many studies have estimated some type of a fiscal rule (‘fiscal response (function)’),
whose specification has varied with the main interest of the study (usually a panel
with yearly fiscal series). Without a great deal of simplification, these can be clas-
sified as belonging to one of three substantially heterogeneous strands in the fis-
cal policy rules literature (irrespective of a country’s involvement in a monetary
union):29
26 This has been challenged by several authors, for example Ferrero (2009) shows in a simplified
two-country model that the role of fiscal authorities is essential, even without proper coordination
of the two governments.
27 The most recent evidence for euro area countries (since 1995 with effects of the Global Reces-
sion) can be found in De Grauwe and Ji (2016). For a longer time span (from 1980) see for example
Allard et al. (2013).
28 While the ‘1:n’ case in a monetary union is tacitly ignored in early literature, more recent
contributions concerned with discretionary fiscal policy include: ‘unpleasant’ volatility of output
and/or inflation (Sargent and Wallace (1981); Badinger (2009), unsustainable fiscal path (Sargent,
2012), negative spillovers (Beetsma and Giuliodori, 2010).
29 An overview of earlier literature and questions addressed can be found in Bayar and Smeets
(2009).
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1. simple fiscal rules (and their outcomes) resembling monetary Taylor type rules
are analysed for individual countries or regional integration groups such as
Taylor (2000) for the US economy or Gal´ı and Perotti (2003) for EU countries;
2. fiscal rules in the spirit of Bohn (1998, 2008)’s seminal work – fiscal response
function (FRF, henceforth) – , whose estimates provide an empirical test of fis-
cal policy sustainability (‘model based sustainability’, MBS); these estimates
are utilized inter alia in debt sustainability analysis (DSA) since they lie at
the heart of its model-based debt simulation exercise (for example Burger et
al., 2011 or Berti et al., 2016).30, 31
More recent contributions emphasize sustainability and other characteristics
(such as economic recovery, see Yoshino et al., 2015), reflecting the growing im-
portance of sustainability in the wake of periods of depressed/slowly-growing
economies, for example in Japan.
3. fiscal rules related to the aforementioned work on the FTPL, employing tech-
niques to capture fiscal policy changes with two broad sub-strands: one for
fiscal policy rule estimations based on primary balances, the other for fiscal
rules using revenues or expenditures, while allowing for mutual interactions
(see Afonso et al., 2011 for references; a recent survey of the FTPL literature
and main strands is provided by Bajo-Rubio et al., 2009, complementing an
early review by Buiter, 2002).32
Although many studies adhere to the previously characterised three groups,
no studies have explicitly tried to systematically capture changes in institutions
30 Burger et al. (2011) was also one of the first studies to use directly non-linear estimation
techniques. They utilize yearly data (both cash (GFS) and accrual (SNA) definition) for South
Africa over the period 1946/1974–2008, and find strong(er) positive responses to indebtedness in
the late 1970s and the 1980s, and after 1998 in particular. Their estimation allowing for non-linear
effect is, however, simply based on the use of the Kalman filter.
31 Focusing on the second group of studies, empirical analyses of fiscal rules and their effects
have also followed a few alternative routes: either country-specific estimations or panel analyses.
Importantly, employed specifications considered both public debt and output gap, and/or further
variables shaping fiscal policy (and institutions). However, there has not been an attempt to
consider a larger group of countries and analyse their behaviour, both as a group and individually.
32 The FTPL literature estimates fiscal policy behaviour and its changes using (Bayesian) Markov-
switching techniques (MSM, henceforth) or more recently, (Bayesian) time-varying parameters es-
timators that allow the identification of up to n individual regimes (usually only two for the di-
chotomy) and associated turning points. Modelling regime changes or time-varying responses pose
a challenge for estimation due to the length of available time series and the high sensitivity of MSM
techniques to the analysed data.
A complication of testing the FTPL is linked to the fact that the intertemporal budget constraint is
understood as an equilibrium condition in both concepts (active/passive), and not as a constraint
per se. However, it is possible to differentiate between these concepts (endogenous/exogenous) by
focusing on achieving solvency. For a discussion see Creel and Le Bihan (2006).
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and fiscal outcomes and/or harmonization as a result of the integration process
in Europe. An overwhelming majority of studies focused on a selection of events
such as the Pact or the Euro adoption. Few studies have employed higher than
yearly frequency of fiscal series (either mechanically reconstructed or on cash basis)
and/or attempted to find reasons for changes (switches) in fiscal behaviour, either
conditional on external events or as a result of a policy-makers game. This is in stark
contrast with the monetary policy literature that has addressed both the effects of
institutional changes on transmission mechanisms, and the conduct of monetary
policy and/or their effects on economic indicators such as output gaps. Similarly in
case of harmonization, few papers have presented statistical evidence on (cyclically-
adjusted) primary balances or the exogenous components of fiscal policy (error terms
from a simple fiscal rule resembling my FR I rule), such as Fata´s and Mihov (2010).
This study contributes to the literature by explicit estimates of the achieved level
of harmonization of national fiscal policies.
This chapter thus provides another contribution to the literature by combin-
ing the estimation of two types of rules (both a macro-fiscal and an optimal) with
the Bayesian TVP technique. This allows the smooth identification of changes in
fiscal regimes, when analysing institutional effects across EA countries, and making
comparisons with those observed in the group of stand-alone EU members. To the
best of my knowledge, only one study by Canova et al. (2012) is to this chapter’s
analysis of the effects of three institutional changes in the case of a synthetic mea-
sure of business cycles: the Maastricht Treaty, the creation of the ECB and the Euro
changeover. The TVP VAR results for a group of seven EA and three EU stand-
alone countries reveal some support for effects related to the European convergence
process rather than to institutional changes.
In the case of quarterly fiscal time series, empirical studies have recovered
fiscal series by primarily employing a mechanical decomposition of yearly series
or a combination of sources of different quality/methodology (cash). The major
EU/EA members, and also countries with a ’history’ of fiscal issues like Greece, Italy,
Portugal and Spain, have been analysed more often. For example Thams (2007)
applies Bayesian Markov-switching techniques to a quarterly series for Germany
and Spain, to identify fiscal policy regime changes in both countries around the
launch of the Euro in 1999 (more sustainable). There was also less stable behaviour
in the case of Germany and stronger responses resembling non-Ricardian policy in
Spain. Schoder (2014) finds that the Pact supports the restoration/preservation of
fiscal policy sustainability in countries with high responses, but does not provide
much support in other countries (Greece, Portugal and France). In contrast with
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my models, the last study utilizes a model without covariates, but simply derives
from a stochastic optimization problem in line with (Bohn, 1998, 2007)’s models.
In addition, the dataset contains ‘mechanically’ reconstructed quarterly fiscal series
(Chow and Lin approach for primary balances and net debt) from the 1980s to 2010
for 15 OECD countries (including non-European member states). In contrast to that
approach, I employ a recent approach based on Bayesian methods (see Ban`bura et
al., 2015 or Giannone et al., 2015) to create a novel database of accrual fiscal series
for EA-12 and EU-3 countries. I prefer gross debt series because of uncertainty about
the valuation of governmental assets. This provides quantitatively and qualitatively
different types of information on fiscal behaviour compared with cash series or a
mechanical decomposition (see Irwin, 2015). In addition, my country-specific series
are comparable with an alternative method that combines individual series from
national accounts with statistical and econometric techniques in several steps; for
further details see De Castro et al. (2014).
Regarding the modelling technique, Cuerpo (2014) applies a quasi-Bayesian
TVP technique (proposed by Ciapanna and Taboga, 2011), similar to my approach.
He uses Spanish quarterly fiscal series (1986q1–2012q4) provided by De Castro et
al. (2014) to estimate a simple fiscal (debt) rule without any controls. He finds that
fiscal policy behaved in a sustainable manner during the 1996–2008 period. However,
this period was characterized by the zeal of meeting convergence criteria in order to
join the first wave of Euro countries, and years of robust conjuncture in the Spanish
economy. While these findings resonate with the conclusions of De Castro et al.
(2014), Ricci-Risquete et al. (2016) analyse a longer sample of the same data with
a MSM VAR technique and only find one change in Spain’s fiscal policy regime (in
late 1992). This indicates possible bias in previous studies using samples prior to
the ESDC. Afonso et al. (2011) also use MSM techniques to analyse fiscal behaviour
in Portugal between the late 1970s and 2008, and find a change in fiscal regimes in
1988 (two subtypes of a non-Ricardian regime). They also find mixed evidence of
more restrictive (that is sustainable) fiscal policy prior to the launch of the Euro,
and around 2002 when Portugal was the first EA country facing sanctions in the
EDP process as a result of violating the Pact. Lastly, Afonso and Toffano (2013)
estimate optimal fiscal reaction functions on quarterly data (from 1970s/1980s to
late 2000s) coupled with monetary reaction functions for three EU economies (EA
countries: Germany, Italy, and one non-EA country: the UK). Allowing for regime-
switching in parameters (MSM technique with two regimes), they find fiscal policy
in Germany to be rather passive (sustainable). Compared to these studies, my
estimation is not limited by a potentially strict assumption about the number of
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regimes in which fiscal policy can operate. I overcome this limitation by performing
TVP estimation of both a simple and a more complex fiscal rule. This approach
allows me to make comparisons, both with the other studies listed, and between the
results of the different estimations. Moreover, I explicitly control for institutional
effects through my estimation approach, while also mitigating problems arising from
additional variables, and a choice of relevant periods. Compared to previous, the
incorporation of a lagged dependent variable also allows me to distinguish between
short-run and long-run behaviour. My results also take into account changes in the
aftermath of the Great Recession and the ESDC, which are not covered in most of
the previous studies that also use data ending during the high-growth period of the
2000s.
Fiscal policy rules
A fiscal rule or a fiscal reaction function closely resembles monetary policy rules, or
so-called Taylor rules (for a direct comparison see Taylor, 2000) because of the use
of: (i) output gap (growth rates of potential or real GDP) as a proxy for cyclical
behaviour and (ii) a ‘policy variable’ such as the structural component of a budget
deficit. A standard (functional) form usually uses models proposed by Leeper (1991)
or Bohn (1998). This standard represents a model specification that allows for the
estimation of fiscal responses and testing of so-called (macro) model based fiscal
sustainability (MBS). In a more general way, a fiscal policy rule (governmental
primary balance response to lagged public debt ratio) can take the following form
(see Bohn, 2008; D’Erasmo et al., 2015 or Ghosh et al., 2013):33
(3.1) bst = αdt−1 + ψ.
The reduced-form fiscal rule (3.1) links the primary balance (bst),
34 the
lagged outstanding public debt (dt−1), both variables expressed as a fraction of
GDP, and ‘other’ determinants (ψ) that include a constant and the one-period
lagged primary balance. The other determinants enable to systematically control
for economic, financial, and institutional conditions such as output gap, external
33 Arguments for the inclusion of debt level in fiscal rules can be found for example in Favero and
Giavazzi (2007). In addition, Fata´s and Mihov (2010) find evidence for cyclically-adjusted primary
balance and growth rates, but find no significant evidence for output gaps in case of EU countries
(dataset only included early years of the Euro area). Since output gaps are commonly utilized and
they are in line both with Taylor rules and an optimal behaviour in micro-based types of models,
my preference is to follow this approach.
34 Primary balance is defined as a difference between total government revenues and expenditures
without interest payments.
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deficit or components of government expenditures for some country or group of
countries i, and a time period t (for example as a forward-looking role for k < ∞
period, 〈t, t + k〉). Possible further determinants may matter but are not directly
incorporated in the model and cannot be explicitly evaluated with respect to their
impact on fiscal behaviour, but only through their effect on already employed de-
terminants. An estimated coefficient on public (government) debt characterises the
response of primary balance to public debt. In the Bohn (1998)’s inspired strand
of the literature, the coefficient on debt (α̂ > 0) is interpreted as a (weak) test of
public debt sustainability, in the case when the intergovernmental budget constraint
(IBC) and no-Ponzi Game condition are satisfied (i.e. explosive behaviour is elim-
inated). However, the steady state level of public debt and its behaviour depends
on the difference between the estimated response coefficient and growth adjusted
interest rate, assuming a standard debt accumulation equation (for details see for
example D’Erasmo et al., 2015).35 One of the shortcomings of this specification
lies in the fact that the debt response coefficient – α – is typically treated as time
invariant, which has been addressed in different ways in the literature (time, debt or
a particular determinant dependent fiscal rules); for these extensions see below.36
Recent studies on FRF have emphasised two further important links be-
tween fiscal responses and a broadly defined environment: (a) optimising behaviour
of fiscal agents, (b) the importance of a connection between fiscal policy behaviour
and monetary policy actions. Therefore, I consider another type of rule that ex-
tends/reformulates the simple model (3.1), that is, a model explicitly allowing for
both factors: optimising behaviour and presence of inflation spillovers (Kirsanova
35 Some authors claim that the failure to control for the role of financial markets is the primary
cause of fiscal policy response estimates that are too low. Therefore, a reformulation of the rule
(3.1) can be viewed as a sufficient sustainability condition, only if the value of (α̂  0) is large
enough. This is however, possibly conditioned on further determinants including interest payments
on the current stock of debt, and if there is no upper limit on positive values of primary surpluses,
for example as shown in Daniel and Shiamptanis (2013).
Either in the simple or in the more complex approach, empirical estimations of such a rule are
so-called MBS tests (see D’Erasmo et al., 2015).
36 The validity of this point, however, relies on the actual specification (country/time dimension).
For further discussion see for example Berti et al. (2016).
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et al., 2005). The ‘static’ form of such a rule then reads:37
(3.2) bst = αdt−1 + βogapt−1 + γpit−1,
where pit−1 is the one period lagged rate of inflation (in percent), ogapt−1 is the
lagged output gap (in terms of the natural output), and the other variables have
the same interpretation as above. In contrast to monetary policy rules, fiscal rules
usually do not include expectation terms for output gap and/or inflation, and only
occasionally can be estimated on real time series because of their limited availability.
Further modifications and extensions of fiscal rules
As already indicated above, fiscal rules are usually specified as time-invariant, which
is not necessarily a good approximation of policy-makers behaviour. As a result,
there have been several extensions of the FRF concept including: (1) debt-level
specific responses, (2) interest rate dependent responses, (3) threshold effects or (4)
time-varying responses.
Firstly, a linear rule is only an imperfect proxy of real fiscal policy reactions
since plots showing (primary) fiscal balance and debt can even reveal a non-linear
relationship. There have been several attempts to account for this possibility. One
approach, already tested in Bohn (1998)’s paper, rests upon adding higher-degree
order terms of a debt polynomial, either in the form of a difference with respect
to a country’s average value (capturing deviations from a country-specific ‘steady
state’) or as additional polynomial terms. Usually, the second and third polynomial
terms are used to estimate changing responsiveness (increasing and decreasing) as
indebtedness increases. A theoretical justification for this non-linear model is linked
to the so-called fiscal fatigue hypothesis (ff hypothesis, henceforth) that was pro-
posed and empirically examined for a sample of developed countries in Ghosh et al.
(2013). The ff hypothesis assumes different behaviour of fiscal authorities depending
on the actual debt level, which can give rise to larger or smaller responses of fiscal
balance.38 Similarly, the second case considers fiscal responses conditioned on levels
37 This study develops a three/five equation model with a goods market (dynamic IS curve), an
expectation augmented version of the Phillips curve (PC), a Taylor type monetary rule (output and
inflation, MP), a debt accumulation equation, and a rule for fiscal authorities (output and debt). In
that model, fiscal authorities respond not only to debt, but also to inflation and output. As a result,
the specification of the fiscal rule takes the form presented in (3.2). Assuming monetary policy is
capable of stabilising the economy, then small responses to debt and only negligible responses to
output and/or inflation, should be found in the case of fiscal authorities (ibid.).
38 For example for very high debt levels, a fiscal authority can respond with a stabilization policy
to reduce deficits (and consequently stabilization/decrease of indebtedness), or the current debt
level can be so high that the fiscal authority will not adjust its policy or even make it loose (that
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of growth adjusted interest rates. Daniel and Shiamptanis (2015) show that for a
group of developed countries, estimates provide similar (or even better information)
compared to the model of ff hypothesis. Other approaches such as threshold models,
attempting to capture varying responsiveness to changing indebtedness (resembling
the previous concept of fiscal fatigue) can result in fiscal responses that are discon-
tinuous at one or several debt levels. Lastly, there have been few studies recently
that estimated a FRF with a time varying response coefficient αt, similar to these
utilized in this chapter, that are discussed in a grater detail below.
3.2.2 How much do institutions matter for fiscal policy?
Previous sections briefly described country-specific estimates of time-varying fiscal
responses. Below I try to find some evidence of whether few major changes of Euro-
pean institutions can be identified as triggers of different fiscal behaviour (responses).
In particular, my interest lies in providing some evidence on the most recent set of
institutional changes (crisis-related), and countries that have been exposed to se-
vere (financial market) pressures. Accordingly, I also explore the other aspect of
the research question, regarding the outcomes of institutional changes around the
harmonization of EA fiscal policies.
There is hardly any robust (indisputable) test for verifying effects of institu-
tions and subsequently harmonization of fiscal policies. A set of figures is included in
the empirical section of this text to check whether there has been any effect coming
from changes in the EA institutional environment for national fiscal policies. These
figures are split into two groups: countries with some fiscal problems (GIIPS), and
all the remaining EA members. My results are compared with a (imperfect) control
group that is made up of three stand-alone EU countries. To make the compari-
son more adequate, countries are divided into three groups by using a debt crite-
rion, while keeping the stand-alone countries together. Presenting all members of a
group in one figure provides a more ‘realistic’ view of individual responses and their
changes over time, compared with separate discussions of the results. Accordingly, I
provide both a visual presentation of harmonization via simple statistics (standard
deviations) for my measure of fiscal behaviour.39
is, a fall in responsiveness, which gives the name to the hypothesis), and a sovereign default will
follow. However, there is no guarantee that fiscal behaviour will follow such a non-linear pattern
since this approach is more mechanical than related to so-called fiscal capacity, fiscal space of a
country, or past behaviour of policy-makers (for details see ibid.).
39 Since there is no clear suggestion regarding a measure of harmonization, in the case of country-
specific estimates (time series models), one could also follow Arouri et al. (2013) utilizing the Geweke
(1982)’s test for measuring monetary policy harmonization of three main central banks (short-term
interest rates).
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In my point of view, there have been three important sets of events since the
late 1980s that can be associated with major institutional changes. These are as
follows:40
(a) the Maastricht Treaty (1991–1993) at the inception of preparations for the
Euro adoption, including a set of the well-known Maastricht convergence cri-
teria (despite being more concerned with high debt levels than with budget
deficits in the case of fiscal criteria);
(b) the launch of the Euro (1999), which initiated the need to comply with the first
version of the Stability and Growth Pact (established in 1996, but only fully
at work from 1999 onwards, including the excessive deficit procedure (EDP,
henceforth) and its sanction clauses for EA members), and
(c) the full unwinding of the Great Recession in the Euro area (late 2009) leading
to the European sovereign debt crisis and a particularly long list of changes
to the fiscal policy framework that was approved and implemented over the
period of 2011–2013.41
Since there is a significant amount of uncertainty regarding the timing for
the set of institutional changes – items ad a) through ad c) above –, I follow Canova
et al. (2012)’s approach for setting a particular cut-off time for individual events.
Therefore, I leave aside for this moment possible lags in observable effects (which can
be checked as a robustness exercise). The key dates are set as follows: in the case
of the Maastricht treaty, the decisive quarter is set to the first quarter of 1993. The
effects associated with the Pact can be set to the third quarter of 1998, when final
decisions were made (on the single monetary policy and the common currency), and
it was finally clear who would be subject to its rule and sanction principles. Linking
to that event, I also add the first major amendment to the Pact that was endorsed
40 For an early overview of important dates in the European integration process see for example
Rogers (2007).
41 These changes included, both further minor modifications of the Pact, the second major change
since 1996 that was mainly implemented to enhance compliance with its principles, and additional
changes of the institutional framework, comprising: (i) the so-called ‘Six pack’ (October 2011),
focused on improving compliance with the Pact, introducing an early warning system, and a cor-
rection mechanism in case of excessive macroeconomic imbalances; (ii) the so-called ‘Two pack’
(May 2013) that complemented the six pack by adding further layers for coordination and surveil-
lance of EA countries; and (iii) the Fiscal Compact (the third title of the Fiscal Treaty, October
2012) that modified and extended the Pact by introducing balanced budget rule and debt brake
rules (if debt is above 60% of GDP), and precipitated the establishment of independent national
fiscal councils alongside the existing set of fiscal rules. The Fiscal Treaty is expected to modify
fiscal policy behaviour as shown for example in Baldwin and Giavazzi (2016); for an overview of all
changes see EC (2013); EC (2015); EC (2016c) or Masten and Gnip (2016).
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in late March 2005. I set the cut-off to 2005q1 since the complexity and uncertainty
around the final version of the rule’s text resulted in a great deal of effort to fix
issues such as, ameliorating problems with non-compliance. While the first wave
of effects stemming from the Global Recession (via trade links) arrived around the
third quarter of 2008 (with the exception of Ireland and the UK facing problems
of financial institutions already in 2007q3), the outbreak of the debt crisis (ESDC)
is associated with events in late 2009 and particularly in early 2010 (see Bruegel,
2015). I set the date to the fourth quarter of 2011 since these events triggered later
changes in the institutional framework – the so-called Six-pack became effective as
late as December 2011 (aimed to strengthen fiscal surveillance and introduce the
Macroeconomic Imbalances Procedure, MIP). The last sequence of this series of
institutional ‘corrections’, the Fiscal Treaty, was ratified by a twelfth EU member
in late December 2012, and entered into force from January 2013. Signatories to this
Fiscal Treaty were additionally granted a period of one year to carry out necessary
amendments at the national level. As a result, it became binding for the first
time for EA participating countries from January 2014. Given the conceptually
different nature of the last change, it is rather difficult to assess how much this
Treaty actually influenced the behaviour of signing countries. Nevertheless, its cut-
off is provisionally set to 2012q4. Since this study analyses institutions, it does
not consider, for example, the case of coordinated short-run demand management
(2009) aimed to propel aggregate demand and growth into positive territory.
The aforementioned dates can be subject to changes (shifts) as already indi-
cated. For example in the case of the Maastricht treaty, one could think of bringing
that cut-off date back to 1992q1. Since the time-varying methodology allows to es-
timate a model specification in any period within the sample period, the previously
mentioned cut-off dates only provide the most likely data points for changes that
are highlighted in individual figures. The final verdict will be passed by plotting a
trace of calculated coefficients. Nevertheless, one can think of factors leading to dif-
ferentiation: some of the dates have already been investigated in the literature and
included in models in a form of a dummy (mainly around the Euro introduction),
while others are not. Results illustrate individual changes in a smoother way and
there is also a possibility of simple mutual comparisons. Since the sample period in-
cludes even more recent periods it reveals whether there was any change associated
with the ESDC and the series of measures implemented thereafter. My expectation
is that there should be a differentiated impact of institutional changes, particularly,
there should be stronger responses in more indebted countries and those seriously
hit in the course of recent events. An overwhelming majority of institutional changes
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has aimed to modify fiscal behaviour towards a more unified framework, so another
dimension to be analysed is their impact on dispersion of individual country-specific
responses by means of standard deviation.
3.3 Time-varying parameter fiscal functions
As outlined in previous sections of this chapter, fiscal responses functions or fiscal
rules are usually estimated as time invariant for a country or group of countries.
Commonly used specifications draw on Bohn (1998)’s model, similar to the model
(3.1) above. A ‘flexibility’ is added to the estimation with the help of time or state-
dependent interactions (see above). Flexibility is by representing the former by
time or event-related dummy variables, and the latter by a Markov-switching model,
where two or more types of responses are assumed.42 Since my aim is to capture
the changing nature of fiscal policy over time given both endogenous and exogenous
changes in economic, financial, institutional and other types of environment, several
techniques could be applied to empirically investigate their effects (see below). A
particular choice of technique can also be driven by the availability of fiscal data that
still varies substantially, even for many European countries (for a recent summary
of data coverage by methodology see Irwin, 2015).
3.3.1 Model specification
In this chapter, a modification of the simple fiscal rule presented as the model (3.1)
above is considered. Firstly, my model will capture time-varying fiscal responses
by relaxing the restriction (time invariability) put on the estimated debt response
parameters, and allowing a fiscal rule to change over time. Secondly, the traditional
approach based on a linear response rule in the spirit of (Bohn, 1998, 2008) allowing
for persistence of fiscal measures, is complemented with an explicit set of controls:
(3.3) bst = ct + %tbst−1 + αtdt−1 + ΓtΘ(.) + ξt,
where bst, bst−1 represent the current and lagged primary balance respectively, dt−1
is the one period lagged debt (all variables in percent of GDP),43 Θ(.) stands for a
set of determinants (economic, financial, ...) of fiscal policy exactly specified below
42 Regimes are usually found to be rather persistent with low switching probabilities, which may
or may not be a good description of fiscal policy. In the case of imperfect information, changes of
regimes may remain unidentified. Similarly, the existence of temporary sub-regimes may not be
allowed for.
43 I employ a model with the one period lagged debt variable following Greiner et al. (2007) and
similarly in case of the output gap series so that there is not problem with simultaneity bias.
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and random shocks (ξt), and ct is the constant term. %t, αt, and Γt represent a
set of time-varying coefficient to be estimated.44 Regarding the determinants, the
literature has yet to reach a consensus as to which are the most important (apart
from the debt variable and a proxy for economic conditions). As a result, I consider
two versions of the fiscal rule:
(i) Fiscal Rule I (FR I, henceforth) – a model that resembles a Leeper (1991)’s
fiscal rule, combining the very simple idea of fiscal policy responding to debt,
while controlling for business cycle related fluctuations. This rule is close to
the (macro) sustainability strand of the literature,
(ii) Fiscal Rule II (FR II, henceforth) – a specification in accordance with the
model outlined in Kirsanova et al. (2005) and briefly outlined above (‘optimal
fiscal policy’), with an inflation rate and a proxy for taxation motives in line
with the original Barro (1979)’s argument (and thus more in the vein of the
FTPL literature).
Models such as the reduced-form fiscal rule (3.1) are meant to capture short-
run fiscal policy behaviour at a yearly frequency, not explicitly considering lags
related to policy-makers actions. Since policy-making reality is different, one can
specify a fiscal rule that explicitly accounts for these lags. This can also be viewed as
an example of the differences between fiscal and monetary policy, as reflected in their
policy rules. In addition, since my model will be estimated at a quarterly frequency,
a simple transposition of a yearly-based model to the quarterly environment may
not be intuitive. Given the typical set-up of fiscal policy, fiscal responses could
possibly be more aligned in a four-quarter-change period (that is one year), than
those from quarter to quarter, as is commonly done in the literature by bringing
a Bohn’s yearly model to quarterly data.45 However, unexpected events requiring
immediate fiscal intervention (such as catastrophes) often result in ad hoc quarter-to-
quarter changes [(q + 1)/(q)] of government expenditures (structural measures). These
are rather limited in terms of their size during a fiscal year. Similarly, while (big)
changes in taxation are only very rarely carried out on a quarterly basis because of
their implications for the behaviour of economic subjects, tax rates do experience
changes during a year. In addition, government’s plans for a fiscal year reflect not
only quarterly, but also monthly variation, based on the matching of revenue and
44 Based on estimated values, long-run (steady state) levels of debt for the analysed country can
be calculated. If ĉt < 0, then debt in such an economy will level out to a positive long-run level of
debt ratio.
45 Only few studies have considered such differences so far, for example Burger and Marinkov
(2012).
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expenditure streams. Given the system of checks on budgetary development by
the European Commission, governments that clearly deviate from planned (agreed)
paths are expected to correct them without delay.46 Therefore, the assumption
of fiscal policy acting on a quarterly frequency seems plausible. Moreover, one
additional exception can be the case of crisis management to stabilise fiscal accounts
(public finances) in fiscally distressed countries, for example the measures recently
adopted in GIIPS countries such as Greece and Ireland. Most of the fluctuation can
be thus attributed to the role of automatic fiscal stabilisers and planned discretionary
measures (such as investments).
In this chapter I begin with a model including only one lag for the sake
of comparability with the literature. Further alternatives such as time-invariant
estimates or a possible four-lag specification consistent with yearly frequency, are
left as a robustness exercise. Therefore, the FR I specification for quarterly series
based on the macro-fiscal rule (3.3) resembling Leeper, 1991’s model (see above)
includes only a control for business cycles and takes the form:
(3.4) bst = ct + %tbst−1 + αtdt−1 + ΓtΘ′(.) + ξt,
where Θ′(.) ∈ {ogapt−1}, where the output gap series (ogap) is estimated using the
Baxter-King band-pass filter (or for robustness check using the HP filter, see data
section or data appendix for details) expressed in relative terms and ξt is the error
term. Interpretation of remaining variables is the same as above.
The alternative specification (resembling ‘optimal fiscal rules’, see above)
with inflation rate and expenditure/tax smoothing variables (FR II) takes the form:
(3.5) bst = ct + %
′
tbst−1 + α
′
tdt−1 + Γ
′
tΘ
′′
(.) + ξ
′
t,
where Θ′′(.) ∈ {ogapt−1, pit−1, gcoutt−1}, with pit−1 is the rate of inflation (CPI, in
percent) and gcoutt−1 represents the trend deviations of total current expenditures
(estimated using the Baxter-King band-pass filter or for robustness check using the
HP filter, see appendix for details), and ξ′t stands for the error term. Interpretation
of remaining variables is the same as above. Based on theoretical considerations
and the work of (Bohn, 1998, 2008), the coefficient %t on lagged primary balance
is expected to be positive (persistence of fiscal measures). The coefficient for the
46 This has become even more important since 2011 when the new procedure for correcting
imbalances (MIP) came into force, complementing the already existing ‘European Semester’ (since
2010), see for example Be´nassy-Que´re´ (2016).
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variable of main interest, the lagged debt ratio, αt would be positive as long as
the government responds with a reduction of primary balance deficit (that is, an
increase of primary surplus) for rising debt and vice versa.
Debt response coefficients estimated in both models (3.4) or (3.5) represent
short-run fiscal responses (α̂SRt ≡ α̂t), which can be viewed only as partial infor-
mation. Therefore, estimates of long-run fiscal responses (α̂LRt ) can be added, and
calculated for a particular time period t, following the logic for ARDL models out-
lined in Chud´ık et al. (2015) as:
(3.6) α̂LRt =
α̂t
1− %̂t
where %̂t is the estimated coefficient on the lagged primary balance variable from
the model (3.3) for period t.
Some studies have flagged/raised the issue of estimating fiscal responses with
the lagged dependent variable – the models (3.4) or (3.5) – because of the effects
of automatic stabilisers for fiscal responses.47 Even though this particular problem
seems to be relevant for reduced versions of fiscal rules, not explicitly controlling for
other determinants but output gap (and for cyclically adjusted primary balance
as the dependent variable), which is not the case here. Since such a model is
(dynamically) misspecified, an appropriate estimation technique is necessary, see
for example Davidson and MacKinnon (2004).48 In addition, such a specification
(3.7) does not allow to distinguish the time frame of the response as with the case
of a model with the lagged dependent variable:
bst = ct + α
′
tdt−1 + ΓtΘ
′
(.) + κt, (in case of the FR I)
bst = ct + α
′
tdt−1 + Γ
′
tΘ
′′
(.) + κt, (in case of the FR II)
κt = גκt−1 + ξt,
(3.7)
where ΓtΘ
′′
(.) or Γ
′
tΘ
′′
(.) includes the same variables as in (3.4) or (3.5) respectively,
κt is the AR(1) error term, ג is the estimate of the autoregressive coefficient for the
AR(1) process and ξt is assumed to be an iid error term.
47 For example see Golinelli and Momigliano (2009); Fourier and Fall (2015) or Plo¨dt and Reicher
(2015).
48 An estimation of the FR I and/or the FR II without the lagged term with an AR(1) error term
can thus be carried out as a robustness check.
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3.3.2 Estimation technique
Few techniques are applied in the literature when estimating the effects of determi-
nants on fiscal policy variables: (i) VAR technique and a number of its modifications,
however, VAR estimates are subject to various critiques (see Afonso, 2005) because
of their reliance on causality or the effect of variables’ ordering. (ii) Panel techniques
can help address some further empirical challenges (short fiscal series, quarterly in
particular), even though the implicit assumption of one regime across the panel
may be too strict. (iii) Markov-switching models allow for several states of the
dependent variable, however, they are subject to issues both with the choice of the
number of states (usually two or three) and their rather data-demanding (sensitive)
features. (iv) A rolling regression and/or the Kalman filter is employed to estimate
similar models since they allow for the time-variation of parameters. However, both
the former and the latter method works with ‘fiscal flexibility’ in a particular man-
ner, in comparison to more flexible TVP models.49 (v) Quasi-Bayesian methods in
the form of a ‘classical’ maximum likelihood estimation (MLE), combined with the
Kalman filter represent a more recent approach.50
In this chapter, I utilize a state-space representation of two models of fiscal
rules (FR I and FR II), and their parameters are estimated using TVP model estima-
tion combined with Bayesian methods. Bayesian methods consider all parameters
to be random variables, and all to-be-estimated parameters are treated as those
stemming from jointly distributed random variables. Their estimation takes into
account the uncertainty associated with all the others (see Kim and Nelson, 1999)
and as a result, it enables the computation of the so-called credible intervals using
the posterior distribution (for details see for example Koop et al., 2007). Although
it is not the only possibility that is available in this case, it ensures that the estima-
tion proceeds in a way that helps to eliminate issues associated with applications of
MLE in combination with the Kalman filter (see footnote 50).
Since the choice (specification) of priors, that is the formulation of beliefs
on prior distributions, is of key importance, I follow recommendations in Primiceri
(2005) or Blake and Mumtaz (2012) and use the beginning of my sample to gener-
49 Some authors raise the issue of rolling window regression estimates’ sensitivity to outliers, in
small samples in particular, see Zivot and Wang (2006) or the specification of a window utilized.
50 There are two potential problem of this combination (for details see Kim and Nelson, 1999): 1)
there is a risk of accumulation of estimation errors since there can be numerous likelihood functions,
especially in large models where one state variable estimation is carried out with conditioning upon
the MLE estimates of the remaining parameters in the system, and 2) the initialization of the
Kalman filter requires specifying correct (objective) priors. While the latter can be solved easily
(for example using a training sample), (the former) obtaining efficient estimates of parameters is
non-trivial.
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ate the necessary information for country-specific models (parameters and variance),
each of the same length for all countries. This choice means that country-specific
characteristics are taken into account at the start of the estimation procedure and
thus, they are aimed at alleviating problems with a fixed choice of some arbitrary
values. This approach is also assumed to lead to more accurate time-varying esti-
mates (reduced variance) because of the natural shrinkage contained in the likelihood
(Byrne et al., 2016).
My novel quarterly dataset allows to carry out simultaneously country-specific
estimations and capture time variation, owing to the use of Bayesian methods for
time-varying parameter estimation in the state-space model framework. Follow-
ing Blake and Mumtaz (2012), for the simulation of draws from the parameters’
posterior distribution, the Gibbs sampler is employed (belonging to Markov Chain
Monte Carlo (MCMC) methods), complemented with the Carter and Kohn (1994)
algorithm. In order to do that, one has to specify (see Byrne et al., 2016): (a) the
unknown parameters of the model to be estimated and (b) their posterior condi-
tional distributions, subsequently allowing (c) the algorithm to draw samples from
them.
The TVP regression model allowing for specified time-variation of coefficients
with the measurement (also called observation) equation being the (3.8a), and the
transition equation being the (3.8b) below) takes the following form:
yt = ℵb0 + βtXt + t,(3.8a)
βt = ω + Λβt−1 + εt,(3.8b)
where the error terms take the form
t ∼ N [0,Ξ] (iid),(3.8c)
εt ∼ N [0,Θ] (iid).(3.8d)
yt is univariate (T × 1), Xt consists of p > 2 fiscal rule determinants (including
the first lag of dependent variable), βt is a p × 1 matrix of coefficients, Λ is the
p×p matrix (∼ Ik identity matrix), and E[t, εt] = 0 (independence). When setting
Ξ = Ik and parameter ω = 0), the regression coefficients evolve according to a
random walk with innovations εt. ℵb0 represents any time invariant variables –
none in my case – and the coefficient (matrix (k × k) of their coefficients) included
in the model specification. In this case it is set to zero.
As Kim and Nelson (1999) or Blake and Mumtaz (2012) explain, initial
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values for time-varying parameters βt (observable state variables), β(0|0), and their
variances (V(0|0)) need to be specified before the Kalman filter can be initialized.
This is done alongside selecting initial values for the variance of the measurement
(observation) equation – Ξ – and the variance-covariance matrix of the transition
equation – Θ. A full derivation of the Kalman filter can be found for example in
Fru¨hwirth-Schnatter (2006, Ch. 13) or in Blake and Mumtaz (2012, Ch. 3).
Following Primiceri (2005) to find the initial values (β(0|0), V(0|0)) for the TVP
model, a simple time-invariant OLS regression is run over a training period (TP ) of
five years at the beginning of the sample; because of one-quarter lag the actual period
is: TTP = 1980q2–1984q4. Even though the length of this training sample period is
rather short, it should provide some information for the estimation. The potentially
limited information content is reflected in the value of the scaling parameter ν
(see below), which accords with Byrne et al. (2016) suggestion for country-specific
estimations. As a result, the starting values for the Kalman filter are (the initial
state and the initial variance): β(0|0) ≡ βOLS and V(0|0) ≡ VOLS . This, however,
reduces the sample period for estimation of fiscal responses to 1985q1–2015q4 (i.e.
124 quarters).
βOLS = (B′TP, t · BTP, t)−1(B′TP, t · yTP, t),(3.9a)
VOLS = ΩTP ⊗ (B′TP, t · BTP, t)−1,(3.9b)
where βOLS is the vector of OLS coefficients and VOLS is the OLS covariance matrix
with
ΩTP = (yTP, t − BTP, t · βOLS)′(yTP, t − BTP, t · βOLS) · (TTP − r)−1,(3.9c)
where r is the number of parameters to be estimated and β(.) and V(.) are priors to
be calculated.
The priors for the measurement (observation) and transition equation are
respectively represented by the inverse Gamma distribution and inverse Wishart
distribution, for a country-specific estimation. Firstly, inverse Gamma (IGa−1) for
the measurement equation, P (Ξ) ∼ IGa−1 [ΞTP , (TTP − r)] with the degree of free-
dom from the training sample (TTP − r) and the scale parameter ΞTP = ΩTP .
The prior for the transition (updating) equation is the inverse Wishart distribu-
tion: P (Θ) ∼ IW [ΘTP , TTP ] with the training sample variance VTP = ΘTP (with
a scaling factor, see below) and degrees of freedom of the training sample TTP .
Following the recommendations of Blake and Mumtaz (2012), I restrict the con-
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tents of the matrix ΘTP since it affects the variation of coefficients in my model
(larger values lead to large dispersion), and the starting period provides limited
information on individual variables. Therefore, the calculated variance is re-scaled
via: ΘTP = VOLS × TTP × ν, where ν is the factor of proportionality. I set it to a
relatively small number ν = 3.510 ·10−5 for the base model – FR I – following Blake
and Mumtaz (2012); a similar treatment of variance for a single equation model is
justified in Byrne et al. (2016). That choice also affects the speed of adjustment for
parameters of my model.51 Parameters (β’s) are drawn from multivariate normal
distribution, in accordance with the recommendation in the Bayesian literature (see
Kim and Nelson, 1999). Since my both models include the lagged dependent vari-
able, I restrict the generated set of random draws of coefficients for that variable to
those that lie only between zero and one in absolute value, that is, for Ψ = {%̂t, %̂′t}
in models (3.4) or (3.5) above so that Ψ ∈ (−1; +1) holds.52
Also for the initialization of the Gibbs sampler some initial values are required
– Ξ and Θ. These are set similarly to the previous case: Ξ0 = VTP and Θ0 =
VTP ×T0×ν. In this model I do not consider the possibility of allowing for changing
volatility over time (stochastic variability, see for example Blake and Mumtaz, 2012)
that can be added, when estimating policy rules. This decision is primarily driven
by the length of available time series, which limits the amount of information that
can be obtained for the identification of individual parameters.
Two statistics were calculated to verify that the algorithm meets the neces-
sary conditions for convergence. Firstly, a statistic that contains information about
the necessary number of draws to achieve a given level of numerical accuracy for
a particular simulation (for details see Geweke, 1992). It is the relative numerical
efficiency (RNE) of the Gibbs sampler. The other (ibid.), is a statistic (convergence
diagnostic, CD) that aims to capture the behaviour of the generated sample by com-
paring its two sub-samples, usually at 10% and 50% of the retained Gibbs draws. I
reduced the lower threshold to 20%, which is similar to its application in Byrne et
al. (2016); for details see Blake and Mumtaz (2012). Using the calculation suggested
by Raftery and Lewis (1992), I arrive at the minimum number of draws (∼ 4000)
for both models, but I utilize 30000 draws and 10000 draws are stored and used for
further inference. Blake and Mumtaz (2012) recommend analysing autocorrelation
51 On the one hand, one could argue that fiscal measures and changes in fiscal policy are not
very frequently adopted because of institutional dynamics. On the other hand, there have been
periods of time, when fiscal policy have responded rather quickly. Therefore, alternative values of
the scaling factor ν were tried, see the robustness section below.
52 This step eliminates non-stationary processes. For some countries this condition is met without
difficulties, while for others a larger number of draws is needed to generate the stored sample (for
example, the Netherlands or Denmark).
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functions and recursive means of the retained draws from the Gibbs sampler, to
detect any irregularities in the simulation exercise.53 Therefore, I conduct a recom-
mended visual inspection of the simulated series and for all models autocorrelation
and values of the CD statistic are calculated.54
3.4 Data and their treatment
My quarterly dataset covers the period between 1980q1 and 2015q4, meaning that
all the major steps in the European integration process in the 1990s and 2000s are
included. This dataset consists of twelve old EU countries (including two members
that entered in the 1980s and three members in mid 1990s, see footnote 5) forming
a monetary union and three stand-alone old EU member states – Denmark, Sweden
and the United Kingdom. This composition of EU countries will enable analysis of
the effects and reactions of fiscal policies across different types (utilizations) of fiscal
policy, and as a result, levels of indebtedness.
For the estimation of country-specific fiscal rules over time, both fiscal time
series, and other macro-economic variables are needed. This study utilizes several
sources of macroeconomic series (see below and in details in appendix). Despite
the fact that quarterly fiscal time series have been published by Eurostat for EU
countries for some time, their length and coverage vary substantially across coun-
tries.55 For the purpose of this study, it was necessary to reconstruct quarterly fiscal
series. My approach to reconstruction (Kalman filter based) is briefly described be-
low, and in greater detail in appendix. Few alternative attempts have been made
to reconstruct quarterly fiscal series from individual revenue and expenditure items.
These attempts used macroeconomic aggregates based on the System of National
Accounts (SNA) or its European version (European System of National Accounts,
ESA), such as Paredes et al. (2014) for the Euro area (currently, EA-15 covering the
period 1980q1–2013q4), and a similar methodology as in the case of Spain (recently
53 Baumeister and Benati (2013) propose as an alternative, so-called inefficiency factors (IF) that
are calculated as the inverse of relative numerical efficiency. Series of IF should be below twenty to
indicate convergence.
54 There was a ‘light’ problem with autocorrelation for some countries (slightly above the 95%
confidence intervals), however, coefficients returned fast to confidence intervals. All countries passed
the CD test (|CD| < 2) as commonly required, even though, I had to increase the burn-in number
of draws (to 50000 or 100000 draws for countries like Germany, Sweden or the UK), while keeping
the stored sample size unchanged at 10000 draws. Values of the RNE varied across countries across
specifications.
55 Otherwise, one would have to start as late as around the first quarter of 2002 for most EA
countries with few exceptions such as France or Finland. The case of stand-alone countries presents
a somewhat better situation. This is because of the ‘obligatory’ beginning of publishing fiscal
quarterly series that goes back to the first quarter of 1999.
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updated to 1970q1–2015q4), see De Castro et al. (2014). Even that reconstruction is
not without problems because of several changes in methodological concepts (ESA
1979, ESA 1995 and ESA 2010) over last decades. As illustrated for Spain in ap-
pendix, my generated fiscal series (primary balance) matches the SNA-reconstructed
series very closely, providing a visual check of the method (robustness) and support-
ing the Bayesian approach. The same does hold for reconstructed public debt series
that is not shown because of space considerations.56
3.4.1 Reconstruction of quarterly series
This section summarises the main steps used to reconstruct quarterly fiscal and
economic time series (for more details on data treatments see the data section in
the appendix). The main source of quarterly series for my dataset is Eurostat for
fiscal time series (Government finance statistics, ESA2010 and Quarterly national
accounts, ESA2010) and OECD (Quarterly National Accounts). Yearly fiscal policy
variables are primarily taken from the database of the European Commission (An-
nual macro-economic database, AMECO) that is compatible with Eurostat, OECD
(Economic Outlook database) and from a historical dataset of fiscal variables pre-
pared by the IMF (Public Finances in Modern History Database, see Mauro et al.,
2013). In order to have comparable series, the same database is used for coun-
try/year observations, that is debt and primary balance, in line with suggestions
in Berti et al. (2016). Furthermore, to eliminate ‘spurious’ responses coming from
during the Sovereign Debt Crisis conducted (one-off) interventions into financial in-
stitutions’ balance sheets in a few EA countries (so-called government support to fi-
nancial institutions – GAFS, for further details see the data subsection in appendix),
these transfers are excluded from primary balance series. Since these measures did
not directly affected public debt series (but changed so-called contingent liabilities),
no adjustment of public debt series was carried out. Moreover, there were various
one-off operations realised in the past (before 2007). However, there is no consistent
and systematic evidence of these items, even for EA countries. Some authors have
tried to adjust series for these effects; one approach uses differences in dynamics of
net capital transfers see Joumard et al. (2008). However, I decided not to distort
the dynamics of the fiscal series with imprecise corrections since their implications
56 I thank Javier Pe´rez (Banco de Espan˜a) for providing me with the latest version of their fiscal
dataset accompanying De Castro et al. (2014).
Furthermore, an empirical illustration for GIIPS countries and the Netherlands (with and without
GAFS series) is shown in the panels of figures (B.1) in the appendix. Details on one-off items and
their treatment can be found in EC (2015), and a brief summary for GAFS series is presented in
van Riet (2010).
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were also related to countries’ debt series.
Since quarterly fiscal time series are rather short or missing for primary bal-
ance and debt, and the output gap (see below),57 for a majority of EU countries
are available from 1999q1 onwards at best, they are extended for the whole sample
period, with quarterly series created with help of the Kalman filter technique and a
Bayesian approach for decomposition of low frequency series.58 One of the biggest
advantages of this approach compared to commonly used mechanical techniques for
temporal disaggregation59 is that quarterly series are constructed with the help of
the information provided by using other (macro) quarterly series that are highly
correlated with to-be-reconstructed fiscal series (primary balance and debt). The
set of variables employed for the reconstruction consists of the following series: un-
employment rate, CPI index, short-term and long-term interest rate, real GDP and
government consumption.60 A similar procedure was employed when reconstruct-
ing other quarterly series (government current expenditures). Further details are
provided in the data section in the appendix.
Output gap and the cyclical component of total current expenditures for
individual quarters are calculated with the help of the Baxter and King (Band-pass)
filter. The calculation uses commonly used parameters (BK12(6, 32) covering main
business cycle frequencies in the range 11/2−8 years) that provides better estimates,
as compared to the Hodrick-Prescott filter (with λ = 1600) on quarterly frequency
(HP filtered series are utilized in robustness section).61 Since both filters have been
shown to have problems in the beginning and end of a time series (‘end-points’),
and a few initial period are lost in the BK filter because of the filter construction),
57 For example even the most recent OECD publication on output gaps for individual OECD
countries is for yearly frequency only, see Turner et al. (2016); the same holds true for the ECB;
however, Jarocinski and Lenza (2016) discuss methods of estimating output gap at quarterly fre-
quency for the Euro area as a whole.
58 This way of reconstructing quarterly series draws upon the contributions of Giannone et al.
(2015) and Ban`bura et al. (2015). I thank Giovanni Ricco for sharing an earlier version of their
Matlab code used in Caruso et al. (2015).
59 The most commonly used are Chow-Lin, Fernandez or Litterman; for overview and details on
available methods with references see for example Quilis (2004).
60 I also tried to recalculate quarterly series utilizing both techniques, and the results were broadly
similar in terms of trends and turning points.
61 Other high values of smoothing parameters for the HP filter were utilized, such as those
recommended by Perron and Wada (2009) or Market and Ravn (2007) for GDP. However, their
gains compared to the standard HP filter were given by the length of available time series. Market
and Ravn (2007) argue that setting the BK filter equal to BK12(6, 32) works well for quarterly
series; the closest counterpart of the HP filter for quarterly data would be BK12(2, 32) according
to Baxter and King (1999).
I will treat the HP filtered series as a robustness check following a recent paper – Hamilton (2016)
– arguing that one should use different filtering techniques other than the HP filter in empirical
applications.
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series are extended with three or four years (12 or 16 quarters of observations) using
forecasting and backcasting in a bivariate VAR(p) model.62 For these extended
series, both filtering techniques were applied, fitted values were stored, and the
extensions of series were dropped. All series were seasonally adjusted (either directly
when accessed in particular databases or before any calculations using the ARIMA
X-13 method).63
Owing to data revisions, several studies have shown the importance of data
vintages’ effects on fiscal series (such as Golinelli and Momigliano, 2009), mainly
government balances (in particular on cyclically adjusted fiscal series). Unfortu-
nately, real-time analysis cannot be carried out in the case of quarterly time series
that are published by Eurostat. Even in the case of yearly series, the AMECO
database that has been running since 2002, comparable series available since 2008,
and the OECD Economic Outlook database, also provides yearly series.
3.5 First results
This section consists of several subsections that follow the logic of my work. Firstly,
country-specific fiscal responses’ estimates are presented (median time-varying co-
efficients on the lagged debt variable, that is, α̂t), so that effects of individual insti-
tutional changes can be assessed. Subsequently, some preliminary evidence on com-
mon behaviours of countries is provided (median responses) for the EA-12 countries
and stand-alone EU-3 countries. Thirdly, because institutional limits place restric-
tions on the conduct of fiscal policy, simple standard deviations of country-specific
responses are presented to see effects of institutional changes on harmonization of
national fiscal policies represented by fiscal responses. All these results are presented
for the ‘macro’ rule #1 (FR I). In the sensitivity section further below, results for
a set of robustness checks are shown that include exclusion of several countries,
changes in specification of Bayesian estimation and also some evidence for the other
‘optimal’ rule, FR II. Since results are broadly comparable, only the base specifica-
tion for the FR I rule are presented. In the following figures, the plotted responses
for the lagged debt variable for a country or a group (i) represent the long-run
responses (α̂LRi, t ) using the transformation shown in equation (3.6), unless specified
62 I follow Watson (2007) for GDP series, where the VAR(p) is with GDP and prices
(Okun/Phillips relationships). In the case of expenditures, I use a model with GDP (Wagner’s
law). Alternatively, AR(p) models are utilized; for details see appendix.
63 Some authors also employ a much simpler approach in the context of exchange rates models,
rolling the mean over four quarters as suggested in Engel et al. (2015). However, I prefer the more
standard method for comparability of seasonally adjusted series (commonly applying the same
method) in my dataset, as it comes directly from statistical offices.
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differently.64
3.5.1 Baseline model – has there been any institutional effect?
In this section, I explicitly analyse the effects of all five institutional changes outlined
in the previous text. Any evaluation of those effects can naturally differ because
of a choice of one of my two fiscal rules. Country-specific responses to modifi-
cations in the institutional environment were mainly determined by a country’s
(non-)compliance with debt requirements. Accordingly, the group of EA countries
is divided into three sub-groups (low, medium and high debt level) for the detailed
investigation of institutional changes. With some degree of arbitrariness regarding
a choice of thresholds, the debt intervals for the EA group are the following: 50%,
80% and above 80% of GDP. Alternatively, it would be possible to group coun-
tries based on their performance during the ESDC, such as those with softer ‘fiscal
constraints’ (GIIPS countries) than others. However, this classification would mix
countries with different adjustment needs over the sample period. Individual time-
varying coefficients on the lagged debt for FR I are shown, calculated as a median
value of all stored responses for a particular quarter and country, repeated over the
entire sample period.
Individual panels in figures 3.1 and 3.2 only provide a general illustration,
since, for the sake of readability, individual so-called credible intervals (the High
Posterior Density Interval, HPDI) are not shown. However, they can be found in
a particular country-specific panel in figure B.2 in the appendix. In these figures,
countries that were subject to international supporting schemes are labelled as pro-
gramme countries, and those with ‘softer’ budgetary constraints already challenged
by financial markets during the ESDC are labelled as weaker countries. In all those
country-specific figures, median values of time-varying debt responses are accompa-
nied by the 10th and 90th percentiles of the posterior distribution.
Starting with the Maastricht Treaty institutional change, its cut-off period
is set to 1993q1 (indicated by a vertical line in the first row of the figure 3.1). An
analysis of countries’ behaviour over three panels of each row in the figure highlights
(only significant changes are considered, and the number of the panel from the row
is bracketed after the last name in the group): France in the low debt group (#1),
no significant response in the medium debt group of countries, and only Greece from
the high debt group (#3). For some countries a change of their behaviour may have
occurred even before, possibly coinciding with the Treaty ratification process, such
64 All results were generated using Matlab. My code draws mainly upon Blake and Mumtaz
(2012) for the Kalman filter and the Carter and Kohn algorithm.
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as Spain, the Netherlands or Luxembourg (improving their public finances in early
1990s).65 In the case of the Stability and Growth Pact, whose enforcement rules
became binding for EA countries in 1998q3 (second row in the figure), there is a
change of behaviour in the low debt group – Luxembourg and earlier on in Finland
(#1), in the middle group – almost all countries change behaviour (Austria, France,
Ireland, the Netherlands and Spain (#2)), and finally in the high debt group –
Belgium and Greece change behaviour (#3).
The last row in the figure is related to a major reform of the Pact that was
finally approved in early 2005 (2005q1) in an attempt to strengthen fiscal discipline
and restore vanishing credibility of the rule: in the low debt group responses are
changed for Luxembourg and Ireland (#1), in the medium debt group responses
change in for Austria and Germany (#2) and finally, for the high debt countries
Belgium and Greece show different behaviour (#3). In the case of several countries,
estimated responses are significant but did not change much or remained at the
previous level, as in France or the Netherlands. Somewhat surprisingly, there were
no significant responses in the cases of Italy or Portugal, despite relatively high debt
levels in both countries during that period(s).
For the purpose of comparison, responses for the stand-alone EU-3 countries
are shown in figure 3.3 further below indicating all changes. A brief inspection
reveals that debt responses for Denmark (belonging to the medium debt group),
and the United Kingdom (belonging to the low debt group) are significantly different
around the period of the Pact. Responses were also significantly different for low
debt countries around the period of the change of the Pact. Responses for Sweden
are not significant for any of these three institutional changes.
65 Results for Austria and Finland (and Sweden) can be affected by the fact that they formally
became EU members in 1995. However, their preparation for Euro adoption was subject to the
Maastricht convergence criteria including two measures for public finances (deficit and debt).
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Figure 3.1: Fiscal behaviour – in the pre-sovereign debt crisis period (–2009)
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SGP reform (2005)
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(1) low indebtedness
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(2) medium indebtedness
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Note: country-specific responses for FR I (median). A vertical red line represents a particular institutional
change, and the dashed line is the Great Recession (2008q3). Colours for individual countries do not vary
across time periods for the sake of comparison. Country debt limits for the year of a change (fixed across
time): (1) low indebtedness: dt < 50%, (2) medium indebtedness: 50% ≤ dt < 80%, (3) high indebtedness:
dt ≥ 80%. The grey horizontal line is set at zero level (left axes) and it can be different from the second
(right) ‘y’ axis. Source: own calculations.
91
CHAPTER 3. INSTITUTIONAL CHANGES AND FISCAL POLICY BEHAVIOUR
Figure 3.2: Fiscal behaviour – in the sovereign debt crisis period (2009–)
Six-Pack (2011)
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Fiscal Treaty (2012)
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(2) medium indebtedness
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Note: country-specific responses for FR I (median). A vertical red line represents a particular institutional
change, dashed line is the Great Recession (2008q3). Colours for individual countries do not vary across
time periods for the sake of comparison. Country debt limits for year of a change (fixed across time): (1)
low indebtedness: dt < 50%, (2) medium indebtedness: 50% ≤ dt < 80%, (3) high indebtedness: dt ≥ 80%.
The grey horizontal line is set at zero level (left axes) and it can be different from the second (right) ‘y’
axis. Source: own calculations.
Two further sets of results (see panels in figure 3.2 above) are related to
changes in the wake of the ESDC. Even though the remaining sample period before
its end is rather short, some consequences of these changes are already visible, at
least in the case of countries trying to restore soundness of their public finances. This
can be interpreted as a first evaluation of those reform steps in the macro-fiscal rules
(governance principles).
Firstly, I investigate the so-called Six Pack in its final version approved in
2011q4 since it seems to have triggered different responses. Using the same definition
of debt groups, the responses were statistically significant, but were not large in
terms of their size. In the case of Luxembourg (#1), a change is visible somewhat
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Figure 3.3: Fiscal behaviour – stand-alone EU countries
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Note: country-specific responses for FR I (median). A vertical red line represents a particular institutional
change, dashed line is the Great Recession (2008q3). Colours for individual countries do not vary across
time period for the sake of comparison. The grey horizontal line is set at zero level (left axes) and it can be
different from the second (right) ‘y’ axis. Source: own calculations.
earlier. For medium debt countries, only Spanish responses look affected (#2), and
also Austrian, French, and not surprisingly Greek responses (#3). Secondly, in the
case of the Fiscal Treaty (2012q4), results are de facto unchanged, compared with
the first change where only the composition of groups is affected (Finland and Spain
moved to the next, higher, debt groups): no change in case of Luxembourg, however,
a positive response for Finland and Germany (#2) and Spain and Portugal (#3).66
Comparing the evolution of responses for the stand-alone EU countries, Den-
mark and Sweden (low debt group) show positive responses around the second
change (2012q4), while British responses remain insignificant (with their debt ratio
belonging to the high debt group in this period).67
To summarise results of this exercise so far, I find effects related to the
Maastricht Treaty only for few countries (only two of twelve). I do however identify
effects for many countries in the case of the Pact (nine out of twelve), and for
the modification of the Pact (five out of twelve). The most recent institutional
changes do not seem to have had a successful impact on fiscal responses (until the
66 Given the fact that EA participating member states were granted a period of one year to carry
out necessary changes, a change in behaviour should be seen from 2013 onwards, when accounting
for the existence of various lags from 2014 onwards.
67 This result for the EU-3 can be expected since they have not signed most or all (the UK) of
the newly introduced institutional amendments.
93
CHAPTER 3. INSTITUTIONAL CHANGES AND FISCAL POLICY BEHAVIOUR
sample period), with only five and four countries respectively, and there are no
visible significant changes for most of the group of high debt countries. A partial
explanation can be associated with estimates of fiscal responses being weak and
insignificant in many countries. It is also possible that in the case of several EA
members, changes in the more general integration process or external constraints
played a more important part than institutional changes. This pattern deserves
further investigation than is possible within the scope of this chapter. Nevertheless,
it could explain why I do not find any effect on fiscal behaviour for countries like
Italy, in the set of ‘major’ events.
Country-specific behaviour – further comments white
As already mentioned, the results for Italy are especially surprising since
their public debt was increasing throughout the sample period. However, a detailed
investigation of Italian country-specific responses in the appendix reveals that they
were hovering around zero most of the time and were not significant. Conversely,
Afonso and Toffano (2013) identify several fiscal regimes in a MSM model using a
sample period up to 2010.
A very similar pattern can be seen in the case of another country facing
a substantial debt burden, Portugal. Time-varying responses reveal a significant
worsening of the fiscal situation during the ESDC, which may have been reversed
at the end of the sample period (insignificant).68 However, there is a difference in
fiscal behaviour of both countries that reflects the preferences of both policy-makers
and voters.69
Regarding results for Spanish, one can see a spike after 1993 with an upward
trend that continued until 2007 (not significant since the launch of Euro), followed
by crisis-triggered negative responses that subsequently reduced around 2012. My
findings for this fiscal rule (FR I) partially resonate with the quasi-Bayesian TVP
estimates presented in Cuerpo (2014).70 The two remaining countries in the group
show different trajectories: Irish responses had been increasing since the mid 1990s
(levelling out around 2000), with an increase just after 2007 followed by a steep
decline, and a reversal (post-2012 results are not significant). Greece was losing
68 These findings resonate with Afonso et al. (2011), who also find just negligible effects of the
Maastricht, and the EDP. My results show more clearly the inefficiency and short-livedness of fiscal
measures in Portugal.
69 While Italy tends to report a primary surplus since 1990s, without a significant impact on
high public debt accumulated throughout the 1970s and 1980s (a reduction towards the 60% limit),
Portugal has kept running primary deficits since the late 1990s following a period of primary
surpluses in the 1980s, which has taken its toll on their indebtedness (the third highest in the Euro
area in 2015) and resulted in a prolonged recession during the ESDC (2011–2013).
70 It also supplements the finding on fiscal regimes in Ricci-Risquete et al. (2016).
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fiscal ground even in the Maastricht period, with a short spell of stabilisation around
1999. The post-2000 period is a combination of declining responses interrupted with
temporary stabilisations, as well as strong negative responses during the ESDC, and
a slow reversal in light of international fiscal supervision and the heavy debt burden.
Turning now to the remaining EA countries, three sub-groups can be iden-
tified: (i) Luxembourg and the Netherlands, whose fiscal responses remained posi-
tive and mostly (Luxembourg) significant throughout the period (with a drop after
2007); (ii) France with positive responses following a declining trend in several
stages throughout the period, (iii) Austria with significant but negative responses,
and Finland with rather volatile responses (strong positive responses followed by
a drop amidst the turbulent early 1990s, with a change in fiscal behaviour around
1995 reaching a peak around 2000, followed by negative responses over the ESDC
period),71 and finally (iv) Belgium and Germany, with positive but mostly insignif-
icant responses for Belgium. My results for Germany are somewhat surprising, but
they do correspond with those in Thams (2007) – they are insignificant in the early
1990s during the reunification of Germany (and before). However, in line with the
findings of Afonso and Toffano (2013), improved fiscal performance is reflected in
positive, rather strong numerical terms, and significant responses after 2004.
What about countries outside the Euro area with more or less independently
set monetary policies, who are not restricted by any common enforceable fiscal rules
but their own? The figure 3.3 above offers an illustration. In the case of the stand-
alone EU-3 countries, fiscal patterns seem to have been driven by factors other
than the need to comply with the EU institutional framework.72 It is therefore not
surprising that the national fiscal policies of this group of countries do not show
many similarities with some of those discussed for previous groups, apart from the
UK: Denmark shows positive and significant responses only affected by the ESDC,
Sweden shows highly volatile and mostly insignificant responses, and the UK shows
rather ‘cyclical’ but mostly insignificant patterns.
71 This specific behaviour of Finnish fiscal policy is usually explained with large stocks of assets,
that is, the net position is positive (a net creditor). A similar explanation holds for Luxembourg,
where improved fiscal performance allowed it to achieve very low levels of public debts.
72 In particular, both Sweden and the UK have had national fiscal rules working to largely
determine fiscal outcomes, at least for some years over the sample period such as the fiscal Golden
Rule and the so-called Sustainable investment rule in the UK between 1998–2008, later replaced
with the so-called temporary operating rule based on CAPB balance and a net debt rule. Swedish
fiscal rules that have been modified several times since the late 1990s, see Claeys, 2008; EC, 2016a).
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Group exercise – pooled fiscal behaviour
The country-specific evidence presented above was based on the inspection of trends
across groups of countries. It is also possible to construct EA-wide aggregates utilis-
ing stored results from the simulation exercise (draws from posterior distributions).
Figure B.3 in the appendix presents the median of time-varying fiscal responses,
that is, long-run values of debt response coefficients, across all EA-12 countries for
the FR I (‘macro rule’) over individual quarters of the sample period. No weights
are applied in this transformation, so each of the EA-12 countries contributed with
its 1⁄12 share to the common pool. In addition, commonly used percentiles (the 16th
and 84th, and the 10th and 90th) illustrate the pooled distribution of fiscal responses
for individual periods.73 Their asymmetry reveals cross-country differences in be-
haviour across several periods during the sample period, for example around end of
2008. A very similar picture is presented in the case of the EA-10 countries (see
panel b) in figure B.3 in the appendix). For the sake of comparison, median re-
sponses are also calculated for the group of stand-alone EU-3 countries (see figure
B.5 in the appendix). Similar to the previous two figures, results are not significant
for shown quantiles, apart from a short spell between 2002 and 2005 and marginally
around 2010.
3.5.2 Has there been any institution-driven harmonization of fiscal
policies?
While the previous sections analysed consequences of individual institutional changes
aimed at restricting fiscal policy behaviour in case on of two criteria is not met, this
subsection attempts to answer the second question of whether the previously men-
tioned institutional changes also had an effect on the harmonization of fiscal policies
across euro area countries. As a preliminary test, standard deviations of individual
fiscal responses are calculated both for EA-12 and EU-3 countries. For that purpose
I utilize the same ‘pool’ of time varying fiscal responses that were instrumental for
calculating median responses in the previous section.
Figure 3.4 below plots cross-sectional standard deviations of country-specific
fiscal responses to illustrate dispersion within the EA-12 group of countries over
the sample period. While the calculated dispersion hovers around 0.15 before the
Maastricht Treaty, there is an upward trend from the early 1990s that continues
until 1996 (reaching 0.30). There is a visible effect around the time of the Maastricht
73 Under normality, the 16th and 84th percentiles represent one standard deviation bounds, equal
to 68 per cent of the object’s distribution.
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Treaty – a temporary stabilisation followed by an increase, so the dispersion of fiscal
responses looks like an inverted hump shape in late 1980s and early 1990s. The Pact
seems to result in a decline to pre-Maastricht values that are followed by an increase,
which is interrupted around the time of its first change. That does not seem to help
stabilise fiscal behaviour since the standard deviation remains highly volatile and
slowly increasing in quarters following the modification. A change in trend comes
around the first set of changes in 2011. Afterwards, a declining trend persists until
the end of the sample period. As a result, dispersion drops below levels observed in
the late 1980s or 1990s (below 0.10).
In the case of the EU-3 group, calculated dispersion is lower in absolute
terms, see figure B.5 in appendix. Otherwise, it follows a similar path with a more
gradual increase in the post-2000 period that last until the end of 2014, when a
decline is observed. These results can be compared with some early statistical
evidence for the EA-12 and a larger group of non-euro countries presented in Fata´s
and Mihov (2010). In their case, dispersion is calculated using a series of yearly
residuals from a fiscal rule similar to the FR I, based on an exogenous discretionary
fiscal policy, that is, one that is induced primarily by non-economic factors such as
political determinants or by the Pact. Both analyses capture increases in the post-
Maastricht and post-2000 period that are more persistent in the case of my measure
of dispersion. A direct comparison is not possible for their other group that consists
of many non-European OECD countries.
The issue of harmonization and business cycles white
Even though I explicitly control for business cycle, questions remain as to how
much of the observed (shown) harmonization is because of output gap synchroniza-
tion across EA countries, and how much can be attributed to the ‘real’ efforts of
policy-makers. There are many ways of capturing the effects of harmonization (syn-
chronization) of business cycles. For the sake of comparability, I simply calculate
harmonization (synchronization) of business cycles across EA countries as standard
deviation, since both fiscal rules include quarterly series of output gaps.
Figure B.4 in the appendix provides an illustration of calculated standard
deviation of output gaps across twelve EA members, and their trend defined as a
centered moving average – a MA−13 process – following the suggestion of Gayer
(2007). This illustration reveals an increasing trend in dispersion until 1992 (from
values around 1.00 to 1.30) with a more or less gradual decline in dispersion of
output gaps over the Maastricht period. This decline reached a trough around the
launch of the Euro, reaching and hovering around a value of 0.70 until mid 2000.
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Figure 3.4: Dispersion of TVP fiscal responses for EA12 countries,
1985q1–2015q4
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Note: unweighted cross-sectional standard deviation of EA-12 TVP responses (based on FR I). Dark areas
are CEPR based recession periods for the Euro area. The red dashed lines represent the Maastricht Treaty
(1993), the Pact became binding (1998), a modification of the Pact (2005), and the Six-Pack and Fiscal
compact (2012 and 2013). Source: own calculation.
Since then, there was a steep increase reaching a peak in 2010 (around 1.50, the
highest value over the sample period), followed by a slow decline that ends in 2014
because of the variable construction. Comparing these trends with those for fiscal
responses discussed above, shows that there is no particularly frequent and direct
influence coming from dispersion of output gaps in the case of dispersion of fiscal
responses for the EA-12 group of countries.74
3.5.3 Sensitivity section
In this section I present and briefly comment on various robustness checks that
are carried out: (a) those that are related to the estimation of country-specific
fiscal rules and (b) those for groups of countries. In case of ad (a), firstly, a set of
robustness checks aims to check the effects of a longer training period: (1) a training
period is extended to 32 quarters (8 years) for the sake of comparability with the
FR II’s estimation, (2) since my dataset consists of reconstructed fiscal series, it is
74 Since results for HP filtered series are similar – changes are somewhat more pronounced because
of the more ‘ragged’ HP filtered series – they are not reported in the robustness section below, but
are available upon request from the author.
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shortened, so that it covers only the period of officially published series by Eurostat,
that is, 2000q1–2015q4 with the length of 64 quarters.75 The remaining quarters are
used for the training sample. Secondly, I explore the effect of changing the factor
of proportionality ν to νalti for the training sample variance adjustment in the base
model (FR I). Thirdly, I investigate whether results of the base fiscal rule model,
FR I, change for an alternative method of calculating output gaps, the commonly
used Hodrick-Prescott filter since it provides slightly different results compared with
the Baxter-King band pass filter.76 Fourthly, results for the alternative (‘optimal’)
fiscal rule, FR II, are added. All these robustness checks are shown for one country
(Spain), see panels in figure B.6 in the appendix. These results can be compared
with the base model results in panel i) of figure B.2 in the appendix.
In the case of robustness checks ad (b), I investigate the effect of excluding
‘outliers’, such as a country with very sound, and a country with very ‘troublesome’
fiscal policy in the EA-12 sample (Luxembourg and Greece). Results for these two
countries are presented and discussed in the main text. In addition, countries that
joined the EU in 1995 are excluded (EU-8, that is, EU-10 without Austria and
Finland). And lastly, I present some evidence on harmonization using the FR II.
Country-specific responses white
A first set of robustness checks aim to check the effects of: (1) extending the training
sample period from 5 to 8 years, that is, 32 quarters (also for comparability with
results for the FR II below). As shown in panel a) of figure B.6 in the appendix, the
picture is almost unchanged with only some quarters becoming (in)significant. A
similar picture is presented in the case of, (2) using a pre-2000 sample (the previous
period, that is 1980q1–1999q4, was treated as a training sample without any further
changes) to expand the training period to 80 quarters in panel b) of the same figure;
while the general tendencies are preserved, responses are stronger in absolute value
and more volatile, with some over the period before the ESDC and mainly the after
2010 turn insignificant.77 However, these last two checks come at an additional
cost, particularly in the latter case, since the sample period does not include the
pre-Maastricht and pre-EMU periods that offer some interesting information and
implications for the EMU period. In addition, given the length of the training
75 That corresponds with the period of data availability for an overwhelming majority of EU
countries in this sample.
76 Sometimes a modification of the HP filter is used, which is the HP band pass filter where the
time series is adjusted twice to filter out both short and long frequencies, see Gayer (2007). I do
not utilize this double filtering approach.
77 An alternative check of my results would be to use the official fiscal series for EA countries
when they are available.
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sample in the latter case (20 years), the of factor of proportionality can be also
adjusted; that is done in the next check below. Results for median responses and
its standard deviation are very similar to results for the full sample shown in the
text above.
Another series of robustness checks are carried out to investigate the effects
of alternating a very important parameter in the Bayesian TVP estimation (the
scaling factor ν). Firstly, I allowed for a lower (higher) amount of information to
be passed through from the training period, and also allowed for faster changes of
parameters represented by the parameters ν. The base value (ν = 3.510 · 10−5) is
reduced (νalt1 = 3.510 · 10−6) and then increased to (νalt2 = 3.510 · 10−3), other
things being equal to the base model. Results shown in panels c) and d) of the
figure B.6 in the appendix reveal only some minor changes to the base results.
Using the Hodrick-Prescott filter (with all other parameters unchanged) with
the standard choice of smoothing parameter for quarterly series (λ = 1600), there is
only a negligible impact on the median of Spanish fiscal responses, and the credible
intervals (see panel f) of the figure B.6 in appendix). An alternative for this check
would be to use GDP growth rates instead of the estimates output gap. However,
I leave this option as an extension of this work since this approximation of cyclical
position is not commonly used in the literature. Similarly, I do not present a check
that uses industrial production series because of the poor coverage of GDP behaviour
in European countries.
In addition, a modification of the base rule specification is employed, the
optimal fiscal rule (FR II) (see equation (3.5) above), which takes into account
potential effects of inflation and tax smoothing. The result for Spain of this micro-
founded fiscal rule differ somewhat as can be see in panel f) of figure B.6 in the
appendix. While main patterns are preserved, the entire series of median responses
is ‘lifted up’, thus leading to different conclusions in terms of significance (only the
change of the Pact and its modification). Further implications such as effects on
dispersion are discussed below.
Harmonization white
The country-specific responses described in previous sections showed heterogeneity,
so it is important to explore the effect of excluding some countries that may be
driving the aggregated (pooled) results presented above.78 As a result, the EA-12
78 Another possibility is to calculate variation coefficients, provided the relative dispersion (stan-
dard deviation) for the period; it is defined as ζ =
σ(.)
x(.)
, where σ(.) is the cross-sectional standard
deviation for a group of EA countries (EA-12 or EA-10) and x(.) is the mean for the same definition
of the group. Values of variation coefficient seem more or less close to the changes in dispersion
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group is modified by excluding one so-called programme country facing the most
serious restrictions on its fiscal policy behaviour (Greece), and another country
with very sound fiscal policy and specific structural characteristics (Luxembourg).
Figure B.3 in the appendix shows the dispersion of responses calculated for this
EA-10 group (without Greece and Luxembourg). I repeat exercises from the last
section on this sample of countries (calculation of dispersion of responses and also
output gaps).
The measure of harmonization (standard deviation) for the EA-10 group
provides somewhat different picture compared with the EA-12 figure. This difference
arises from the EA-12 excluding Greece, whose responses have been determined by
supervisory bodies, and Luxembourg with rather specific fiscal policy behaviour.
It shows a decline and an increase in dispersion just before the Maastricht Treaty
period, followed by a reduction in the mid-1990s (below 0.10), see figure B.3 in
the appendix. Afterwards, dispersion hovered around that level until the Great
Recession, when another decrease followed during the second recession period in
the aftermath of the ESDC. From 2013 onwards, dispersion has been basically flat
around 0.05. This picture does not reveal any major change in dispersion as a result
of institutional changes, apart from the Maastricht Treaty and a stabilisation effect
seen after the last change at the end of 2012.79
Repeating the same exercise for the optimal rule (FR II) generated fiscal
responses, with only small differences; see panels in figure B.7 in the appendix.
In the case of EA-12 countries, there is an increase in the late 1980s, followed by
a reduction of dispersion around the Maastricht Treaty (from 0.16 to 0.09). An
increase of dispersion in the first quarters of the EMU is mitigated (to about 0.12),
and the same holds true for volatility pattern before the ESDC. There is also a
decline of dispersion visible after 2010 (to about 0.05) that is partially reversed
in the last quarters of the sample period. For the EA-10 group (see lower panel
of the same figure), plotted dispersion is again very similar. Apart from a small
level effect (lower dispersion), there is a visible effect of the Maastricht Treaty in
this specification, which is then partially offset in the EMU period. Similar to the
recently described dispersion of EA-12 countries, there is a decline and a sluggish
increase at the end of the sample period with much more reduced volatility during
measured by standard deviation over the sample period. However, this characteristic is problematic
because of the unboundedness revealed during the financial crisis period. Specifically, ζ is a very
large number since the calculation of the mean is affected by extreme values. I therefore do not
report these values.
79 A very similar picture is also obtained for EA-12 without Luxembourg (EA-11) or for an even
smaller group – EA-8, that is EA-12 without Austria, Finland, Greece, and Luxembourg (EA-8).
Both sets of results are available from the author upon request.
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the first decade of the Euro.80
Turning to the output gap series, I check robustness by calculating the dis-
persion of EA-10 countries’ output gaps. This check reveals that the distinction
between both series is more similar than in the case of fiscal responses. While the
dispersion of fiscal responses was only declining or stable (see description above),
the dispersion of output gaps resembled the recently described case of EA-12 coun-
tries in figure B.4 in the appendix): a decline and an increase before the Maastricht
Treaty (from 0.75 to above 1.25), a reduction before the launch of the Euro (at levels
around 0.50), more or less stable dispersion until 2005, followed by an increase that
peaked in 2010 (single peak), and a gradual decline.
3.5.4 Is a high degree of harmonization necessarily a bad thing?
A higher degree of harmonization of fiscal policy in a monetary union can be viewed
as a potential problem since individual member states would behave as one, that
is, as a (large) closed economy. One particular reason for concern that has been
discussed at great lengths in the literature, is the risk associated with negative fiscal
spillover effects during periods of economic difficulties. In a series of papers in and
around 2012 some authors (for example see Bagaria et al., 2012; Holland and Portes,
2012 or DeLong and Summers, 2012) tried to make a theoretical point by analysing
the risk of fiscal tightening leading to self-defeating recessions, especially when fiscal
measures are applied in countries forming a monetary union.
Particular attention was paid to the combination of the existence of a zero-
lower bound on nominal interest rates (ZLB, henceforth) when the interest rate
channel of monetary policy does not work, and/or liquidity constraints in the case of
EA (or EU) countries. This on-going debate since 2009, see the ‘introductory’ paper
by Barell et al. (2009), has highlighted several key aspects, such as (see Holland and
Portes, 2012): the multiplication effects of fiscal measures not only depend on a (1)
country and time, including cyclical position and broadly defined institutions such
as financial institutions, but also on (2) the type of ‘instrument’ utilized (revenue
or expenditure side), (3) on the composition of economic agents in the economy,
that is, (non-)Ricardian behaviour, and (4) the links provided by the movements of
financial capital and flows of goods and services.
If one finds a scenario of sequential or simultaneous fiscal tightening plausible,
what would be the possible alternative that could prevent that from occurring? To
80 The dispersion for stand-alone EU-3 countries is also rather similar. There is a level effect –
dispersion is larger in absolute terms –, increases from 1997 to 2003, and declines during the Great
Recession period, and is followed by an increase in the last quarters of 2014 and 2015, see figure
B.8 in the appendix.
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begin with, one mechanism is linked to the OCA theory, which highlights that this
type of risk would be mitigated or even eliminated in the case of a large and effective
system of transfers within a monetary union (‘risk sharing’). However, van Rompuy
et al. (2012) report in late 2012 points out that this ’risk sharing’ condition does not
seem to be the case in the Euro Area (or the EU) at the moment. This report simply
echoes conclusions already made in EC (1977); EC (1977a) and in Delors (1989).
Moreover, a recent comparison of the US economy and their fiscal federalism, to
that in the EU (see D’Apice, 2015) reveals that on average, estimated transfers only
amounted to 1/4 of a percent of GDP of the EU, and were almost equal to zero for
the Euro Area. Conversely, the US reached 11/2 percent of GDP (over the period
1980–2005) and increased to about 9% of GDP during the Great Recession. The
achieved level of harmonization could thus pose a threat for economic growth given
the very low level of ‘federal budget’ flows in the EU/EA (currently represented by
flows from and to the European budget). This is another problem related to the
increased harmonization of national fiscal policies, especially in the zero-lower-bound
environment that is echoed in Portes and Wren-Lewis (2015).81
It seems that the current EU budgetary system would have to be reformed
in order to represent an efficient tool in policy-makers’ toolkit.82 There is also a
system of payments related to the Structural funds, whose purpose is very different,
and whose re-allocation would represent a challenge. While countries in trouble
would be forced to request help from the ESM fund, this fund is basically restricted
to provide support in crisis situations.
Other possibilities discussed in the literature are related to degrees of fiscal
centralisation in a monetary union, and mainly draw on literature concerned with
the effects of fiscal federalisms (dating back to the late 1950s or early 1970s, see
a summary in Evers, 2015). These discussions cover a wide range of alternatives,
spanning various levels of revenue sharing (‘equalization’) up to a full fiscal union,
that is, the existence of a supranational fiscal institution. A few recent studies have
even attempted to investigate the effects of such fiscal arrangements in relation to
81 This recent study recommends larger interconnectedness of rules of the Pact with aggregate
demand (member states’ cyclical situation). Moreover, when the probability of reaching the ZLB is
larger than 50% (forecasted by a central bank), the rules would be temporarily disabled. However,
such a change of the ‘rules of the game’ would call for another mechanism that clearly sets up ways
of dealing with the consequences of the freeze, and supposedly large increase in public indebtedness
that would follow.
82 Estimates of the importance of fiscal transfers have been declining since the pioneering studies
of Sala-i-Martin and Sachs (1992), which suggest that up to 40% should be compensated by trans-
fers. More conservative estimates of around 10% are later suggested by Asdrubali et al. (1996).
Estimates for the Euro Area have been much lower and indicate lower efficiency, see Sørensen and
Yosha (1998).
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the current state of affairs in the Euro Area. Simulations in a stylised two-country
DSGE model (see Evers, 2015) reveal that simple tax revenue sharing would not be
particularly helpful if an asymmetric shock occurred. On the contrary, it would bring
about a large volatility in macroeconomic indicators (consumption and production).
However, a fiscal union (a common fiscal authority) would meet expectations in
terms of smoothing and regional income insurance (about 30% of regional income).
Another aspect of my analysis relates to the fact that fiscal rules cannot be
viewed as a panacea. Studies as early as the work of Kydland and Prescott (1977)
shows that they can sometimes be suboptimal. Although they can help countries
carry out sustainable fiscal policy while preserving macroeconomic stability, as with
any simple rule, they are subject to ‘specification’ and enforcement issues.83
The European fiscal policy framework currently faces several parallel chal-
lenges, leaving aside the problems associated with inadequate transparency or the
challenge of enforcing rules that are watered down and made inefficient by exceptions
and ‘balancing’ actions of the Commission. The increased harmonization of national
fiscal policies has raised the question of how to address crises without making eco-
nomic problems worse. One way of making the current, rather complex system more
transparent would be by removing the long list of exceptions and special circum-
stances that are a ball and chain for the modified Pact. Although they were adopted
with good intentions to make the clear and simple fiscal rules (Pact) more flexible,
they come at the cost of increased complexity and reduced enforceability.84 A more
promising approach is a combination of a simple fiscal rules with an independent
fiscal institution (see Fata´s and Mihov, 2010 for references). Such an approach is
especially helpful in cases when a strict requirement of meeting the rule’s conditions
may be suboptimal for the short-term or medium-term, consequently creating a
long-term issue. An alternative would be the introduction of some sort of a Golden
rule and a simple debt ceiling with or without automatic restriction on spending
when that limit is reached, if for example, combined with an independent fiscal au-
thority. The latter has already been implemented in many countries in the EU/EA.
If the debt level was low enough, it could also help deal with idiosyncratic shocks
without the necessity to introduce further fiscal mechanisms at the supranational
level. However, that is not observed across EU/EA countries in the post-ESDC
period. Since that alternative does not seem to be plausible in the near future, one
83 For example, Fata´s and Mihov (2010) highlight that natural diversity of national government
opinions and vested interests towards fiscal priorities can create tensions among stabilisation policies
inside a monetary union.
84 Similar remarks on possible fiscal policy arrangements (the need for simplification, open access
to information, etc.) have been made, for example in Deutsche Bundesbank (2015).
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has to think of using existing institutions such as the ESM to accumulate resources
(‘rainy days’ fund) to be used in countries affected by idiosyncratic (asymmetric)
shocks. The necessary resources could be raised by negligibly increasing the current
system of mainly output based (GNI) contributions, than by completely changing
the current system. Such simple solutions may have a chance of being implemented
rather quickly since policy-makers are very aware of the problem, and realise that a
change would help them deal with future crises at lower costs, thus, increasing their
chance of remaining in the office.
3.6 Conclusions
The primary importance of sound (sustainable) fiscal policy in a monetary union has
been repeatedly highlighted, both in the theoretical literature, and policy-makers’
documents for individual members and other participating countries. Therefore,
this chapter aimed to shed some light on the effects of a few essential institutional
changes that directly influence national fiscal policies in the Euro Area. Even before
the Great Recession, various measures were already implemented in the form of
institutional constraints placing limits on the behaviour of fiscal policy variables
(deficit, and government debt). Nevertheless, a series of recent events that have
shaken up several Euro Area members has revealed the simple truth – despite having
spent a significant amount of time and effort in repeated attempts to boost the fiscal
resilience of the monetary union towards endogenously generated shocks by setting
anew, the rules of the ‘fiscal game’, fiscal policy has remained an Achilles heel of
the European integration project.
For my empirical analysis, I utilized a simple tool for modelling fiscal pol-
icy behaviour suggested in the literature. A country-specific fiscal behaviour was
approximated by two types of fiscal rules. One that followed macro-fiscal response
literature (in line with the Leeper (1991) or Bohn (1998) type of literature), the
other resembling a Taylor rule, that is, a micro-based, optimal fiscal rule (in line
with a model by Kirsanova et al., 2005). These rules were estimated using a com-
bination of time-varying parameter techniques and Bayesian methods to produce
a path of estimated coefficients. These estimates explicitly showed any changes in
fiscal behaviour as a result of institutional changes controlling for relevant determi-
nants. In order to do that, I created a novel quarterly dataset of fiscal and economic
determinants covering twelve EA members and three stand-alone EU countries, cov-
ering the period 1980q1–2015q4. Since fiscal variables were not readily available at
quarterly frequency for all EA/EU countries and the sample period, they were recon-
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structed using a Bayesian decomposition method, following Giannone et al. (2015)
and Ban`bura et al. (2015).
To summarize the findings, my results showed that the process of institu-
tionalization of fiscal policy for EA countries was grouped by their debt levels. In
only a few countries, the Maastricht Treaty resulted in differentiated fiscal behaviour
over the pre-Euro period. Conversely, the Pact and its modification had some more
broad impact on national policies. The last set of results are related to changes
and attempts to address the causes of a worsening of fiscal indicators during the
Sovereign Debt crisis. Though these changes seem to have triggered responses, they
were also not explicitly associated with high debt countries. There were no signifi-
cant behaviour changes in the case of the three stand-alone EU countries chosen as
a control group.
As a part of the analysis, I also addressed another question related to the
effects of changing institutions on the harmonization of fiscal behaviour across EA
members. Some evidence was presented that fiscal responses (estimated coefficients
on debt variable in fiscal rules) were already harmonized, measured by their stan-
dard deviation, even before the Maastricht period that led to a small decrease in
dispersion in the EA-12. However, that trend started to change before the launch of
the Euro. Changes during the first years of the monetary union had almost no im-
pact until the outset of the European sovereign debt crisis. That major disruption
of economic activity resulted in a new phase in EU-wide macro-fiscal regulation,
eventually ushering in a decline of dispersion of fiscal responses to levels comparable
or even below those from the 1980s. My results are robust both to the specification
of Bayesian estimation and the choice of a fiscal rule, and to the method used for
output gap calculation. Since the calculated quarterly output gap series show some-
what different behaviour over the sample period, they cannot be viewed as the only
(main) driver of fiscal harmonization. This finding is of essential importance for
the single monetary policy and its conduct. Nevertheless, a harmonization of fiscal
responses does not imply anything about the actual shape of fiscal policy. Mainly,
when the commonly utilized concept of Bohn (1998)’s sustainability is applied, the
median response for EA countries is positive but rather low. That seems to indicate
that despite the extra fiscal space provided by interest rates being unprecedentedly
low, in some countries even negative, the sustainability of fiscal policy may be easily
endangered by another unexpected shock, and lead to an economic downturn with
the need to actively use fiscal measures.
Naturally, there are many avenues for extension of my work. One or both
fiscal rules can be estimated either with four lags (or up to four lags) or with
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compatible growth rates of individual variables to compare my results with those
under the assumption of a traditional fiscal behaviour (yearly planning horizon).
It would be possible to re-estimate fiscal rules on aggregated series for the Euro
area and compare its behaviour with the pooled method utilized in the chapter. An
extension of my approach could include not only fiscal rules but also their monetary
counterpart (a stylised ECB response function), to see their changes and possible
interactions over years of monetary integration, and mainly over the Euro period.
A multilateral measure of harmonization could provide a clearer picture regarding
this issue. Since the choice and specification of priors is of key importance for
Bayesian techniques, it would be possible to extend this chapter by using a so-called
hyperprior, that is a prior distribution on a hyperparameter (see Amir-Ahmadi et al.,
2016). That modification would also allow to carry out sensitivity exercises (evaluate
uncertainty regarding a prior) by considering variations in the hyperparameter of a
prior. Another extension can be aimed to capture the effects coming from policy
changes, that is, to model variations in policy-makers’ fiscal responses completely,
following a similar exercise done for monetary policy rules (Primiceri, 2005). This
would be possible by employing a Bayesian TVP estimation allowing for changes in
volatility over time (fiscal regimes with more or less discretionary measures), and
would require a much longer time series than was available in this study.
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B.1 Data treatment
The main steps and data sources for creating the quarterly database of fiscal and
other control variables employed in this chapter are summarized in this section.
Following recent studies – Mauro et al. (2013) and Berti et al. (2016) –, Emphasis
was put on ensuring that the reconstructed time series was consistent over the
utilized sample period. In general, the main steps applied in the case of fiscal and
other variables were the following:
 Eurostat databases are the primary source of fiscal quarterly series (total
deficit, gross debt, interest payments, and non-interest expenditures, in ESA2010
standard often available only from the mid-1990s to 2015); see Eurostat, 2016;
Eurostat (2016a,b).
 In case that series was not available, yearly series were taken from a database
published by the European Commission (Annual macro-economic database,
AMECO henceforth, see EC, 2016b). If they were available only partially
(usually public debt series but not primary balance series), the Historical Pub-
lic Finance Database (HPFD, henceforth, see Mauro et al., 2013) providing
both series was preferred as the main source for both primary balances and
public debt series.
The HPFD series were linked to AMECO series by utilizing growth rates of
HPFD series to the first data point (observation) available in the AMECO
database if necessary.
GAFS series (government support to financial institutions) came from a Euro-
stat database on the excessive deficit procedure (EDP) notifications provided
by individual member states (see Eurostat, 2016a). GAFS are values that
represent budgetary impact of government actions to support financial insti-
tutions and/or financial markets over years of the Great Recession and/or the
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European sovereign debt crisis. They are available from 2007. As of the end
of 2015, only three EA countries have not reported any GAFS values (Esto-
nia, Malta and Slovakia, as of the end of 2016). GAFS series are then related
to auxiliary fiscal measures (one of the so-called one-off items) not stemming
from the outstanding value of government debt, budgetary situation or a sit-
uation in financial markets as a result of one or both of them. GAFS are also
excluded when assessing programme countries by international organisations
such as the IMF; for further details see van Riet (2010).
 Once yearly series for the time period were completed (1980–2015), they were
imputed into a mixed frequency database (quarterly series alongside yearly
ones) to check consistency of yearly and quarterly country-period observations.
There were only minimal differences between the yearly values provided by
the AMECO database and sums of reconstructed series (since quarterly series
reflect seasonal adjustment, minor differences (< 0.5%) are to be expected
because of rounding, etc.).
 Missing observations for fiscal variables were reconstructed using country-
specific information contained in series (unemployment, CPI index, govern-
ment short-term [3M or its proxy] and long-term interest rates [10Y or its
proxy], GDP and Government consumption)i by employing the Kalman filter
and Bayesian approach, as described in (Giannone et al., 2015 and Ban`bura
et al., 2015); for further details on individual series see text below.
 Since series of quarterly output gaps were not readily available (only yearly
series), they had to be calculated using the Baxter-King (BK) band-pass fil-
ter and the Hodrick-Prescott filter (HP filter).ii The utilized dataset contains
quarterly GDP observations (prior to 1980q1 from the same OECD Quarterly
National Accounts database, QNA henceforth, see OECD, 2016a) that can be
used to extend the sample period. Moreover, the OECD Economic outlook
(EO No. 99 from June 2016, see OECD, 2016) contains forecasted quarterly
GDP. Both are used to evaluate this exercise.
To mitigate the issue with the beginning and end of quarterly GDP series
i Extending this set of variables to a larger one by adding: consumption, investment and current
account balance, led to similar values of reconstructed fiscal series.
ii The BK filter (BK12(6, 32)) was used as a benchmark in line with Market and Ravn (2007).
Even though this study also derives a formula for optimal HP filter, my interest is not in finding
an optimal business cycle for the group of countries. Thus, for the sake of comparability, it is left
as another robustness check for further research. The closest approximation to the widely used HP
filter is BK12(2, 32) according to Baxter and King (1999). However, the HP filtered series were only
used for robustness checks in this paper because of the objectives explained in Hamilton (2016).
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(as a robustness check year-on-year growth rates in a particular quarter were
utilized), the main steps were the following:
firstly, I forecasted and backcasted up to four years (16 quarters) of GDP us-
ing an unconditional bivariate VAR(p) model for log differences of GDP and
differences of inflation. The lag length p was selected via the Akaike infor-
mation criterion (AIC henceforth), following the recommendation of Watson
(2007).iii Since the original Watson (2007)’s approach works with time series,
including house permits that were not available for this sample (all countries
and years), quarterly series of industrial production and inflation (and interest
rates spreads) were used instead as a robustness check for output gaps gener-
ated using quarterly GDP and inflation (and interest rates).iv OECD series of
industrial production were already seasonally adjusted.
Both filtering techniques were applied on the extended GDP series, carefully
selecting the specification of the BK filter, and the HP filter as a robustness
check with a standard choice for quarterly series: λ = 1600 (see below).v
Next, all observations outside the sample period were excluded from further
estimation. Similar results were obtained when backcasted observations were
replaced with actual GDP observations. I therefore decided to use them in-
stead.
Alternatively, I repeated all previous steps using an alternative approach sug-
gested in Watson (2007) for reconstructing output gap series – an AR(p) model
for GDP without any covariates. I also followed another approach proposed
by Marcellino and Musso (2010) that uses GDP growth rates in an AR(4)
model, and also with country-specific AR(p) models to allow for differences
across countries in the sample (some catching-up, other developed countries).
An evaluation of forecasted/backcasted observations was carried out by com-
paring all results against the OECD forecast and OECD QNA database. All
methods performed well in terms of relative errors of predictions for the period
2016q1–2017q4. As a consequence, I decided to use the VAR(p) predictions
and keep the other version for robustness.vi
iii The optimal lag selection starts with the ‘rule-of-thumb’ recommendation for the maximum
number of lags as suggested by Schwert (1989) and commonly applied for lag selections.
iv OECD database contains quarterly and monthly series of permits issued for dwellings. For this
sample they were available since 1980q1 only for six (four EA) countries, and were not available at
all for some countries.
v Since the optimal lag length of the BK filter was larger than 12 for several countries, 16 quarters
of GDP were forecasted and backcasted, and not just 12 (three years) as recommends by Watson
(2007). That allowed to keep the sample period at the same length for all EA and stand-alone
countries.
vi Since the variables (GDP and CPI) are non-stationary, the transformations mentioned in the
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Secondly, output trends were calculated using the Baxter-King band pass fil-
ter that was applied to individual GDP series in order to find the best fit;
the standard specifications for most of the EA/EU countries (MA component
with 12 lags and the length of cycles between 6 and 32 months) were able to
provide smooth series (checked by periodogram). The optimal number was
higher in only a few countries (16 lags: Greece, Ireland and Sweden). In order
not to lose observations from the sample (which is usually a reason for using
the HP filter), four years of actual (backcasted) data were used with this filter.
The differences between both specifications of output gaps were negligible.
Thirdly, as a robustness check, I applied the HP filter with the standard
smoothing coefficient value λ recommended in the literature (equal to 1600,
for example see Ravn and Uhlig, 2002). In addition, following Perron and
Wada (2009)’s suggestion, an alternative corrected HP filter was considered
with the smoothing parameter equal to 8 · 105 (500 times the standard value)
to capture changes in the slope of the trend, and thus eliminate bias coming
from attributing too little variation to the cyclical component in comparison
with the trend component. However, I did not use this HP filter since it did
not effectively fit the given sample length. Lastly, I used the Christiano and
Fitzgerald filter with the cycles between 6 (min) and 32 (max) quarters, as-
suming that GDP follows Random walk with drift (process assumed for the
underlying data generating process). The main result was that the commonly
utilized HP filter could not be viewed as optimal since it did not filter out
cyclical frequencies of quarterly series, while the BK filter performed quite
satisfactorily.
In particular, for the reconstruction of quarterly time series of primary bal-
ances and public debt, the following steps have been done:
a) Fiscal variables – both debt and primary balances (net lending/net borrowing
series, B.9, with interests payable), all series were in levels in the ESA 2010
methodology – millions of units of national currency, not seasonally adjusted
– provided by Eurostat and DG ECFIN (AMECO database). Because of a
lack of quarterly observations before 1995 (public debt) and 1999 (primary
balance) for most of the Euro area/EU countries (except for Belgium, France
and Spain) and the United Kingdom, both series were reconstructed using the
text were applied to both series. I also experimented with a larger bivariate VAR (with differences
of unemployment rate and interest rate spread, as suggested by Watson (2007). However, results
were similar in terms of prediction errors, to the simpler model that was then kept (transformations
reduced correlations among variables).
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Historical Public Finance Database (HPFD), by applying growth rates calcu-
lated from level series;
The main challenge was the recalculation of the primary balance series for Lux-
embourg due to missing observations at the end of the 1980s (1988 and 1989). I
collected information on central budget from OECD Economic Survey of Lux-
embourg (OECD, 1986, 1988, 1989, 1990, 1992, 1994) and calculated growth
rates for budgetary out-turn and preliminary values for 1989 (no other values
are available even after consultations with staff working with fiscal data in the
Banque de Luxembourg) of net lending/net borrowing items. These rates were
applied to the AMECO database’s ESA 1995 series available for other years
in this period. Since estimates of interest payments are unavailable as well,
payments in both years were approximated with values representing linearly
decaying payments between the observed endpoints (1987 and 1990). This ap-
proximation is mostly likely overestimating the actual interest payments due
to the reduction of debt ratio, and fall in interest rates following the high-
interest rate period of the early 1980s (see OECD, 1990).
As a robustness check, (1) I kept primary balance unchanged or replaced
missing years with linearly approximated values (between endpoints), with
negligible impact on the level of primary balance and recalculated series re-
spectively and (2) I used a trend of interest payments for central and general
governments provided by the IMF GFS (Government Finance Statistics, cash
data, see IMF, 2014) with basically unchanged results.
Germany was treated as West Germany before 1990 and growth rates applied
to the first observation for the re-united country in 1991 using the HPFD
database (separate calculations for West Germany up to 1991 and for Germany
1990–2015 in comparison with the previous approach, had only negligible effect
on the output gap estimate, so the previous method was preferred).
b) Total current expenditures without interest payments were calculated from
underlying series of this National account aggregate using series from Euro-
stat database (quarterly, mil. of national currency, not seasonally adjusted),
using the exact definition provided in the methodological notes to the AMECO
database, and then complementing these with AMECO database and/or the
HPFD database (yearly series, for most of the EA countries before 1999). Since
they were at yearly frequency, quarters were created using the same decom-
position method as fiscal series. Consequently, three years (twelve quarters)
of observations were backcasted/forecasted via VAR(p) model, where its lag
length p was chosen optimally for each country in the sample (the AIC cri-
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terion). Subsequently, the BK and HP filter were applied to calculate trend
deviations of current expenditures, without intercept (cgoutt) that is used in
the fiscal rule.
c) GDP and its components (General government final consumption expendi-
tures, Private final consumption expenditures and Investments – Gross Fixed
Capital Formation) – real (2010 constant prices), nominal, both series sea-
sonally adjusted, came from OECD QNA Database and OECD EO No. 99
Database. No further adjustments were necessary;
d) Price index series (consumer prices, seasonally adjusted, national definition)
were obtained from the OECD EO No. 99 database;
e) Interest rates, both short term (3M interbank rates) and long term (10Y
bonds), were primarily obtained from Eurostat databases (Eurostat, 2016b)
and complemented with OECD EO No. 99, OECD Main Economic Indicators
database (MEI henceforth, see OECD, 2016b) and with IMF IFS database
(IMF, 2016) and AMECO database.
Missing observations of long-run interest rates for Greece (between 1989 and
1991) were approximated using growth rates from short-term interest rates
(both series are highly correlated over this period). As a robustness check, I
use information on average lending rates from the WDI database of the World
Bank (see WB, 2016) for Portugal, that faced double digit interest rates at
that period (as the only member of the EC) there is only negligible impact
on recalculated series or fiscal series. 3M series for Portugal obtained from
OECD database (1980q1–1985q4) are estimates, therefore, to keep the same
approach to series in the database, they were replaced using yearly observa-
tions and correlations with other series in line with the reconstruction of fiscal
series.
As a robustness check, missing observations for early 1980s in the case of Ire-
land were reconstructed with the help of growth rates based on short-term
exchequer’s bills provided by the Irish statistical office (CSO, see CSO, 2016),
with negligible impact on the series itself and fiscal variables;
f) Unemployment rates (Labour force survey, harmonized series – ILO definition,
seasonally adjusted) were taken from OECD MEI database and from IMF IFS
database;
g) Current account balances (according to the IMF’s 6th Balance of Payments
manual – IMF BMP6) were taken from OECD EO No. 99, seasonally ad-
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justed (ARIMA X-13) or calculated as a proxy, utilizing series of exports and
imports of goods and services (national account definition, annual levels, na-
tional currency, seasonally adjusted) from OECD EO No. 99 and OECD QNA
database.
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B.2 Figures and tables
Figure B.1: Examples of primary balances – original and adjusted,
1980q1–2015q4
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Note: GAFS series are non-zero for the Netherlands, Portugal and Spain since 2008, for Greece, Ireland and
Italy since 2009. PBAL – officially published series, PBAL adj – officially published series with adjustments
for GAFS. PBAL alt series in case of Spain is without GAFS items only between 2011 and 2015, and thus
not fully comparable since Eurostat provides non-zero GAFS observations from 2008; the plotted series is
based on a 2016 update of the dataset accompanying De Castro et al. (2014). Vertical axes are different for
some countries. Source: own calculation and Eurostat (2016); Eurostat (2016a). 115
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Figure B.2: Long run country-specific fiscal responses
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(g) France
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(i) Spain
Note: country-specific debt responses for FR I (median). Red dashed lines represent the credible intervals:
the 10th and 90th percentiles of the posterior distribution. Source: own calculations.
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Country-specific fiscal responses (cont.)
Programme countries
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Note: country-specific debt responses for FR I (median). Red dashed lines represent the credible intervals:
the 10th and 90th percentiles of the posterior distribution. Source: own calculations.
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Figure B.3: TVP fiscal responses for Euro area countries, 1985q1–2015q4
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Note: median debt response for EA-12, and EA-10 countries (EA-10 = EA-12 without Greece and Luxem-
bourg, based on FR I). Unweighted cross-sectional standard deviation of EA-12, and EA-10 TVP responses
(without Greece and Luxembourg, based on FR I). Dark areas are CEPR based recession periods for the
Euro Area. Red dashed lines (CI XX ) represent the 16th and 84th, and the 10th and 90th percentiles of the
posterior distribution of TVP EA-12, and EA-10 responses. The red vertical dashed lines represent quarters
relevant for institutional changes (for details see the main text). Source: own calculation.
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Figure B.4: Dispersion of output gaps, 1985q1–2015q4
EA-12
0
.0
0
0
.2
5
0
.5
0
0
.7
5
1
.0
0
1
.2
5
1
.5
0
1
.7
5
2
.0
0
2
.2
5
2
.5
0
1985q1 1988q1 1991q1 1994q1 1997q1 2000q1 2003q1 2006q1 2009q1 2012q1 2015q1
EA−12 MA−13
EA-10
0
.0
0
0
.2
5
0
.5
0
0
.7
5
1
.0
0
1
.2
5
1
.5
0
1
.7
5
2
.0
0
2
.2
5
2
.5
0
1985q1 1988q1 1991q1 1994q1 1997q1 2000q1 2003q1 2006q1 2009q1 2012q1 2015q1
EA−10 MA−13
Note: unweighted cross-sectional standard deviation of output gaps calculated with the BK filter for EA-12
and EA-10 countries (EA-12 without Greece and Luxembourg). MA−13 stands for the centered moving
average of length 13 quarters (symmetric filter). Dark areas are CEPR based recession periods for the Euro
Area. The red dashed line represents the launch of Euro in January 1999. Output gaps and their dispersion
is available since 1980q1. Source: own calculation.
Figure B.5: TVP fiscal responses for stand-alone EU countries, 1985q1–2015q4
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Note: median debt response for EU-3 (based on FR I). Unweighted cross-sectional standard deviation of
EU-3 TVP responses (based on FR I). Output gap estimated with the BP filter. Red dashed lines (CI
XX ) represent the 16th and 84th, and the 10th and 90th percentiles of posterior distribution of TVP EU-3
responses. The red vertical dashed lines represent quarters relevant for institutional changes (for details see
the main text). Source: own calculation.
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Figure B.6: Robustness checks – country-specific fiscal responses for Spain
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(f) Alternative fiscal rule (FR II)
Note: country-specific debt responses for FR I and FR II (median). Red dashed lines represent the credible
intervals: the 10th and 90th percentiles of the posterior distribution. Source: own calculations.
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Figure B.7: Robustness – TVP fiscal responses for Euro area groups,
1988q1–2015q4
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Note: median debt response for EA-12, and EA-10 (EA-10 = EA-12 without Greece and Luxembourg, based
on FR II). Unweighted cross-sectional standard deviation of EA-12, and EA-10 TVP responses (based on
FR II). Output gap estimated with the BP filter. Red dashed lines (CI XX ) represent the 16th and 84th,
the 10th and 90th, and the 5th and 95th percentiles of posterior distribution of TVP EA-12, and EA-10
responses. Dark areas are CEPR based recession periods for the Euro Area. The red vertical dashed lines
represent quarters relevant for institutional changes (for details see the main text). Source: own calculation.
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Figure B.8: Robustness – TVP fiscal responses for stand-alone EU countries,
1988q1–2015q4
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Note: median EU-3 debt response (based on FR II). Unweighted cross-sectional standard deviation of EU-3
TVP responses (based on FR II). Output gap estimated with the BP filter. Red dashed lines (CI XX )
represent the 16th and 84th, the 10th and 90th, and the 5th and 95th quantiles of posterior distribution of
TVP EU-3 responses. The red vertical dashed lines represent quarters relevant for institutional changes (for
details see the main text). Source: own calculation.
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Chapter 4
Consumption Responses to an
Unexpectedly Large Shock in
Public Salaries – Evidence From
a Government Intervention in
Hungary
4.1 Introduction
white white white white white white white
white white white
It doesn’t matter how beautiful
your theory is, it doesn’t matter how
smart you are. If it doesn’t agree with
experiment, it’s wrong.
[Richard P. Feynman (1918–1988)]
True natural experiments in social sciences are rather rare events, particu-
larly because it is difficult to trace exogenous and unanticipated shocks, such as
unexpected changes in income or wealth and their effects on consumption, savings
and other variables. In most cases, one has to rely on data from controlled experi-
ments in ‘artificially created environments’, such as laboratory or field experiments.
In the case of macroeconomic issues however, such experiments are unlikely for a
number of reasons (see Fuchs-Schu¨ndeln and Schu¨ndeln, 2015).
Since 2000 and mainly in the post-2007 period, governments in developing
countries have instituted many interventions in attempts to stimulate consumption
and consequently, economic growth, after unexpected shocks. As a consequence of
such government interventions, a number of empirical studies have explored how
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these interventions lead to changes in income, and corresponding effects on con-
sumption or wealth. Most interventions have been randomized but pre-announced,
that is, expected, such as tax cuts and rebates in the US economy in response to
two crisis events: (a) in 2001: Johnson et al. (2006); Agarwal et al. (2007) and
(b) in 2008: Parker et al. (2013).1 These studies provide evidence, either on the
basis of consumption expenditure surveys such as the US CEX (see Johnson et al.,
2006 or Parker et al., 2013), or on monthly credit card spending and debt series
(see Agarwal et al., 2007), that households responded in a, sometimes even more
than, modest way to these random but expected income shocks.2 Related estimates
of the marginal propensity to consume (MPC, henceforth) vary substantially, lying
between 0.3 and 0.9. These findings disprove the implications of the permanent
income hypothesis (PIH, henceforth), the Life-Cycle model (LCY, henceforth) or
Ricardian equivalence and give further credit to the liquidity-constraint-hypothesis
explanation (see Carol, 2001).3 However, only a few interventions have been ‘truly’
unexpected, such as Agarwal and Qian (2014) examining a ‘cash’ experiment in
Singapore, Jappelli and Padula (2014) exploring a change in the pension system in
Italy. My study belongs to this group and utilizes the same intervention as Telegdy
(2017), to study the effects of a change of public wages in Hungary. Nevertheless,
both types of studies are of key importance to policy-makers deciding upon changes
in direct or indirect taxation or pension and social system reforms (see Jappelli and
Pistaferri, 2010 or Fuchs-Schu¨ndeln and Schu¨ndeln, 2015).
In this chapter I identify a time period when there was an exogenous shock
to households lifetime resources as a result of an unexpected increase in the perma-
nent component of total (disposable) income. I study the reaction of consumption
expenditures to this shock in a quasi-natural experiment setting (in terms of Fuchs-
Schu¨ndeln and Schu¨ndeln, 2015’s terminology). The shock, a result of a government
intervention, is an unanticipated and unexpectedly large increase in the basic salary
(50%) of employees in the Hungarian public sector in 2002. This intervention rep-
resented a large share of total public employment since it affected 90 percent of
1 The ‘September 11’ event and a sluggish recovery thereafter, and the US sub-prime mortgage
crisis turning into the Great Recession.
2 Jappelli and Pistaferri (2010) point out that many studies on tax rebates, including those
from Regan’s tax changes or Bush’s temporary tax reduction, work with surveys on households’
expectations about their consumption plans or with questionnaires trying to discover households’
behaviour in such situations. As a result, they are both subject to limitations and mismeasurement.
3 A particular wealth situation can also affect consumers’ response to income shocks, assuming
that responses are driven by shocks affecting consumers’ employers. For example, Baker (2017)
found that consumption responses are stronger with increasing indebtedness, using a dataset of
individual income, consumption and wealth for the period around the Great Recession (2008–2012)
when shocks were rather frequent. However, these findings only complement previous findings for
wealthier parts of the US population because of the characteristics of the dataset.
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workers in the public sector.4
Given the characteristics of the intervention, I use a similar approach to
Jappelli and Padula (2014) in order to study effects at the household level, instead
of analysing individuals and their incomes. This allows me to compare household
heads that are directly exposed to the government intervention, with those that are
not, assuming that a variation in consumption responses is driven by a realization
of the income shock.5 I will consider households of public employees as the treated
group since this government intervention only targeted public employees, and I con-
trast this group with a control group of households of private employees and other
types of public workers. Because of limitations regarding consistent information on
the source of household incomes, I use a novel approach to select those that were
affected within a group of households. I calculate probabilities of working for the
public sector over an exhaustive set of occupational categories, using a novel individ-
ual dataset based on the cross-sectional Hungarian household budget survey (HHBS,
henceforth). This allows me to use a regression framework to identify the consump-
tion responses of households in response to the exogenous change in their income,
when controlling for relevant economic and socio-demographic characteristics.
A few studies have used a similar approach to analyse the effects of unex-
pected shocks to individual (household)’s income (wealth), in a quasi-experimental
setting, with perfect knowledge of individuals’ (households) types. For example,
Jappelli and Padula (2014) used this approach to explore a change in the pension
system of public employees in a cross-sectional dataset of Italian households. Their
difference-in-difference estimation revealed large increases in the income-wealth ratio
and a small reduction of the consumption-income ratio. Larger responses are found
for younger households and for households where more than one member works in
public sector. Several studies already in the early 2000s, such as Browning and
Crossley (2001), also explored the effects of exogenous changes in health conditions
or labour market situations, and their implications for consumption. Recently Agar-
wal and Qian (2014) examine a Singaporean government cash-bonus intervention in
2011 that only applied to citizens. They use credit/debt cards and bank check-
ing accounts to analyse the time-dimension-effect for consumption (announcement
and disbursement effect). Their difference-in-difference estimation reveals effects on
4 Those public sector employees who worked for publicly owned firms such as the national railway
company, MA´V, or the Hungary Post, Magyar Posta (separate employment contracts similar to
private sector firms), and workers in the judiciary system, were not affected by this intervention;
for details see below.
5 Although a ‘natural’ choice would seem to be the individual level, I chose this modelling
approach because controls for some household characteristics are only observed at the household
level in budget surveys.
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small durable goods and discretionary items, with stronger responses for liquidity
constrained individuals. Nevertheless, there are not many empirical studies that
document large permanent income shocks. In addition, this study represents one
of the first analyses of a shock – in a transition country –, that affected almost all
public sector employees, in a quasi-experimental setting. It also complements the
only other study (Telegdy, 2017) that uses the same salary intervention to study
public-private sector salary spillovers. He finds spillover effects in the case of male,
younger and highly educated current workers, while there are less effects for newly
hired workers whose bonuses are raised more than regular salaries.
The recipient side of government intervention is represented by households
surveyed in the repeated cross-section survey (HHBS) between 2000 and 2005, in-
clusive of the two years prior and two years after the intervention. The HHBS is a
representative survey of Hungarian households that is carried out regularly by the
Hungarian central statistical office (HCSO, henceforth), with quite a long history
compared to similar surveys in other European countries.6
The HHBS has very detailed information on household consumption, and
a rich set of socio-demographic household members’ characteristics. Since there
is no consistent (explicit) information on households members’ source of primary
labour income over the sample period, I propose the following identification strat-
egy. Firstly, I establish a link between the occupational categories of public and
private workers, and establish their primary labour income. Probabilities of work-
ing in public sector occupations that were directly affected by the salary change are
calculated (only a subset of all public sector workers, since for example, the judiciary
system was excluded from the salary increase). Employment data is sourced from
surveys by Hungarian firms and public sector workers, which were used in Earle
et al. (2012) or more recently in Telegdy (2017). This survey data covered around
three-fifth of the public sector and around seven percent of private sector workers
(of firms with five and more employees). Secondly, I use this (probabilistic) informa-
tion to select those among households that were likely or very likely to be exposed
to the unexpected increase in permanent income. Thirdly, after establishing the
occupational-sector-probability-income link, I proceed with analysing households’
consumption behaviour. Consumption behaviour is approximated with changes of
expenditures on a consumption basket or its individual components, employing two
standard measures: the level of consumption and average propensity to consume
6 This survey has been used for a number of mostly ad hoc research projects, and inter alia for the
calculation of inflation rates in the economy. Recent studies used HHBS data for a decomposition
of inflation rates in order to analyse household specific inflation (see MNB, 2015), and income and
consumption behaviour before the Great Recession (see Hosszu´, 2011).
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(APC, henceforth).
Given the structure of public sector employees remuneration, a change in
their base salary can be viewed as a change in the permanent component of their
total disposable income. Standard consumption theory postulates that the effects of
such an unexpected increase in income are associated with changes in consumption
expenditures at the household level. However, my findings are somewhat surprising:
there are significant responses for subcomponents of total consumption expendi-
tures (durable and non-durable), but no significant changes in total consumption.
I therefore propose an alternative explanation: In the early 2000’s, a change in the
system of subsidies on housing loans triggered a consumption boom7 that left many
households with higher actual levels of consumption expenditures compared with
their disposable incomes.
The salary increase thus led to a consolidation of ‘weak’ balance sheets in
households living above their means.8 This seems to be supported by some evidence
showing an increase in consumption (catching up effect) over the period 2004–2005.
Moreover, I argue that this unexpected income change may have unintentionally
prevented (together with regulatory restrictions on housing loans) a burst in loan-
driven-consumption bonanza, which occurred a few years later on the eve of the
Global Recession, in a more severe fashion.
The main drawbacks of this approach are related to the indirect identification
strategy, and the implicit assumption that there is no self-selection into public jobs
that would bias my results.9 To address these concerns I first show that, the results
remain robust when compared to alternative probability specifications of working in
the public sector (restricted to between 60% and 90%). I also show that there is no
significantly different path of income growth for other types of public sector workers
(public servants), and/or particularly significant difference in the salary trends of
private sector workers.
7 That strongly resembles Mian and Sufi (2015) illustration of the mid 2000s US credit crunch
(mortgage-bubble) unfolding into the most severe economic crisis since the Great Depression, or
Kumhof et al. (2015) alternative illustration that places more emphasis on income inequality and
indebtedness.
8 Since Hungary shares borders with Austria and there have been many links between both
countries (going back in time to pre-1989 period), it is not surprising that Austrian and Hungarian
consumption patterns are relatively similar despite a world of difference between the average income
in both countries.
9 Some advantages of public sector workers (for details see below) are more than compensated by
the larger number of benefits available to private sector workers, and the fact that public opinions
on jobs were not in favour of just one type of job sector. Moreover, public workers were exposed to
the same labour market laws as private workers (no indefinite employment guarantee), and many
professions had the alternative to set up private businesses (particularly within the health and
education sectors).
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The remainder of the text is organised as follows: chapter 2 briefly reviews
consumption theory, and provides a description of government interventions, and
their economic and institutional background. Section 3 summarizes the identifi-
cation strategy and describes the data sources and their adjustments. Section 4
presents the main results and robustness checks, and discusses them in the con-
text of other studies. Section 5 concludes and offers some suggestions for further
research.
4.2 Consumption and income link – what do theoretical
concepts suggest
4.2.1 A brief review of consumption theories
An individual (household, agent) maximizes the expected utility of a stream of
consumption over a (finite) period of time (t = 1, . . . , T ), subject to commonly
defined intertemporal budget constraints (IBC) and a wealth condition so that the
possibility of a Ponzi scheme is eliminated. If there is no restriction on an agent’s
access to credit markets, no difference between the subjective and objective interest
rates, and their utility function is assumed to be time and state separable, then the
(consumption) Euler equation for the agent can be expressed as follows:
(4.1)
U ′(Ct)
β(1 + rt+1)
= Et+1
[
U ′(Ct+1)
]
,
where β is the subjective discount factor (being the inverse of the subjective rate
of preferences, ρ) equal to ( 11+ρ), rt+1 is the real (market) interest rate (objective
discount factor) and Et+1[.] denotes the expectation operator.
The equation (4.1) states that the agent cannot increase their expected util-
ity from consumption by shifting available resources between any two periods (for
example t and t + 1). Already Hall (1978) shows that the condition (4.1) can be
transformed into the expression (4.2), where the expectation of the t + 1 period
consumption in the period t (Et[Ct+1]) is the current value of consumption (directly
substituted in below); similarly for the general case – marginal utility of consumption
is a martingale – without assuming certainty equivalence, that is, quadratic utility
function, see Deaton (1992), in cases where the subjective and objective interest
rates are equal:
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(4.2) Ct+1 = Ct + ξt+1,
where ξt+1 is the random innovation (martingale difference, Et[ξt+1] = 0) that con-
tains any information about innovations in any of consumption determinants.
However, there can be a change in (marginal utility of or) consumption when
expectations are not realised, that is, when evaluated ex post as shown by Jappelli
and Pistaferri (2010). The implication of this assumption (consumption follows a
Random walk) is twofold:10
 unexpected changes of income will affect (marginal utility of) consumption;
 expected (anticipated) changes of income will only have an effect on consump-
tion when new information about income becomes available (and will bring
about changes in the previously optimal consumption plan).
The magnitude of a consumption change will depend on other determinants
of the consumption profile, such as the type of income shock (size, length, etc.) and
the way in which an agent’s economic environment affects how they adjust their
consumption path. Jappelli and Pistaferri (2010) show that the implications of
the equation (4.2) can be verified via the orthogonality condition test (a weak test
for known values of determinants). When there is uncertainty around the values for
determinants, such as with work-related income, the equation (4.2) can be rewritten
to explicitly express the main consumption determinants, and their effects on the
optimal consumption plan (see ibid. for an example of only labour income as a
source of shocks).
Subsequent empirical tests have shown (see for example Friedman, 1957;
Deaton, 1992) that consumption responds differently when compared to the as-
sumptions of the standard (neoclassical) model outlined above. These tests not
only consider the type of income shocks, that is, the agent’s perception about their
nature, but also the time horizon, life expectations of agents, or utility function and
its exact specification.
To begin with, some realised income shocks are viewed as temporary (tran-
sient in their nature), such as winning a lottery, receiving dividend payments or ex-
tra work related emoluments such as money-like vouchers or bonuses. Other income
shocks are considered more permanent in their nature and associated with expected
10 As Deaton (1992) points out, the equation (4.2) – in consumption levels compared to its
‘marginal utility of consumption’ version – is not sensu strictu a random walk because of the
seldom occurrence of heavy tails (large outliers).
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changes, for example with professional career progress, ageing or major health prob-
lems such as serious illness or disability. That has resulted in a reformulation of the
stream of income (Y Dt ) into an income process, consisting of two components (in
the case of income or capital taxation a stream of disposable income):
(4.3) Y Dt = Y
P
t + Y
T
t ,
where Y Pt is the permanent income characterised as a random walk: Y
P
t = Y
P
t−1 +θt,
with the innovation θt, and Y
T
t is the transition income that follows an iid process.
Depending on the specification of a structural model for consumption (finite
or infinite time horizon), changes in disposable income result in changes of the
optimal consumption path. If a shock arrives and consumption does not respond
(unexpected shocks), the difference is automatically saved; for some examples of
unexpected temporary income shocks, see Fuchs-Schu¨ndeln and Schu¨ndeln (2015).
Secondly, there are alternative explanations for different types of behaviour
of consumption and income that is captured by the workhorse LCY model, which
are not necessarily at odds with the assumption of rational consumers. One expla-
nation is offered by precautionary savings models. This class of models changes the
assumption of the functional form of the utility function (to isoelastic), resulting
in a savings behaviour driven by changes in uncertainty of income processes. In
spite of this change, the main conclusions of the quadratic utility model explained
above remain unchanged – consumption responds to unanticipated changes only.
The consequences of income shocks cannot be easily established and studied in this
particular class of models. However, consumption responses can be worked out with
the help of various approximations. For example, Blundell et al. (2008) point out
whether there is a dependence on the size, length of a shock but also on individual’s
and broader economic environment pertaining characteristics such as a type of wel-
fare or pension systems. The other class of consumption models are so-called buffer
stock models (see for example Carol, 2009). Perhaps closer to observed reality, these
models assume that consumption responses are additionally affected by the discount
rate. In this environment, there is a reduction in effects as a result of permanent
income changes.
Another unobservable factor that usually modifies responses is: the free avail-
ability of access to formal (external) financial and insurance markets that is assumed
in the standard model above or the necessity to use informal or self-insurance pos-
sibilities. In these cases, the effects of income shocks will be modified since liquidity
constraints tend to prevent the agent from responding in the expected manner, even
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in the case of unexpected permanent shocks (asymmetrical responses). The reason
for this behaviour being the unavailability of tools for the required adjustments in or
towards the optimal consumption path.11 Empirical studies do find larger responses
of households that are subject to liquidity constraints. However, a recent study by
Kaplan et al. (2014) relativises them by emphasising the effects coming from hand-
to-mouth consumers, who keep a large proportion of their wealth in illiquid types of
assets. For further explanation of the deviations from the standard LCY model of
consumption behaviour such as ageing and other demographics related factors, see
the early survey in Attanasio (1999).
More recent literature places more emphasis on the rational inattention ex-
planation (existence of inertia) or near-rationality of consumers. These based on
ideas in Reis (2006) help to explain differences in consumers’ responses such as
so-called excess sensitivity when pre-announced income shocks are of different mag-
nitudes. From this perspective, only those shocks that are large enough for an
‘irrational’ agent result in a new optimal savings plan. Others shocks can be simply
reflected in swings of actual consumption regardless of their sub-optimality. This
approach helps bridge differences in the literature related to excessive sensitivity.12
To summarise, in the aftermath of an income shock, the consumption of an
agent is expected to respond for unexpected income changes only under the strict
assumptions of PIH or LCY. Their response will depend on: (i) the agent’s charac-
teristics and preferences, (ii) structure of their economic and financial environment
(presence of any distortions in credit and insurance markets), and (iii) the type of
shock itself. Therefore, there is likely to be a lower consumer response in the case of
Hungary than otherwise, since it is a medium-level income (catching-up) country,
that does not necessarily meet some of the standard assumptions, such as a full
access to credit markets (see below).
4.2.2 Some stylised facts on Hungarian economy
Real economy and financial markets
Based on GNI per capita in USD in 1990 (World bank Atlas method), Hungary was
ranked as an upper-middle income country in terms of the World Bank classification
(see WB, 2017). Compared to other countries in the Central and Eastern Europe
11 While there is no observed consumption smoothing for negative shocks, there is still saving in
the case of unexpected (transient) positive shocks.
12 Previously, only small and regular payments, and not large payments, had been found liable to
this phenomenon, see for example an investigation of regular oil-related dividends in Hsieh (2003).
However, a more recent empirical evaluation of the same dataset by Kueng (2015) provides evidence
of near-rationality instead.
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(CEE, henceforth) region, Hungary was one of the most developed countries that
had been partially opened to foreign investors from Western countries, had a two-
tier banking system13, and had been represented in international organisations such
as the IMF (since 1982) even before the fall of the Iron Curtain (1989–1990). Similar
to other CEE countries, the governments’ ultimate goal was to fully integrate with
other European countries by joining the EU. The main barriers to this goal were:
a relative poor economic performance compared to other CEE countries in early
1990 complemented with a relatively high level of foreign currency denominated
debts, ‘soft’ budget constraints represented by providing support to state firms, and
relatively high dependence on imports, which increased when many foreign investors
opened production facilities across the country; for further details see Bokros and
Dethier (1998).
Having failed to restore internal and external balance, a ‘forced’ reform was
carried out in early 1995 under a newly appointed finance minister Lajos A. Bokros
(therefore so-called ‘Bokros package’). This reform included a new policy regarding
privatization of state-owned firms, a banking reform, and a redefinition of revenues
and expenditures of the government budget, mainly focusing on rather generous
welfare and pension systems (see Bokros and Dethier, 1998). Contrary to most
countries in the region, the Hungarian economy was not affected by the turbulence
of the Russian debt crisis (1998–1999), or by the ‘September 11’ event. GDP growth
remained stable throughout the sample period. However, rates of inflation were
somewhat higher compared with the other V-4 countries,14 and were mostly driven
by a stark nominal wage growth, accompanied by regular changes of central parity
in a crawling peg exchange rate arrangement.15 Throughout the period, inflation
rates were slowly reduced from double to single-digit values, resulting both from
an anti-inflation programme introduced by the ruling government in 2000, and the
introduction of inflation targeting in June 2001, with the first target was set at
4.5%± 1% for December 2002.
Private sector salaries grew at a relatively stable rate between 2000–2005
13 There was a very similar one tier banking system across other CEE countries, that is, com-
mercial banks were simply branches of the state central bank that were allowed to collect deposits
and grant loans.
14 The Visegra´d group of countries (V-4) represents a particular subgroup of the CEE (neigh-
bouring countries, originally at a higher stage of economic development compared to countries in
the CEE region) that played an important role in the process of regional integration before all its
members joined the EU.
The V-4 includes: the Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland and the Slovak Republic, with Slovenia
also sometimes taking part in joint initiatives.
15 With narrow bands (±2.25%) towards few currencies reflecting post 1995 trade patterns (pre-
dominantly to the ECU), after the financial mini-crisis with regular adjustments. Patterns later
widened to ±15% in 2001 and were completely abandoned in 2008 (see MNB, 2001b, 2008).
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(annually slightly above 51/4% in real terms), while public sector salaries were subject
to large fluctuations, with annual averages of more than 8.5%.16 These factors,
along with the anticipated EU accession, led to a speculative attack on the currency
(on revaluation of the central parity) with a peak around mid-January 2003. In
response, the central bank had to intervene in financial markets to substantially
reduce interest rates (by 100 base points, see MNB, 2003). The effect on interest
rates (both deposit and lending) was visible as they reached new lows in 2003, and
may have boosted what was already a strong demand for loans (mostly mortgages)
since the spring of 2002 (see below).
Remuneration system
Generally, public sector employees are subject to different remuneration schemes as
compared with employees in the private sector. As a result, public sector salaries
tend to be lower on average, compared to private sector salaries (negative premium).
The situation is worse for public sector employees in transition or emerging coun-
tries (including CEE countries), as compared to developed countries. This negative
premium is larger, and is supported by statistical evidence (see Adamchik and Bedi,
2000 for Poland or ECFIN, 2014 for new EU member states).
There are a multitude of possible explanations for these stylised facts (see
Adamchik and Bedi, 2000 or ECFIN, 2014): (a) specific market position of gov-
ernments in the provision of public goods and services, (b) different (alternative)
objectives and incentives, and public sector constraints (usually non-profit) allow
for the production of mixed or public goods with positive externalities/spillover ef-
fects, (c) unionisation of the labour force tends to be higher in the public sector,
(d) differences in productivity that reflect qualitatively different characteristics for
employees in both sectors, (e) job security, working hours, competitive pressures,
etc. (see also De Paola et al., 2014) and (f) other job-related characteristics that
are hardly directly observable in most cases, seem to play an important role in the
public sector (see also Borjas, 2003).17
The base salary of public sector employees tends to be based on a ‘salary-
experience’ grid, where ‘experience’ is simply represented by the seniority princi-
ple.18 The base salary is then adjusted by applying coefficients that reflect a par-
16 Weighted averages for both sectors, with weights based on total employment in individual
NACE categories. Own calculation based on WIIW statistical database for the main categories of
the NACE employment classification (see WIIW, 2015).
17 Naturally, this may lead to a self-selection of candidates for public sector jobs or conversely
for private sector jobs.
18 The grid system accords with the highest level of education attained by the employee.
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ticular type of organisation within the public sector (central institutions vs. local
administrative vs. publicly-owned firms). Moreover, there are usually (up to two)
extra salaries in a year that are not commonly linked to the performance of the in-
stitution, and a range of supplements based on an employee’s profile that allow for
greater differentiation within public institutions. Therefore, any salary increase can
come from two sources, a change of the base salary (either automatic or discrete),
or when any of the other remaining components is amended.
The salary system in Hungary at that time followed these general rules that
were embedded in the public sector remuneration system (for further details see
Telegdy, 2017 or ECFIN, 2014): a salary grid for public workers with coefficients
allowing for experience/education differentiation, various allowances, a thirteenth
salary and ad hoc supplements. Before the unexpected income change, the govern-
ment was increasingly pressured to change public sector salaries, since they were
kept broadly unchanged as compared to those in the private sector. As a result,
there was a negative public income gap in 2002 before the government intervention,
and public sector salaries were on average more than 15 percentage points (pp)
lower. In addition, the Hungarian public sector was prevailingly subject to factors
such as a higher share of women and/or employees with higher levels of education.
In particular, regular adjustments of the minimum wage in the period 2000–2002
resulted in many public workers’ salaries falling below new thresholds.19
Another factor warranting serious consideration is the existence of larger
shares of grey sector activities in some private sector occupations (compared to
public sector). This grey sector source of income is not often captured in surveys
(wage/salary/income under-reporting). For example, artificially low incomes can be
supplemented with side cash payments in some services, while expenditures could
be recorded ‘correctly’ at household level if there was no artificial hiding of any
illegal sources of income.20 This option does not seem to be very likely since large
discrepancies could attract the attention of authorities. While this should be of
less concern for public sector employee income, they are still subject to other extra
sources of income from, for example, bribes (see Gorodnichenko and Sabirianova,
2007).21 Since the economy was growing at a fast pace during the sample period,
19 Minimum wage increases in 2001 and 2002 were rather important since they raised the minimum
salary in real terms; other changes throughout the period (2004 onwards) only compensated for
inflation; the minimum salary/average salary ratio followed this pattern between 2000 and 2005 (in
%): 29− 39− 41− 36− 36− 36; own calculation based on HCSO data.
20 Blades and Roberts (2002) has already questioned estimates based on a macro model that
edged up to as high as 25% for Hungary towards the end of the millennia, see Schneider and Enste
(2000), or an updated version in Schneider and Klinglmair (2004).
21 From time to time, workers in some occupations would receive ‘in kind’ items or cash for
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this unofficial part of the total income could have also increased enough to have sig-
nificant implications on consumption expenditures. Given the potentially exposed
occupational groups and the estimated size of these effects, these dynamics could
affect both durable and (some) non-durable consumption expenditures.22 In addi-
tion, estimates of ‘omitted’ activities, shown in Blades and Roberts (2002), may not
necessarily only be linked to the non-observed economy (grey and black), but may
also reflect structural changes and standard problems that statistical offices have to
deal with in emerging economies (mismeasurement, hiding of consumption expendi-
tures or ‘forgetfulness’ in the case of some expenditure items). Therefore, it can be
rather challenging to perform an accurate comparison of income to consumption in
both sectors.
Government intervention – (post-)election ‘surprises’ and welfare system
changes
There were several salary changes in Hungary in 2001 and 2002 (see OECD, 2004)
that may have been motivated by the early 2002 elections. The reach of these
changes was however, rather limited. The first change in July 2001 was aimed at
civil servants and public order officers, and the other from January 2002 was targeted
to different public sector employees, such as public order officers and army officers.23
However, the autumn 2002 increase had far reaching effects because of its impact
on a significantly larger number of public employees (few hundreds of thousands vs.
units of thousands). This second 2002 salary increase came in the wake of a newly
established government promising, and (somewhat surprisingly) almost completely
delivering changes in the welfare system following their pre-election promises.
Although an April 2002 general election (two-rounds on 7th and 21st of
April) saw the opposition (MSZP, Hungarian Socialist Party) winning the popu-
lar vote (by about 1 pp in percentage), they still had fewer seats than the ruling
party (FIDESZ, Hungarian Civic Party). Thanks to a coalition with a liberal party
(SZDSZ, Alliance of Free Democrats), the MSZP formed a coalition government
with a narrow majority in Parliament, ousting the incumbent prime minister (Vik-
services provided or for getting preference for treatment, as ‘presents’ and not necessarily as extra
payments.
22 In order to analyse this effect, one would need more detailed information about the income
structure of households going beyond what is currently available in the HHBS. Such information
would help to identify members who work for the public and/or private sector with high probabilities
of being exposed to such types of side payments coming from ‘customers’.
23 Although public servants’ salary adjustment in 2001 primarily affected coefficients applied to
the base salary (15%, see Telegdy, 2017), the ‘real’ effect in terms of salaries was larger. OECD
(2004) states that the size hovered between 35% and 55% for both groups. The early 2002 increase
was differentiated: public order officers (15%) and army officers (55%), see ibid.
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tor Orba´n and his three-party right-wing coalition) from the position. While the
results of the first round of voting were somewhat surprising, the second round
of voting only confirmed the previous election results. The responses of financial
markets can provide some guidance on the extent to which a particular result was
unexpected (an election result, an announcement, a decision). In case of the official
announcement of Hungary’s 2002 elections (first round), the markets responded in
a number of ways.24
The soon-to-be prime minister (Pe´ter Medgyessy) publicly pledged to in-
crease the salaries of public employees (in a meeting on May 24), just a few days
after he took office in mid-May, and even before the coalition agreement was signed
(May 26) and he and his government were officially approved by the Parliament
(May 27).25 Soon after (May 31), during the first press conference of the newly
formed government, a series of to-be-realised measures were officially announced
(action programme), inclusive of measures to improve the welfare system and meet
most of their pre-election promises.26 Among those who benefited from the new
programme were: students and pensioners with low incomes, and public employ-
ees.27 This set of measures was later on dubbed as a ‘100-day action programme’,
and was followed by another ‘100-day programme’ later in the summer of that year
(targeting underdeveloped regions and support for families, see ORIGO, 2017).28
24 Daily yields on government bonds moved between 1.3% and 0.8% across maturities (3 − 15
years). The HUF/euro exchange rate depreciated by about 0.1% after the announcement; own
calculation from OFX, 2017, also visible in official daily announced exchange rates by the MNB
(see MNB, 2017). This was partially reversed after the release of second round results, as both the
coalition’s entry into office and their parliamentary approval brought about a mild depreciation and
increase of bond yields. However, the markets’ reactions to the results could have been affected by
the fact that the first trading day after the announcement was the next Monday, that is, after two
days of no trading and the accumulation of pertinent election-related news.
25 The source of the exact timing of all individual events is a series of newspaper articles – various
European newspapers between May 15 and July 15 – accessed via Europresse (2017).
26 Even though the Socialist party won the election with a program of changes and improvements
to the welfare system, the action programme can be viewed as a departure from previous election
norms where announced promises were simply abandoned in the post election period.
27 The first action programme from early June included one-off lump-sum allowances to people
receiving low pensions, increased support for academics (salary increases for scholarships and pen-
sions that were below the minimum wage were realised as early as July), and the unexpected 50 per
cent increase in public employees’ base salary from September, that would be seen in pay pockets
for the first time in October of that year. This increase was particularly important and significant
since base salary was around 85% of the total remuneration, see Telegdy (2017).
28 In the case of the first note about the programme, financial markets responded sharply –
daily bond yields jumped up by a few percentage points (day-to-day change across maturities
of 3 − 15 years) and kept increasing almost until the end of the next week. However, on the
day of its official announcement (press conference on Friday), and also a day before a correction
occurred, the exchange rate responded with a small depreciation on the day of the government’s
approval (∼ 0.2% day-on-day change of the last value of HUF/euro, also visible in the official daily
announced exchange rates by the MNB); the same data source as in the footnote 24 above. Even
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Despite the limited applicability of the salary increase that was applied to
the base salaries only, without effect on other public servants or employees in public
companies, this measure is called ‘a-50-percent increase’ (see Telegdy, 2017). How-
ever, this radical salary adjustment brought about severe fiscal imbalances, as a
budget deficit approaching 10% of GDP – only roughly estimated costs of these
two 100-day-action programs could add as much as 4 percent of GDP in additional
spending – sparked ‘criticisms’ from international organisations (EU, OECD), and
subsequently led to a (forced) fiscal stabilisation program; for further details see
OECD (2005); OECD (2007). This perhaps caused any further changes in the
salary system to be postponed to later years (2005 and 2006).
Moreover, soon after the approval of the new coalition government, there
were a series of political clashes between the new and old government, including
accusations of public finances mismanagement (in early June) against the former
right-wing prime minister and his government. Further political turmoil erupted
after a news leak revealed the new prime minister as a former spy.29 This resulted
in a new wave of accusations from both sides of the political scene and eventually
forced several politicians to step down, even from opposite (right) political parties.
Supporters of the previous right-wing government also organised protest marches
(mainly) in Budapest to demand the prime minister’s retreat, and later, in first
days of July, even demanding at least a re-count of election votes. However, the
situation slowly stabilised from the second half of July, as individual measures of
the 100-day programme started to work, and the government’s approval rates began
to rise.
Lending boom
The salary change described above was not the only measure that was likely to
affect household incomes and their resulting consumption. Some funds obtained
during the housing loan (mortgage) boom (see below) were often used for different
purposes than they were originally intended. On the verge of the credit boom in
2000, Hungarian loan ratios (debt to income, assets) were at very low, single-digit
levels, compared to the double-digit levels seen in other Western European countries
at the time.30 That situation was not atypical in Hungary, but it was more or less
larger fluctuations occurred later on because of further events in the early days of July, see below.
29 A June 17th article in the conservative opposition-aligned newspaper Magyar Nemzet (‘Hun-
garian nation’) accused the prime minister of working for the Hungarian counter-espionage service
under the former communist regime. He acknowledged that fact on June 19th; see Boyes (2002).
30 The share of mortgages (as percent of GDP) was a mere 2.2% in 2001 but increased to 9.5%
in 2004, while the share of household loans jumped from 7.5% to almost 20% over the same period
according to Palacin and Shelburne (2005).
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a common feature in almost all V-4 or more broadly in CEE countries, reflecting
underdeveloped financial systems (historical heritage), and regional behavioural dif-
ferences such as, preference of a saving concept over loan-based purchases of durable
goods. However, individual (private) ownerships of homes and flats (∼ 9/10 of house-
holds) was much more prevalent in Hungary, compared with rather high communal
or collective ownerships in other EU transition countries of the region (or the V-4);
for a comparison of CEE housing markets see for example Palacin and Shelburne
(2005) and references therein. Also, while housing prices development in Hungary
had been growing at a very slow pace, without showing signs of a large price bubble
even during the run-up period to the Great Recession, the opposite occurred in for
example, the Baltic States, see Hildebrandt et al. (2012).31
The fast growth of loans was mainly linked to a government supporting
scheme (re-)introduced in the winter of 2000 (original conditions were eased already
in summer 2000) as part of the so-called Sze´chenyi Plan. After its final endorsement
in January 2001, it enabled even low and lower income households to access loans.32
This scheme involved interest rate subsidies (for further details see Kiss, 2002; Szalay
and To´th, 2003): (1) for issuers of mortgage securities (housing loans backed by
issuing mortgage bonds) and (2) for private borrowers (up to 60% of the collateral
value, local currency-denominated only) meeting rather strict but gradually relaxed
criteria. Although these subsidies were originally only for new homes, they were later
extended to existing homes in March 2002. As a results of this change, housing loans
were subject to a steep increase in quantity, and accordingly became relatively cheap
in comparison to standard consumer and other types of non-commercial loans.33
This buoyant trend in the early 2000s was also supported by: (a) the limited use of
credit cards since an overwhelming majority of issued cards belonged to the debit
cards category, and (b) high interest rate charges for consumer and other credits,
31 Nevertheless, there were periods of temporary fast price growth (during the credit boom de-
scribed below), particularly in the (greater) Budapest region in the new millennium before EU
entry, and a few traditional recreational regions.
32 A system of housing loan subsidies was introduced in the early 1990s (declining size over its
lifetime), and loans with an amortisation subsidy were aimed at stimulating the renovation, repairs
or refurbishment of older buildings and new developments, for details see Hegedu¨s and Va´rhegyi
(2000).
33 This change also led to a significant reduction of interest rates for non-subsidized housing
loans: by 5 pp when the average percentage rates of charge (APRC) was around 22% in 2000 for
new housing loans, but only around 14% in 2002. Similarly, rates for consumer and other types
of loans such as car loans were also influenced, see MNB (2001). For illustration, mortgage loans’
share of total lending increased from around 33% to almost 50% in late 2002, with a real growth rate
of 64%, and 34% for other types of loans (year-on-year for 2001), see MNB (2002). The majority
of lending was carried out in local currency and was realised as long-term loans; only about 10%
of loans in 2004 were in a foreign currency denomination (see Palacin and Shelburne, 2005). As a
result, households net savings position turned into a balanced one.
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only sluggishly reduced by means of financial institutions’ competition, going hand-
in-hand with previously high (double digit) rates of inflation, and a lack of necessary
institutional measures.34
This situation was not only affected by rapid loan growth, but also by the
modification of the loan subsidies scheme. In early 2004 a survey-based estimate
cited by MNB (see MNB, 2004) stated that between 15% and 30% of the loans for
existing homes were actually used for consumption purposes, because of widespread
home ownership, and credit constraints that lead to low amounts of other finan-
cial assets. This increased further when strong growth in household consumption
expenditures surpassed that of their real incomes. In comparison to some western
countries, loan-to-market-value ratios were rather low, and only exceptionally ex-
ceeded 60% in mid-2002 (according to MNB, 2002), with the statutory limit being
equivalent to 80% to 90% (see MNB, 2003).35 In response to signs of instability
and further systemic issues, particularly, rapidly increasing state budget costs, the
loan subsidies scheme was modified in June and again in December 2003 in an effort
to: (1) curb the demand of households for them and (2) change the 1 :3 ratio (new
vs. existing homes) to approximately 1 : 2 (see MNB, 2004). Anticipation of these
changes drove up consumers’ demand for these types of loans further, and their
share jumped by 20 pp within a year (from 55% to 75%, see MNB, 2004a). Already
in 2003 a GfK survey mentioned in ibid. revealed that three fifth of households did
not have any financial savings, and half of them belonged to low income deciles.
While there was an expected slow down after further regulatory changes,36 another
problem gradually emerged as demand was redirected towards foreign-currency de-
nominated loans (which led to the financial crisis in 2007).
34 One of the reasons for not using chip-equipped (credit) cards was to eliminate the possibility
of large frauds, such as those that took place in the early 1990s because of low credit card security
standards, for details see MNB (2002).
35 Even that value could have been too high, given particular characteristics of the Hungarian
housing market, such as high ownership ratio and the limited resellability of many properties.
In short, similar to other countries in the V-4 group, structural adjustment (reform) programmes
carried out in the early 1990s and high rates of inflation changed valuations of individual assets.
However, as the situation improved, the process of selling publicly owned houses and flats (from
1992 in Hungary) increased supply compared to demand. A description of the Hungarian housing
market’s early development can be found in Valkovszky (2000).
These dynamics started to reverse around the beginning of the new millennium, mainly driven by a
rapid increase in prices in (greater) Budapest, and speculation on price increases in the wake of the
EU accession that peaked in 2003, see Vadas (2007). Importantly, MNB (2003) provides a piece
of information on real residential property prices; they were 75% higher in 2001 compared to 1997
(and in 2002 and later because of construction activity).
36 Nevertheless, a further restriction of conditions took effect in 2005 (only new homes, younger
generation, value of property for loans, etc.), see MNB (2004b).
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4.2.3 Identification strategy
In this section I present the main steps of my identification strategy. As already
mentioned, I link employment and budget data to analyse the effects of the salary
change on consumption. Households are represented by household heads that are
identified using a standard approach, that is, as adult members of households with
the highest total (gross) income.37 The definition of a household, as being equivalent
to a consumption unit, enables to analyse consumption behaviour around the salary
change for a larger number of different types of expenditures, since it dampens the
problem of missing observations (expenditures of a particular type). Moreover, it
seems to be rather innocuous to assume that household consumption profiles are
primarily driven by their heads (families) controlling for main household character-
istics, particularly in case of durable consumption items.38
The identification of income shock effects is rather challenging since the
household budget survey (HHBS) does not contain any precise information about
the type of employment (sector) for any adult member of a household over all years of
interest. The HHBS offers an indirect way of selecting ‘treated’ households from the
others since there is a 4-digit standard classification of occupations’ code (FEOR-93,
that is, the Hungarian version of international occupation classification, ISCO-88)
among a list of various characteristics of an adult.39 The same classification codes
are available both in the employment-income survey and in the HHBS, and the
employment survey covers both private and public workers. It is thus possible to
use the code classifications to calculate a measure of public coverage of individual
occupations (‘jobs’) in the economy.
In my analysis I use a measure that represents age-gender-occupation spe-
cific probabilities (occupational probabilities) that represents the probability that a
37 Alternatively, one could define household heads using other criteria such as age, gender, which
are also commonly utilized in empirical studies.
I also define a new classification using the original datasets to match the number of households as
follows (for a similar treatment of household heads, see for example Gorodnichenko et al., 2009):
the person with the highest primary labour income; in the case of younger/older households with-
out any labour income: male or the oldest person in the household. The original dataset used the
highest earning person in the household; alternatively a male or the oldest person. The correlation
of both definitions of household heads was larger than 0.85 across the sample period (16+ sam-
ple). Moreover, there were less households with missing primary labour income in my definition of
household heads.
38 This is similar to Baker (2017) and his links across financial datasets and consump-
tion/population surveys. Alternatively, one can analyse the consumption behaviour of adult mem-
bers of a household such as unmarried couples or single persons sharing one household, which is less
common in Hungary than in more developed countries, in the case of unexpected income shocks.
39 For example the code 2431 represents Primary school teacher who belongs to the group 243,
Kindergartens and primary educational institutions teachers, trainers and educators are within the
subcomponent 24, Educators and teachers are a part of the group 2 Professional Occupations.
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member of a household (household head) of a certain age (between 18 and 60 years
or less) and gender works in the particular occupation j in the public sector. These
probabilities can be calculated using the following formula (4.4):
(4.4) Pr
occj
h, i, a, t =
N
occj
h, i, a, t
N
∑
(.)(j)
h, i, a, t
,
where N
occj
(.) is employment in occupation j in the public sector, N
∑
(.)j
(.) is the total
employment in the same occupation j across sectors (that is, private and public),
and the subscript indices of the Pr
(.)
h, i, a, t represent: a probability for a particular
individual (household member h), a gender (i), an age group (a), and a year (t)
respectively.
Since many household heads working in the public sector do not have their
main occupation according to the 4-digit classification, probabilities are calculated
for the 3-digit classification (as a robustness for the 2-digit classifications). Since
not all public workers were exposed to the unexpected increase, workers in the
judiciary system and public servants are not included in the public employees group
as already explained above. Additionally, employees in public enterprises were also
not included since their contracts are similar to private ones.
Calculated probabilities are then utilized to identify those household heads
(as likely or very likely) that work in particular occupations in the public sector.
Since the matching is ‘probabilistic’, a range of occupational probabilities between
60% and 90% (adjustable by using an interval of five percentage points) was used
to create the treated (affected) group of households, a likely-to-be-treated group of
household (with probabilities above 50% up to previous threshold), a likely-to-be-
control group of households (with probabilities below 50% and above the comple-
ment of 10% to 40%), and the control group consisting of households with (10%
to 40% probabilities of working in the public sector). This is illustrated below in
table 4.1. The robustness of these results is checked by moving between the lower
and upper bound for the control group, and changing the probability of working
in public sector by five percentage points. This check produces very similar results
results. Therefore, I set the benchmark results at a 70% probability of working in
public sector.40
40 Because the retirement age was lower at that time (mainly female workers), and to avoid any
retirement age related issues, probabilities were also calculated for the sample of workers between
20 and 56, or alternatively between 25 and 56 years (the narrowest definition of household heads).
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Table 4.1: Examples of groups of probabilities utilized for treated and control
group
Treated Likely treated Likely control Control
I. Prjt ≥ 0.60 0.60 > Prjt ≥ 0.50 0.50 > Prjt ≥ 0.40 Prjt ≤ 0.40
... ...
VII. Prjt ≥ 0.90 0.90 > Prjt ≥ 0.50 0.50 > Prjt ≥ 0.10 Prjt ≤ 0.10
4.3 Data and preliminary empirical evidence
4.3.1 Income and consumption dataset
Data come from various sources since there is no unique survey providing detailed
information on both characteristics in the desired structure. The employment (in-
come) component makes use of a database complied by Telegdy (2017), while the
consumption component comes from yearly published Household Budget Surveys
by the Hungarian central statistical office (HCSO). These sources are supplemented
with data from a cleaned and harmonized dataset provided by a research unit of the
Hungarian Academy of Science.41
The income-employment dataset makes use of the Hungarian Wage Survey
Data conducted by the National Employment Office every year in May. Beside the
information on a type of employment contract (private or a type of public), few
further socio-demographics and economic characteristics are collected (gender, age,
occupation, structure of earnings, working conditions, region and a dummy variable
for new workers).
Employment data are collected differently depending on the type of sector.
Workers in the public sector (public employees and public servants) working for
organisations run by central and/or local public authorities are sampled exhaustively
for most organizations.42 For those that do not have a centralised accounting system,
the same rules apply as for the private sector.
Data on private sector employment are collected by the size of firms: there
41 Mainly to check and harmonize series of expenditure items that changed definitions and labels
(codes) over the sample period.
42 Public sector employees account for about 85% of the sample since they represent most of
workers across public healthcare, education or administration. Employees in the judiciary sys-
tem are excluded since they are subject to different types of contracts (no unexpected increase in
salaries). Similarly, employees in publicly owned firms are subject to labour laws, and are therefore
merged with those operating under private system contracts. Moreover, the sample excludes (af-
fected) employees in some specialised professions (employees protecting lives and wealth), however,
consumption data are available for all types of workers and have to be adjusted accordingly.
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is a random sample of small firms (up to five employees) that are required to report
information on all their employees. The same full reporting system is used for all
firms with less than 50 employees since 2002. In the case of larger firms (originally
with employment above 20, from 2002 above 50 employees), only information on
selected workers born at particular days in a month is collected.
Because the differences between both sub-samples of the survey are impor-
tant to its representativeness on the national level, private firm series were adjusted
with the help of the National Tax Authority (providing information about all double-
entry book firms, for details see Earle et al., 2012). Similarly, data on public units
were adjusted with the help of records on employment in education, health care,
administration and the other public sector activities. The final dataset contains
full time employees only (18 through 60 years) with personalised weights allowing
consistent aggregation across occupations and sectors. However they do not have
their own ID and can be followed over time only using their characteristics. The
random sample coverage of both sectors is approximately two-third and seven per-
cent (public and private sector respectively), see Telegdy (2017) for details on the
data construction.
A brief inspection of table C.11 (and also table C.12 in the appendix) reveals
that the structure of public workers is different in some aspects compared to that
of private sector workers. There are many more workers in manual professions,
including technicians or specialists. Public employees are also older in terms of
average age and more represented by females. Also, their experience structure (not
shown) is shifted towards higher values, that is, they tend to stay longer in the
sector, and the share of newly hired workers is somewhat lower compared to the
private sector.
The second source of data in the dataset is the Hungarian household budget
survey. It is one of the longest-running in Europe and also in the world, dating as
early as 1949.43 However, owing to institutional changes, there are natural differ-
ences in the survey’s coverage or its structure over the period. The current structure
has been used since 1993 (with some changes in 2002 and 2005, see below), with sur-
veys conducted every year. Because of interest in the unexpected change of salaries,
my sample is restricted to the period 2000 through 2005. Compared with other bud-
get surveys, quarterly series for Hungarian households are not available (because of
the survey structure).
Households for the HHBS are selected utilizing a stratified random sampling
method (two stages), and the survey covers a total of around 9000 households in a
43 Probably the oldest is a Swedish survey, whose beginning can be traced back to 1907.
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year. For the analysis, sample sizes vary between 4500 and 6500 households with
active household heads between 18 and 60 years (as a result of relatively low labour
participation rates – around 62%, and a rather fast ageing population; some statis-
tics are in table C.13 in the appendix). In the first years of the HHBS, households
were followed over a few years and medium-run characteristics could be constructed
(three-year rotating panels, between 1993 and 2001), see Kapita´ny and Molna´r
(2002). That type of survey was subsequently replaced with a rotating panel of
households similar to the US CEX survey (only cross-section information is avail-
able or cohort (average) characteristics). Moreover, between 2004 and 2005, the
survey was partially remodelled (income information and more detailed COICOP
structure up to 4th level) to be consistent with the labour force survey (LFS) that
was harmonized across EU countries.44
For the dataset, the same caveats hold as with its well-known western coun-
terparts, particularly, regarding the coverage of very low and very high income
households, and misreporting issues (for details see Eurostat, 2003 or Eurostat,
2008).45 Income and expenditure data are obtained from both one-month-kept
income and expenditure diaries. Information about irregular expenditures (for ex-
ample on housing) and annual income are collected in follow-up interviews. Field
workers conduct two personal interviews at the beginning of the survey (basic in-
formation on households, in spring), and at the end of a year, in order to collect
further information (see above) on the household and their members. The interviews
provided a comprehensive source of information since they capture many household
characteristics (demographic, professional, individual), as well as information about
household’s dwelling (type, location, appliances), wealth or borrowing-related char-
acteristics (some characteristics vary over time, such as questions related to daily
commuting, or those releated to income/economic situation expectations).
For this study, all income and expenditure series were converted to real
Forints (HUF) with the base year = 2005. For the analysis only households with
positive amounts of expenditures or income are considered.46 As a robustness check,
44 The quality of data from HHBS meets standard quality requirements for budget surveys.
However, the survey is not represented in a few dimensions (see Eurostat, 2003; Eurostat, 2008 or
Hosszu´, 2011), such as coverage of very poor or very rich people because of high rejection rates.
A small bias is introduced since the aggregation of individual expenditures in the HHBS represent
approximately 85% of the national account aggregate across the sample period. As a robustness
check, one could also rescale all individual expenditures and re-estimate the model specification.
45 Misreporting may stem from attempts to hide some expenditures (called ‘guilty pleasure’ items)
such as, alcohol and cigarettes belonging to the category ‘conspicuous consumption’, which could
arouse suspicion from authorities, or simply ‘forgetfulness’, typing errors, etc.
46 The exclusion of the bottom and top 1% households – for income or expenditures – does not
affect results significantly.
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Figure 4.1: Income ratios in private vs. public sector, 2000–2005
(a) full sample
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(b) full sample by gender
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Note: differences in earnings of public and private sector employees, full sample for both surveys (18–60
years), weighted data for the population (see main text). Source: own calculation.
new household heads were calculated to represent the highest earning person in the
family. Comparisons to the official (HCSO) definition of households show that be-
tween 85% and 90% of heads remained the same in the 16+ sample, or between 75%
and 79% in the most restricted sample (25–56 years old heads). However, this mod-
ification resulted in a higher number of observations (households) with non-missing
or non-zero primary labour income. These results are summarised in the appendix.
The panels in figure 4.1 compare the income premiums for private sector
employees with those of public sector employees. The dynamics reveal a reduction
of the public income gap (from about 10 pp in 2001), and its reversal into a surplus
of approximately 12 pp in 2003 and 2004 going down to 9 pp in 2005. Panel b) of the
same figure plots premiums by gender and reveals the well-known fact that female’s
remuneration is on average lower than that of men: while differences for male public
employees was negligible in the years before and after the change when they turned
into a positive gap of about +20 pp, the negative gap for females (around -11 pp)
was reversed and stood at about +15 pp in 2005; for more evidence on different
trends for selected experience or gender or occupational groups around the year of
change see Telegdy (2017).47
Figure 4.2 provides evidence of a ratio of two medians for both real con-
sumption expenditures (x˜0.5) and real primary labour income, in both sectors. The
47 As shown in table C.11 in the appendix, around 3/4 of public sector employees are female.
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Figure 4.2: Consumption/income ratio for private and public sector,
2000–2005
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Note: probability of very likely working for public sector (Πj, t > 0.70) (left) and probability of likely
working for public sector (0.50 > Πj, t ≤ 0.70) (right), full sample (18–60 years, right). Household heads
with entrepreneur type of income (fully/partially self-employed) are not included in the figure. Source: own
calculation.
large ratio of median consumption and income in the early 2000s points towards
insufficient resources based on primary income only.48 For comparison, Jappelli and
Padula (2014) show consumption/income median shares for Italian households (also
defined for private and public sector) that partially overlap with the sample period.
For these households the shares oscillated between 0.7 − 0.8, and values above 0.9
were observed towards the end of 2000 for the private sector only.
48 There are two possible explanations: firstly, the figures show primary gross labour income as
being the only source of income, without any tax and obligatory social security payments being
subtracted/added. The figures do not reflect any secondary or other sources of incomes and/or
social allowances; similarly in case of grey economy’s side payments or artificial under-reporting of
household incomes from both sides of income distribution. Calculations based on HHBS data show
that all the aforementioned ‘extras’ amount to around 55% (on average) of gross labour income,
with various aid, allowances and benefits and obligatory tax + insurance payments largely netting
out themselves across deciles of households (see also Hosszu´, 2011). Therefore, it seems to be rather
a crude measure of ‘available’ income for households. Nevertheless, as it stands, on average, it would
not cover all expenditures in a year, and had to be complemented with the use of savings and/or
other types of income(s) (∼ 1/4 on average). Moreover, there is some evidence on ‘net’ APC of
households by deciles available: up to the 3rd decile was above 1.0 before 2004, while the average
for all deciles hovered around 90% (similar to national accounts averages) in the same period; for
details see ibid. This resonates with some early evidence showing average APC above 85% for
all households in the late 1990s, see MNB (2000). Secondly, it could point to a problem of the
consumption dataset, that is, lower quality income data in the survey (because of misreporting,
typos, etc.). This is a well-known problem of household surveys in many countries including the
UK or the US, see for example, discussions in Baker (2017).
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4.3.2 Estimation strategy
Prima facie evidence shown in the panels of figure 4.3 (or in C.1 – C.4 in the ap-
pendix) reveals some consumption related effects of the (un)expected salary change.
However, it cannot be viewed as fully satisfactory and therefore, the next step is a
regression analysis. This analysis helps to reveal the effects of the salary change (ex-
ogenously generated variation in income because of the government intervention) on
households’ consumption, while controlling for the socio-economic and demographic
characteristics of households. For that purpose the following model is estimated:
(4.5)
ln (consumptioni, t) = α+βPE ·PEi+βD×DPOST +βTE ·PEi×DPOST +Γxi, t+i, t
where ln(consumptioni, t) is the natural logarithm of total consumption expendi-
ture in year t of a household i, DPOST is a dummy for the post-increase period
(2003–2005), xi, t represents a vector of household specific and environment-related
covariates (the highest attained level of education, age and gender of the household
head, family size and region), and i, t is an error term. Alternatively, the left hand
variable is replaced with the ln(consumption/income)i, t variable, that is, with the
ratio of the natural logarithm of total consumption expenditure over primary labour
income in a year t for a household i, with the remainder of the model being the same
as model (4.5).
There are a few concerns about the validity of my results, related to the
assumptions for estimation. Firstly, whether the change of salaries is exogenous
with respect to consumption decisions of the household. Given the fact that the
change of public employees’ salaries in 2002 was unexpected (at least the actual
magnitude as I argued in previous sections), there is no endogeneity concern. The
reform was primarily aimed at improving the remuneration of public employees
compared to their private sector peers. Secondly, a more difficult assumption is that
the salary change should be exogenous regarding the sample composition. There is
only limited evidence of employment switches since the employment-income survey
only contains information about newly-hired workers, but no information about
their previous job.49 Telegdy (2017) provides some evidence on employment in the
private and public sector up to 2006 (unfortunately for all public sector workers
only) that reveals (compared to base level in 1998) a reduction in employment up to
2001, an increase between 2002 and 2003, and a decline until the end of the sample
period. In contrast, there is slowly increasing employment in the private sector
49 While that information could be obtained from an institutional database of all workers, I could
not gain access to that source and it is thus left as a future extension of this study.
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throughout the period. Therefore, I also compute a share of newly hired workers in
both samples to obtain some indirect evidence of workers’ turnover in both sectors.
While in the public sector it was oscillating around 7% up to 2002 and around
5.5% afterwards (and a declining trend), the private sector had a positive non-zero
trend throughout the period, reflecting an increase from about 9% to almost 11% at
its end. Accordingly, I cannot test this hypothesis explicitly with available datasets
since this evidence is rather indirect. Nevertheless, it seems that job market patterns
did not change (substantially) in the wake of the change of public workers’ salaries.
Since the probabilistic measure can vary from year to year, results are shown
for three specifications: with no restrictions on probabilities and with fixed distribu-
tions of probabilities before the unanticipated change (for 2000 and 2002 since 2001
is similar to 2000). Firstly, results for both specifications without covariates are sum-
marised in table 4.2. In columns two and three, there are models with occupational
fixed effects without time effects (TE), and with a restricted set of TE, respectively
(a linear time trend approximated by the variable year, column 3), and finally in
the next column (4), with both types of fixed effects. The last two columns repeat
the full two fixed effect specifications. The coefficient on the probability of working
in the public sector (Πj) times the post-treatment dummy (D
POST ) is highly signif-
icant, and has the expected sign across specifications. Its estimated size is around
0.1 (for models including any type of time effects). Results of the F-test are also
reported and confirm the significance of my specification. However, their values still
indicate rather weaker (imperfect) identification since they are close but somewhat
lower than 10 (∼ 9.3 for time varying probabilities in column 4). Nevertheless, I
proceed with the estimation and show results for the second stage.
The reduction of the sample for household heads between 25–56 years old (not
reported), and between 20 and 56 years does not change results substantially (see
C.1 in the appendix). The estimated effect of the post-treatment dummy and the
probability of working in public sector is slightly higher for time varying probabilities
(around ∼ 0.13), effects for fixed time probabilities is almost unchanged (around
0.09).
4.4 Empirical results
4.4.1 Baseline results
In the next step (second stage), development of primary labour income is linked to
the development of consumption (total expenditures on goods and services) and their
share on labour income (average propensity to consume). Subsequently I will explore
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Table 4.2: First stage results
time varying probabilities fixed probabilities
(= 2000) (= 2002)
Probability (Πj) -0.180*** -0.036 -0.043 0.013 -0.083**
0.036 0.032 0.031 0.027 0.033
Πj ·DPOST 0.397*** 0.117*** 0.117*** 0.095** 0.095**
0.003 0.033 0.003 0.038 0.038
year 0.066***
0.005
Constant 7.216*** -124.261*** 7.051*** 7.226*** 7.693***
0.036 10.189 0.0150 0.020 0.028
Observations 19357 19357 19357 21515 21515
R-squared 0.347 0.579 0.367 0.350 0.349
Occupation FE yes yes yes yes yes
Time FE no no yes yes yes
Lin. time trend no yes no no no
F-test 170.17 12.38 9.27 6.08 6.21
P-val 0.002 0.000 0.003 0.015 0.014
Note: Πj is the probability of working in the public sector. Calculation is based only on positive
labour incomes; for details see main text. Occupation FE and year FE not reported. Clustered
S.E. at the occupational level. Households heads between 18 and 60 years ∗∗∗ represents statistical
significance at the 1% level, ∗∗ at the 5% level and ∗ at the 10% level. Source: own calculation.
effects for selected subcategories of consumption such as total expenditures, without
strong life-cycle hypothesis (LCY) related expenditures on health and education
(category commonly used in PIH-LCY literature), or durables and non-durables.50
To begin with, averages of total household expenditures are shown in figure
4.3 (for probabilities of working in public sector equal or higher than 70%). Since
only yearly series are available, the first observation capturing the effects of the in-
tervention is in 2003, marked with red line in panels of the figure. Pre-change trends
(2000–2002) are relatively similar for the treated and control group of households.
Effects of the unexpected increase are less visible in the case of median total expen-
ditures, which is presented in panel b) of the same figure. If total expenditures less
health and education related expenditures are plotted, patterns are slightly different
and these changes of expenditure are more visible. For example, figures C.1 – C.4
in the appendix show the mean and median of total consumption for subgroups of
households, that is, household heads between 20–56 years, and for total consump-
50 The number of possible consumption aggregates to be utilized for comparison is limited because
the time series spans years from the early 2000s, where few changes in the HHBS methodology
occurred.
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Figure 4.3: Total expenditures – mean (left) and median (right), 2000–2005
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Note: all expenditures for household heads between 18–60 years, probability of working for public sector
(Πj, t > 0.70), trimmed data (positive value only) to eliminate outliers defined as those observations/years
below the 1st and above the 99th quantile. Source: own calculation.
tion expenditures less expenditures on health and education, that is, without the
two types mostly related to the LCY behaviour).
In the second step, I pool individual years of HHBS to create a pseudo panel
(consumption dataset) of Hungarian households organised by household heads (de-
fined on the basis of the main breadwinner in a family), as it is commonly done in
the consumption literature (following suggestions by Deaton, 1985 or Heckman and
Robb, 1985). Apart from running a simple specification of the model (4.5) for the
dependent variable, an extended model is added to include a set of explanatory vari-
ables (controls): age, gender and the highest attained education of the household
head,51 a measure of household size, and a regional dummy.52 This model specifica-
tion should not change the main conclusions since individual variables should affect
the strength of the change in income (reduced it). In case of a regional variation, I
use a regional dummy because the sample size for individual regions takes only the
value = 1 if a household lives in Budapest or the Pest region (mostly suburbs of the
51 The educational levels were defined as up to full primary education, secondary education
(finished with a GSCE type leave certificate or international baccalaureate including vocational
training), lower tertiary (up to bachelor’s degrees, special post-secondary education of a more
professional type, and upper tertiary for masters and higher degrees (PhDs).
52 The household size is restricted to eight, so that households with more than eight members
takes the same value; there are only a few observations of that particular size in the sample. I also
experimented with different consumption units as a proxy for the size of household, using so-called
OECD measures. Since there are negligible differences, the simple specification is preferred and
utilized across models.
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greater Budapest region, comprising around 20% of the yearly sample), and 0 for
any other region in Hungary.53 For the robustness section, I include seven NUTS II
regions based on that Eurostat classification of EU regions.54
Table 4.3 summarizes the results of the intervention in terms of the base-
line specification (for consumption columns 2 and 3, and for consumption/income
ratio in columns 4 and 5). In the second column, the simple specification reveals
that the consumption of public workers is lower (but not significantly) when com-
pared to private workers, by 0.02 (in log terms). The post dummy is positive and
statistically significant, which means a common trend of consumption expenditures
for both groups of workers. The interaction of post-increase dummy and dummy
for public workers is positive (increased consumption by 0.01 in log terms) but in-
significant. The next column of the table comprises household variables, controlling
for differences in consumption across households coming from similar age, gender,
household size, attained education, or region where they live (greater Budapest or
elsewhere). All of them have the expected signs and are statistically significant, and
the three main dummy variables associated with the effects of the salary increase
do not change sign or significance.55
The second to last and the last columns show results for average propensity
to consume (APC): Firstly, for the set of change-related dummy variables, and
subsequently for specifications with the same set of controls as in column 3. The
simple specification reveals negative and statistically significant differences in APC
between public and private households (-0.017). This was expected based on evi-
dence shown in figures above. Although it also indicates a negative trend in APC
shares in the post-change period, the effect on public workers (negative) is insignifi-
cant. The same set of controls utilized in the first part of the table reveal a negligible
but somewhat smaller APC for older household heads, heads with higher education
levels, and household heads living in the greater Budapest region. Conversely, as
expected from the theory, MPC of males and larger families is higher.
53 There are originally 20 regions in Hungary in the dataset available. Some observations are
rather small, amounting only to few per cent of the total sample, and therefore not meeting the
criteria of being an NUTS II level region specified by Eurostat, see Eurostat (2016).
54 These NUTS II regions include: central and northern Hungary, Transdanubia (3 sub-regions),
and Great Plain (2 sub-regions).
55 The additional controls are in line with expectations since consumption increases with age,
household size and attained education level. It also shows that living in the greater Budapest
region has a small but significant impact on the level of consumption. Moreover, consumption from
males is larger than their female counterpart.
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Table 4.3: Baseline specification
Consumption (log level) Consumption/income
DGOV -0.022 -0.023 -0.017*** -0.009**
[0.023] [0.020] [0.005] [0.005]
POST 0.118*** 0.102** -0.043*** -0.005
[0.045] [0.040] [0.009] [0.009]
G POST 0.005 0.030 -0.002 -0.008
[0.033] [0.029] [0.007] [0.006]
age 0.004*** -0.000**
[0.001] [0.000]
male 0.338*** 0.036***
[0.013] [0.003]
fam. size 0.062*** 0.015***
[0.007] [0.001]
secondary 0.241*** -0.037***
[0.018] [0.004]
lower tertiary 0.474*** -0.081***
[0.021] [0.005]
upper tertiary 0.640*** -0.091***
[0.025] [0.006]
Budapest 0.049*** -0.026***
[0.016] [0.004]
Constant 7.060*** 6.263*** 1.049*** 1.053***
[0.020] [0.046] [0.004] [0.010]
Observations 5,225 5,225 5,225 5,225
R-squared 0.014 0.260 0.044 0.182
F-test 24.45 183.6 80.01 115.7
Note: sample of households (20–56 years), with primary education. Standard errors are
reported in brackets. ∗∗∗ represents statistical significance at the 1% level, ∗∗ at the 5%
level and ∗ at the 10% level. Source: own calculation.
4.4.2 Age and consumption aggregate specific estimates
When the same specification is executed for a larger sample of households (18–60
years) or conversely for a smaller sample of households (25–56 years), results do not
change significantly. Alternative specification were estimated using a simple split-up
of the full sample to see how results vary across subgroups of households (public vs.
private employees/households). Three roughly equal groups were created: a group of
younger, medium and older age household heads, each representing approximately
1⁄3 of the sample: 20–35 years old, 36–45 years old and 46–56 years old. Results
for this estimation are shown in appendix tables nos. C.2 – C.4. While there is
no significant difference for the youngest group, in the case of the medium age
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group, there is significant effect in the extended specification for APC, where the
dummy for public worker times the dummy for post-change period is negative and
significant (higher income reducing APC). One can expect that these workers are
from occupations with higher salaries (upper levels in the public salary-experience
grid), where a change of the base salary results in larger increases in disposable
income, while controls preserve their signs and significance. However, the expected
positive impact on income with seniority is not confirmed in the last estimation for
older households, where only the specification for APC without any controls has
statistically significant variables of primary interest (public worker and the post-
change dummy).
So far my specifications included only the total consumption expenditures
aggregate. Since the aggregation procedure can hide some trends otherwise observ-
able, I carry out an analysis across consumption aggregates. Tables C.5 – C.8 in the
appendix present results for the base sample with and without controlling for the
same set of household determinants for selected sub-aggregates: (1) total consump-
tion aggregate excluding health and education related expenditures, (2) durable
consumption, (3) services and (4) food consumption.
While there are only minor differences for expenditures without health and
education, estimates for durable goods consumption show different patterns; in levels
where the post-change trend turns insignificant and the dummy for public sector
households becomes weakly significant (at 10% level). There are more changes
in the case of the APC model (both dummy for public sector households and its
interaction with post-change trend turn positive and are significant), while the post-
change trend still has a negative sign but turns insignificant. Also some of the
controls for the extended specification are insignificant (age, size or some educational
categories).56
In the case of the consumption of services, the level of consumption is similar
to the base estimation results. However, the APC specifications show that house-
holds of public workers consumed more services (coefficient 0.02), and there was an
additional statistically significant increase after the salary change (0.05). These re-
sults are confirmed in the extended specification, where both the dummy for public
workers (0.03), post-trend (0.03) and their interaction (0.04) are statistically signif-
icant with positive signs. In the case of controls, there were positive coefficients on
age (was near zero in the base specification), and on household heads who attained
the secondary level of education. However, there is no difference in consumption for
56 There are only negligible differences in the case of estimates for non-durable consumption.
Owing to space considerations, these are available upon request from the author.
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male and female headed households.
In the case of food consumption (food, beverages including tobacco and al-
cohol), differences in consumption levels turn significant (still with negative signs),
both without and with the inclusion of other determinants keeping their levels of sig-
nificance and signs. When looking at the APC specification, the post-trend dummy
is significant in both estimated models, the public sector dummy and its interaction
with post-trend dummy change signs (higher level of consumption in public sector
households) but only the interacted (G POST ) dummy in the model without co-
variates remains significant (the oppose it true in the case of the dummy for public
workers).
4.4.3 Robustness of base results
In this section I aim to address the main concerns of the estimation procedure, and
accordingly show that my results are not driven by violation of assumptions for
difference-in-difference techniques. One of the most important concerns is the exis-
tence of the same or very similar trends in consumption behaviour in both sectors.
The figures above showing the development of consumption already address this
issue. Nevertheless, Bell et al. (1999) suggest two estimation procedures to identify
any potential violation of this crucial assumption: (1) a placebo dummy in a reduced
sample, when the post-change dummy is shifted to a time before the actual change
happened (because of the sample structure, I moved it to 2001 and set it equal to
1),57 (2) the placebo dummy is interacted with the dummy for public sector workers
in the full sample (2000–2005).
I employ the model set-up shown in equation (4.5), but focus on the coeffi-
cient of the placebo dummy, whose significance would mean not passing the test for
the difference-in-difference estimator (the main identification challenge). In the case
of ad (1), the coefficient on the interacted dummy is not significant, which supports
the same trend hypothesis assumption (not shown). The same is true when the other
specification is estimated. I also follow Jappelli and Padula (2014) and include the
correctly generated post-change dummy (D POSTT ) and its interaction with the
public worker dummy. In terms of signs and size, their estimates are comparable to
the base estimates. This can be seen as another sign of robustness of my findings
(see table C.9 in the appendix).
The baseline specification and further (robustness) estimations control for
both the household specific environment and partially for the general (macroeco-
57 The use of this approach is rather limited since it means that there is only one year before this
change and one year after it – years after 2002 are dropped.
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nomic) environment, and thus increase the validity of the presented estimates. Fur-
ther robustness tests can be carried out to check for particular deviations from the
standard set of controls. For example, the set of household (family) controls could
be expanded to allow for different types of economies of scale within the family
(e.g. so-called OECD consumption units),58 the number and structure of non-active
members of a household (children in particular), finer education or age groups, or
localization determinants. In the case of geographical location, only the simple
dummy for the greater Budapest region versus the remaining regions is utilized.
Therefore, I conduct a robustness check using a set of seven dummies representing
the seven NUTS II regions in Hungary (see the footnote 54 above), with results
presented in table C.10. Although these dummies are not reported, the results are
quite similar to the baseline specification (A lower level of disaggregation such as
a national definition of regions or NUTS III regions, cannot be utilized due to a
limited number of observations for individual levels or a lack of detailed regional
information.)
Furthermore, robustness checks were also carried out after a decomposition
of total consumption into a few main aggregates and household head age groups.
I do not report these results since they were similar to those already presented.
Another set of robustness checks investigates sensitivity of my results with respect to
trimming the distribution of dependent variables, when smaller and larger amounts
of expenditures were eliminated (only zero observations or those below the 5% and
above 95% quantiles). These checks do not lead to significantly different results
compared to results presented in the paper.
4.5 Conclusion
Although a number of studies have explored the changes of income and their ef-
fects on individuals’ consumption behaviour, most of them have focused on events
that can only hardly be characterised as (truly) unexpected. This paper utilized
a quasi-natural experiment (government intervention) related to an unexpectedly
large increase of public sector employee in Hungary. This particular set-up allows
to estimate the effects of this shock on consumption behaviour of public employees,
which can be compared to that of private employees.
Because of data limitations, I construct age-gender-year-occupation specific
58 As already mentioned above, I try two alternative OECD consumption units except for the
simple size proxy utilized throughout the paper, and the results are comparable. Therefore, I prefer
the simple size variable since it is the most restrictive specification in terms of economies of scale
within a household.
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probabilities for the purpose of identification of employees subject to the government
intervention. These computed probabilities allowed me to link the information from
employment–income labour surveys with consumption expenditures and household
characteristics coming from the cross-sectional household budget surveys. While the
effect on employees’ labour earnings is identified and robust to alternative specifi-
cations, consumption responses (behaviour) did not show the large variation that
is expected in the case of standard LCY and/or PIH type of models and their pre-
dictions. Only some subcomponents of the total consumption expenditures (such
as services or durable consumption) show variation as a result of the unanticipated
change. However, when consumption expenditures are related to income (average
propensity to consume), my results show significant changes of these ratios. In addi-
tion, estimates for households grouped by household heads’ age show differentiated
responses for younger and older households.
How can these results be reconciled? One can think of the following two
possibilities. Firstly, the documented talks about the rather low pay of public em-
ployees, and salary increases in some sub-groups, may have resulted in some sort of
expectations of a change for the others (possibly related to the election campaign of
the main rival parties in 2002). In this case, the only question may have been ‘when’
and ‘by how much’ given the situation of public employees at that time. Therefore
some subsequent gradual adjustment of households’ consumption profiles could have
taken place. However, the change was much too large (even compared to previous
rather moderate changes) to be fully compatible with this explanation.
Secondly, given the description of the Hungarian economy and financial mar-
kets, particularly the dynamics around subsidized housing loans, there is some ev-
idence that loans were used for other purposes not directly related to purchases
or renovations of houses or flats. This redirection of funds would change both the
total expenditures and some of their specific subcomponents such as consumption
of (non-)durable goods. Although this ‘generous’ loan scheme was in use since end
of 2000, the main increase in the number of provided credits occurred in 2001 and
partially in early 2002, just before the salary change took place. In late 2002 and
early 2003 some households’ budgets were already constrained by loan repayments
and other outgoings. Therefore, it can be argued that the salary increase was not
reflected in already inflated levels of expenditures, but instead had the unintentional
effect of working as a safety net for constrained households facing serious financial
(repayment) difficulties in late 2003 and later. This explanation is further supported
by the observation that the group of treated households’ consumption expenditures
gradually caught up with those of the control group of households in 2004.
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There is still a great deal of room left for further research. Since households
are identified by household heads, it would be possible to analyse the impact on
households with more than one public sector employee and thus investigate differ-
ences in behaviour within public sector households. The combined dataset utilized
here only has a small sample of private companies, so one could utilize administra-
tive data to obtain the same information as in the case of public employees (and
further complement the information on public sector). As a result, the probabilistic
part of my exercise could be improved, to allow for a more detailed identification,
and perhaps ‘matching’ of public sector and private sector workers with the house-
hold consumption dataset. Such data enhancements on the income side would help
identify those household heads in the consumption survey that are now lost due to
missing observations. Future research could also aim to explain workers’ behaviour
(selected groups of workers), for example, their motivation to change their jobs
(mobility across occupations), and the qualitative characteristics of public sector
workers after such a large income shock.
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Appendix C
C.1 Figures and tables
Table C.1: First stage results (20–56 years)
time varying probabilities fixed probabilities
(= 2000) (= 2002)
Probability (Πj) -0.161*** -0.016 -0.023 -1.435*** 0.112***
0.036 0.032 0.031 0.025 0.028
Πj ·DPOST 0.406*** 0.128*** 0.126*** 0.093** 0.087**
0.034 0.035 0.040 0.040 0.040
year 0.065***
0.005
Constant 7.197*** -122.013*** 7.033*** 7.886*** 7.228***
0.036 9.890 0.0150 0.032 0.021
Observations 18229 18229 18229 20090 20090
R-squared 0.345 0.576 0.361 0.349 0.344
Occupation FE yes yes yes yes yes
Time FE no no yes yes yes
F-test 145.66 13.13 9.72 5.35 4.77
P-val 0.000 0.000 0.002 0.022 0.031
Note: for labour incomes larger than 0. Occupation FE and year FE not reported.
Clustered S.E. at the occupational level. Households heads between 18 and 60 years.
Source: own calculation.
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Table C.2: Baseline specification – younger households
Consumption (log level) Consumption/income
DGOV 0.040 -0.002 -0.039*** -0.027**
[0.052] [0.047] [0.012] [0.011]
POST -0.055 0.035 -0.039* -0.009
[0.096] [0.088] [0.022] [0.021]
G POST 0.100 0.025 -0.023 -0.017
[0.073] [0.065] [0.016] [0.015]
age 0.020*** -0.001
[0.004] [0.001]
male 0.367*** 0.027***
[0.030] [0.007]
fam. size 0.049*** 0.017***
[0.014] [0.003]
secondary 0.276*** -0.036***
[0.047] [0.011]
lower tertiary 0.445*** -0.063***
[0.052] [0.012]
upper tertiary 0.521*** -0.081***
[0.056] [0.013]
Budapest 0.020 -0.036***
[0.033] [0.008]
Constant 7.009*** 5.774*** 1.076*** 1.072***
[0.045] [0.147] [0.010] [0.035]
Observations 1,071 1,071 1,071 1,071
R-squared 0.006 0.214 0.090 0.207
F-test 2.284 28.88 35.14 27.72
Note: sample of households (20–56 years), with primary education.
Standard errors are reported in brackets. ∗∗∗ represents statistical
significance at the 1% level, ∗∗ at the 5% level and ∗ at the 10% level.
Source: own calculation.
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Table C.3: Baseline specification – middle age households
Consumption (log level) Consumption/income
DGOV -0.012 -0.011 -0.034*** -0.021**
[0.039] [0.035] [0.009] [0.008]
POST 0.159** 0.083 -0.024 0.014
[0.078] [0.069] [0.018] [0.017]
G POST 0.001 0.048 -0.018 -0.025**
[0.058] [0.050] [0.013] [0.012]
age 0.003 -0.000
[0.004] [0.001]
male 0.327*** 0.031***
[0.023] [0.006]
fam. size 0.036*** 0.010***
[0.010] [0.002]
secondary 0.232*** -0.059***
[0.033] [0.008]
lower tertiary 0.490*** -0.102***
[0.038] [0.009]
upper tertiary 0.638*** -0.112***
[0.045] [0.011]
Budapest 0.080*** -0.023***
[0.029] [0.007]
Constant 7.080*** 6.398*** 1.069*** 1.082***
[0.033] [0.165] [0.007] [0.040]
Observations 1,627 1,627 1,627 1,627
R-squared 0.024 0.273 0.052 0.175
F-test 13.11 60.64 29.97 34.31
Note: sample of households (20–56 years), with primary education.
Standard errors are reported in brackets. ∗∗∗ represents statistical
significance at the 1% level, ∗∗ at the 5% level and ∗ at the 10% level.
Source: own calculation.
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Table C.4: Baseline specification – older households
Consumption (log level) Consumption/income
DGOV -0.053 -0.036 0.002 0.007
[0.035] [0.030] [0.007] [0.006]
POST 0.156** 0.126** -0.056*** -0.016
[0.067] [0.058] [0.013] [0.012]
G POST -0.023 0.029 0.017* 0.007
[0.049] [0.041] [0.009] [0.009]
age -0.008*** -0.001
[0.003] [0.001]
male 0.330*** 0.042***
[0.019] [0.004]
fam. size 0.083*** 0.018***
[0.011] [0.002]
secondary 0.220*** -0.027***
[0.025] [0.005]
lower tertiary 0.464*** -0.077***
[0.030] [0.006]
upper tertiary 0.720*** -0.083***
[0.035] [0.007]
Budapest 0.057** -0.022***
[0.024] [0.005]
Constant 7.064*** 6.825*** 1.025*** 1.043***
[0.030] [0.155] [0.006] [0.032]
Observations 2,527 2,527 2,527 2,527
R-squared 0.014 0.296 0.027 0.189
F-test 11.88 105.90 23.03 58.76
Note: sample of households (20–56 years), with primary education.
Standard errors are reported in brackets. ∗∗∗ represents statistical
significance at the 1% level, ∗∗ at the 5% level and ∗ at the 10% level.
Source: own calculation.
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Table C.5: Robustness I – total consumption less spending on health and
education
Consumption (log level) Consumption/income
DGOV -0.022 -0.021 -0.017*** -0.009*
[0.023] [0.020] [0.005] [0.005]
POST 0.240*** 0.194*** -0.046*** -0.002
[0.047] [0.042] [0.010] [0.010]
G POST -0.019 0.013 -0.000 -0.009
[0.035] [0.030] [0.008] [0.007]
age 0.004*** -0.000**
[0.001] [0.000]
male 0.341*** 0.036***
[0.014] [0.003]
fam. size 0.060*** 0.016***
[0.006] [0.001]
secondary 0.242*** -0.037***
[0.019] [0.004]
lower tertiary 0.454*** -0.082***
[0.022] [0.005]
upper tertiary 0.631*** -0.092***
[0.026] [0.006]
Budapest 0.045*** -0.026***
[0.017] [0.004]
Constant 7.060*** 6.269*** 1.046*** 1.050***
[0.019] [0.047] [0.004] [0.011]
Observations 4,601 4,601 4,601 4,601
R-squared 0.041 0.286 0.046 0.191
F-test 64.88 184.00 73.86 108.10
Note: sample of households (20–56 years), with primary education.
Standard errors are reported in brackets. ∗∗∗ represents statistical
significance at the 1% level, ∗∗ at the 5% level and ∗ at the 10% level.
Source: own calculation.
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Table C.6: Robustness I – consumption of durables
Consumption (log level) Consumption/income
DGOV -0.035 -0.042* 0.006** 0.007**
[0.029] [0.025] [0.003] [0.003]
POST 0.061 0.064 -0.008 -0.006
[0.051] [0.045] [0.005] [0.005]
G POST -0.007 0.011 0.008** 0.007*
[0.038] [0.033] [0.004] [0.004]
age 0.007*** -0.000
[0.001] [0.000]
male 0.353*** 0.010***
[0.015] [0.002]
fam. size 0.063*** 0.000
[0.008] [0.001]
secondary 0.222*** 0.001
[0.023] [0.003]
lower tertiary 0.428*** -0.002
[0.025] [0.003]
upper tertiary 0.593*** -0.002
[0.028] [0.003]
Budapest 0.059*** -0.010***
[0.018] [0.002]
Constant 7.229*** 6.279*** 0.192*** 0.192***
[0.024] [0.052] [0.003] [0.006]
Observations 3,800 3,800 3,800 3,800
R-squared 0.003 0.264 0.002 0.018
F-test 3.99 135.60 2.17 7.11
Note: sample of households (20–56 years), with primary education.
Standard errors are reported in brackets. ∗∗∗ represents statistical
significance at the 1% level, ∗∗ at the 5% level and ∗ at the 10% level.
Source: own calculation.
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Table C.7: Robustness I – consumption of food
Consumption (log level) Consumption/income
DGOV -0.046* -0.057** 0.004 0.018***
[0.027] [0.023] [0.006] [0.005]
POST 0.142*** 0.139*** -0.097*** -0.044***
[0.050] [0.044] [0.011] [0.010]
G POST -0.027 -0.008 0.027*** 0.010
[0.037] [0.032] [0.008] [0.007]
age 0.004*** 0.000
[0.001] [0.000]
male 0.368*** 0.011***
[0.014] [0.003]
fam. size 0.066*** 0.012***
[0.008] [0.002]
secondary 0.257*** -0.052***
[0.023] [0.005]
lower tertiary 0.493*** -0.151***
[0.025] [0.006]
upper tertiary 0.651*** -0.193***
[0.028] [0.006]
Budapest 0.045*** -0.036***
[0.017] [0.004]
Constant 7.105*** 6.259*** 1.800*** 1.836***
[0.023] [0.052] [0.005] [0.012]
Observations 4,397 4,397 4,397 4,397
R-squared 0.011 0.280 0.063 0.348
F-test 15.66 170.30 99.27 234.6
Note: sample of households (20–56 years), with primary education.
Standard errors are reported in brackets. ∗∗∗ represents statistical
significance at the 1% level, ∗∗ at the 5% level and ∗ at the 10% level.
Source: own calculation.
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Table C.8: Robustness I – consumption of services
Consumption (log level) Consumption/income
DGOV -0.023 -0.026 0.025** 0.037***
[0.024] [0.021] [0.011] [0.011]
POST 0.124*** 0.105** 0.025 0.066***
[0.046] [0.041] [0.022] [0.022]
G POST 0.003 0.028 0.046*** 0.036**
[0.034] [0.030] [0.016] [0.016]
age 0.004*** 0.001**
[0.001] [0.000]
male 0.342*** 0.000
[0.014] [0.007]
fam. size 0.061*** 0.019***
[0.007] [0.004]
secondary 0.246*** 0.066***
[0.019] [0.010]
lower tertiary 0.480*** -0.000
[0.022] [0.012]
upper tertiary 0.644*** -0.036***
[0.025] [0.014]
Budapest 0.047*** -0.003
[0.016] [0.009]
Constant 7.062*** 6.249*** 1.560*** 1.432***
[0.021] [0.047] [0.010] [0.025]
Observations 5,002 5,002 5,002 5,002
R-squared 0.015 0.264 0.028 0.058
F-test 24.67 179.50 48.14 30.71
Note: sample of households (20–56 years), with primary education.
Standard errors are reported in brackets. ∗∗∗ represents statistical
significance at the 1% level, ∗∗ at the 5% level and ∗ at the 10% level.
Source: own calculation.
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Table C.9: Robustness I – pre-trend test
Consumption (log level) Consumption/income
DGOV -0.038 -0.022 -0.022 -0.013** -0.006 -0.005
[0.028] [0.024] [0.024] [0.006] [0.006] [0.006]
POST 2001 0.223*** 0.293*** 0.227*** -0.062*** -0.011 -0.017
[0.049] [0.044] [0.058] [0.010] [0.010] [0.013]
G POST 2001 -0.047 0.003 -0.010 0.008 -0.000 0.010
[0.036] [0.031] [0.041] [0.008] [0.007] [0.010]
age 0.005*** 0.004*** -0.000** -0.000**
[0.001] [0.001] [0.000] [0.000]
male 0.329*** 0.327*** 0.036*** 0.036***
[0.014] [0.014] [0.003] [0.003]
fam. size 0.103*** 0.104*** 0.015*** 0.015***
[0.008] [0.008] [0.002] [0.002]
secondary 0.258*** 0.247*** -0.039*** -0.037***
[0.019] [0.019] [0.004] [0.004]
lower tertiary 0.474*** 0.459*** -0.083*** -0.082***
[0.022] [0.022] [0.005] [0.005]
upper tertiary 0.655*** 0.633*** -0.094*** -0.092***
[0.025] [0.026] [0.006] [0.006]
Budapest 0.048*** 0.047*** -0.026*** -0.026***
[0.017] [0.016] [0.004] [0.004]
POSTT (2003) 0.092* 0.009
[0.055] [0.013]
G POSTT (2003) 0.024 -0.016*
[0.041] [0.009]
Constant 7.064*** 6.066*** 6.084*** 1.055*** 1.053*** 1.051***
[0.024] [0.053] [0.053] [0.005] [0.012] [0.012]
Observations 4,601 4,601 4,601 4,601 4,601 4,601
R-squared 0.022 0.292 0.299 0.052 0.189 0.191
F-test 35.05 189.3 163.00 84.31 107.1 90.22
Note: sample of households (20–56 years), with primary education. Standard
errors are reported in brackets. POSTT is the post-change trend (2003–).
∗∗∗ represents statistical significance at the 1% level, ∗∗ at the 5% level and
∗ at the 10% level. Source: own calculation.
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Table C.10: Robustness II – total consumption and regional trends
Consumption (log level) Consumption/income
DGOV -0.022 -0.016 -0.017*** -0.010**
[0.023] [0.020] [0.005] [0.005]
POST 0.240*** 0.195*** -0.046*** -0.000
[0.047] [0.041] [0.010] [0.009]
G POST -0.019 0.015 -0.000 -0.010
[0.035] [0.030] [0.008] [0.007]
age 0.004*** -0.000**
[0.001] [0.000]
male 0.339*** 0.036***
[0.014] [0.003]
fam. size 0.061*** 0.016***
[0.006] [0.001]
secondary 0.242*** -0.038***
[0.019] [0.004]
lower tertiary 0.452*** -0.082***
[0.022] [0.005]
upper tertiary 0.626*** -0.093***
[0.025] [0.006]
Constant 7.060*** 6.337*** 1.046*** 1.027***
[0.019] [0.048] [0.004] [0.011]
Observations 4,601 4,601 4,601 4,601
R-squared 0.041 0.292 0.046 0.196
F-test 64.88 126.00 73.86 74.64
Note: sample of households (20–56 years), with primary education.
Standard errors are reported in brackets. NUTS II regional dummy
variables not reported. ∗∗∗ represents statistical significance at the
1% level, ∗∗ at the 5% level and ∗ at the 10% level. Source: own calculation.
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Table C.11: Characteristics of employment samples
Public Private
2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005
Gender (share of female) 0.73 0.741 0.732 0.738 0.741 0.744 0.396 0.396 0.395 0.409 0.412 0.399
Age (years) 41.9 42.3 42.7 42.8 43.1 43.4 39.2 39.4 39.4 39.9 39.8 39.6
Occupation
Managers 0.084 0.084 0.081 0.082 0.085 0.085 0.114 0.111 0.110 0.105 0.104 0.104
Specialists 0.338 0.345 0.341 0.337 0.349 0.355 0.049 0.051 0.054 0.067 0.070 0.060
Technician, associate profession 0.263 0.266 0.272 0.280 0.280 0.278 0.166 0.167 0.170 0.174 0.177 0.178
Clerks 0.049 0.048 0.054 0.056 0.055 0.055 0.080 0.080 0.073 0.073 0.073 0.072
Sales and servicemen 0.071 0.070 0.066 0.061 0.059 0.057 0.089 0.092 0.100 0.103 0.108 0.112
Agriculture 0.003 0.003 0.003 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.020 0.020 0.021 0.020 0.019 0.017
Hand workers 0.026 0.025 0.026 0.025 0.023 0.023 0.265 0.270 0.253 0.239 0.225 0.228
Operators 0.018 0.017 0.017 0.017 0.016 0.016 0.143 0.141 0.141 0.137 0.140 0.147
Manual workers 0.148 0.143 0.140 0.141 0.132 0.130 0.072 0.069 0.077 0.081 0.085 0.082
Sample (ths. persons) 413.6 408.6 439.4 506.2 514.5 508.9 125.7 123.6 133.8 135.1 149.1 153.3
Note: full employment samples (18–60 years), weighted data for the population. Source: own calculation.
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Table C.12: Employment sample structure
Public Private
Sample Population Sample Population
2000 413.6 671.0 125.7 1948.3
2001 408.6 669.8 123.6 1952.7
2002 439.4 678.9 133.8 1858.0
2003 506.2 689.8 135.1 1859.5
2004 514.5 686.7 149.1 1923.2
2005 508.9 679.2 153.3 1888.0
Note: in ths. persons. The private sector values represent
those of double entry booking firms (with more than 5
workers). The public sector values are for all public sector
workers (civil servants and public employees without
workers in the judiciary system, and special (security)
forces – members of military forces, fire-fighters, the police
and border guards). Source: HCSO (2015), own calculation.
Table C.13: Budget survey sample structure
Household heads Household heads
(18–60 years) (20–56 years)
2000
Age = 44.1 Age = 42.4
N = 6266 N = 5356
2001
Age = 43.7 Age = 42.3
N = 6186 N = 5312
2002
Age = 44.1 Age = 42.6
N = 5956 N = 5080
2003
Age = 44.5 Age = 42.8
N = 4388 N = 3770
2004
Age = 45.1 Age = 43.3
N = 6730 N = 5789
2005
Age = 39.7 Age = 39.0
N = 7133 N = 6232
Note: sample for household heads between 20–56 years
reflects lower retirement age in Hungary in early 2000s.
Few household/year observations were dropped due
to typos, for example when the highest labour income
was found in case of children. Source: own calculation.
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Figures
Figure C.1: Robustness I: total expenditures – mean (left) and median (right),
2000–2005
Year of change
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Note: all expenditures for household heads between 20–56 years, probability of working for public sector
(Πj, t > 0.70), trimmed data (positive value only) to eliminate outliers defined as those observation/year
below the 1st and above 99th quantile. Source: own calculation.
Figure C.2: Robustness II: total expenditures – mean (left) and median
(right), 2000–2005
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Note: all expenditures for household heads between 25–56 years, probability of working for public sector
(Πj, t > 0.70), trimmed data (positive value only) to eliminate outliers defined as those observation/year
below the 1st and above 99th quantile. Source: own calculation.
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Figure C.3: Robustness I: total expenditures excl. health and education –
mean (left) and median (right), 2000–2005
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Note: all expenditures for household heads between 20–56 years without health and education related
expenditures, probability of working for public sector (Πj, t > 0.70), trimmed data (positive value only) to
eliminate outliers defined as those observation/year below the 1st and above 99th quantile. Source: own
calculation.
Figure C.4: Robustness II: total expenditures excl. health and education –
mean (left) and median (right), 2000–2005
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Note: all expenditures for household heads between 25–56 years without health and education related
expenditures, probability of working for public sector (Πj, t > 0.70), trimmed data (positive value only) to
eliminate outliers defined as those observation/year below the 1st and above 99th quantile. Source: own
calculation.
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Chapter 5
Conclusions and Suggestions for
Future Research
There has been revived interest in fiscal policy topics following the worst economic
and financial crisis since the Great Depression in the 1930s, the Great Recession,
and the following sovereign debt crisis in Euro area countries. Despite continuing
growth in theoretical and empirical work in this area, there are still many important
questions that have not been explored (see for example Alessina and Givazzi, 2013
for a list). In particular, given that the recent years of economic and financial
turmoil have had some effects on the coordination of policy-makers’ behaviour and
their tools. This thesis aims to fill some of the existing gaps.
Chapter 1’s focus was on debt sustainability of countries in the Euro area.
Our results show that the monetary union as a whole passed the macro-based sus-
tainability test, that is, there was no indication of substantial problems in the group
of countries. Yet, in spite of a battery of checks carried out showing robustness of
our results, the problem can be in the detail, not explicitly captured or even con-
cealed in a panel estimation. For example in the context of EA countries, some of
them dealing with debt legacies and facing country-specific fiscal challenges. This
was the impetus for my exploration of individual Euro area countries’ fiscal re-
sponses in Chapter 2, firstly, looking at fiscal behaviour at a country-specific level,
and subsequently, at the issue of harmonization of national fiscal policies.
My exploration of debt burden and its repercussions (fiscal fatigue or debt
legacy) in Chapter 1 also lead to an important proposal. My co-author and I sug-
gested a simple rule for assessing the risk of fiscal fatigue by quickly investigating the
debt legacy in a country without running complicated (micro-based) country-specific
models. This rule offers a tool that can be used for assessing potential macro-fiscal
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vulnerabilities in the context of fiscal risk analysis or debt sustainability analysis
(DSA). DSA has recently become an integral part of the country assessments car-
ried out by international organisations. In this context, one possible extension of
the work could be to assess the robustness of the approach, not only across different
EA/EU countries, but also across various blocks of countries. Since results of our
rule seem to be rather ‘slowly moving animals’, one could also try to improve its
prediction power in order to make it an early warning-indicator. There is also scope
for further exploration of debt legacy, by its endogenization or by adding explicit
links to the literature on fiscal limits (see Davig et al., 2011).
My analysis of fiscal behaviour in Chapter 2 revealed that institutions can
sometimes place binding (efficient) limits on fiscal policy, particularly when the
value at stake is rather high. Moreover, I analysed the process of harmonization
of fiscal behaviour as a direct consequence of institutional changes. While extant
evidence regarding this process has only been anecdotal to date, my results present
new empirical evidence. An extension could further explore the harmonization pro-
cess by using alternative approaches to enhance the robustness of my findings. In
addition, this chapter looked mostly at the issue of fiscal policy and did not explore
macroeconomic fundamentals. Accordingly, one natural extension that I will seek
in the future, is to assess the contribution of key determinants of fiscal responses. In
addition, country-specific rules do not allow for various channels of spillover effects
from other. Although it would require a different methodology, another extension
can look into this particular aspect of fiscal behaviour in a monetary union.
Moreover, there is still much to be said about the theoretical and policy-
making implications of my findings. It is also a well-documented fact (at least
theoretically) that fiscal rules cannot be viewed as the panacea since they can some-
times be suboptimal, as alluded to in Kydland and Prescott (1977). Rules are aimed
to help countries carry out sustainable fiscal policy while preserving macroeconomic
stability.1 However, any process of harmonization can also pose a more or less
well-hidden threat in itself. In the case of fiscal harmonization in the Euro area,
symmetrical ‘fiscal tightening’ as a result of spillover effects and no ‘buffer zones’
(strong and unshakeable economies), may present a risk to economic growth.2 In
particular, this risk can easily materialize given the very low level of ‘federal bud-
get’ flows in the EU (flows from and to the European budget), as compared to the
1 For instance, Fata´s and Mihov (2010) highlight that the reason can be national governments
natural diversity of opinions and fiscal priorities, which can create tensions among stabilisation
policies inside a monetary union.
2 Holland and Portes (2012) provide some evidence from a simulation in a stylised model for the
UK and US economy.
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US economy.3 Despite its potential importance, this fact has not been adequately
explored, especially in the zero-lower-bound environment that is echoed in Portes
and Wren-Lewis (2015).4
Further extensions of my work, could be in the way fiscal rules interact with
their monetary counterpart (an ECB’s response function), to explore their changes
and possible interactions over years of monetary integration and mainly over the
Euro period. In a similar vein to an exercise done for monetary policy rules, another
extension could capture any effects coming from the volatility of policy-makers’ fis-
cal responses. Regarding estimation techniques, it could be possible to use Bayesian
TVP estimation to allow for changes in volatility over time. Provided the sample
period is extended, one could explore fiscal regimes with more or less discretionary
measures. It would also be possible to employ the Bayesian TVP VAR technique
to provide another robustness check to my country-specific estimation, and/or to
address some further issues associated with the harmonization of such spillover ef-
fects across EA states, as already outlined above. Lastly, a Factor Augmented VAR
Bayesian estimation could be done to shed some light on the selection of the main
variables driving fiscal policy outcomes.
Regarding the last chapter, I partially explored the effects of a quasi-natural
experiment. I proposed one possible explanation for the ‘non-arrival’ of results
after such a massive change in individual incomes (their permanent part). As a
further test of robustness of my results, it could be possible to use administrative
data to expand the small sample of private companies in my dataset. That would
mean obtaining more or less the same information about private workers, as was
collected for public employees (and of course, further complementing the public
sector information). As a result, the probabilistic part of my exercise could be
substantially improved to allow for a more detailed ‘matching’ of public sector and
private sector workers with the household consumption dataset. Such an improved
piece of information on the income side would help identify household heads in the
consumption survey that are now lost because of missing observations.
The share of public workers in the economy is substantial, but workers that
did not directly benefit from the unanticipated change of wages were, naturally, not
included in the treated group. My estimation is done for individual households whose
3 For a very recent estimate and comparison with the US federal budget see D’Apice (2015).
4 This recent study recommends larger interconnectedness of the Pact’s rules with aggregate
demand (members’ cyclical situation). In addition, for cases when the probability of the ZLB is
larger than 50% (forecasted by the central bank), they propose the fiscal rules to be temporarily
disabled. However, such a change of the ‘rules of the game’ would necessitate another mechanism
that would clearly set up ways of dealing with the consequences of the freeze and supposedly large
increase in public indebtedness.
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heads are identified as working/not working for the public sector. Since the HHBS
contains information on all household members, effects across types of households
can be investigated (none, one or more adults working for the public sector in a
household). The estimated model can also be extended to explicitly control for the
presence of the housing loan bubble (there is some information in the HHBS available
since 2002). Nevertheless, the identification of the treated and control households is
potentially the Achilles heel of this exercise. Given the intervention, it allows me to
compare household heads that are directly exposed to the government intervention,
with those that are not, using a probabilistic approach and assuming that a variation
in consumption responses is driven by a realization of the income shock. However,
the validity of my results could be strengthened if there was a piece of information
that, would allow for the direct identification of public/private sources of the labour
income for individuals or at least households, or in a perfect case, would facilitate
the integration of both the employment surveys with the HHBS.
Another avenue for future study is the exploration of further effects (and
medium-run/long-run consequences) of the unanticipated change in public sector
salaries. I am currently exploring qualitative aspects of this change on for public
sector workers and/or on selected groups of workers, looking specifically at their
motivation to change occupations as a result of the income shock.
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